SHARON IAPPELLI v. BOARD OF REVIEW

(NOTE: The status of this decision is .)
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3558-07T33558-07T3

SHARON IAPPELLI,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, and PRIME

FABRICATORS, INC., C. CARUSO

LANDSCAPING, FREEHOLD NISSAN,

LLC, and SUN BANCORP,

Respondents.

____________________________________________________________

 

Submitted January 26, 2009 - Decided

Before Judges R. B. Coleman and Sabatino.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 168,487.

Sharon Iappelli, appellant pro se.

Anne Milgram, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alan C. Stephens, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Claimant Sharon Iappelli appeals from the Final Decision of the Board of Review affirming the Appeal Tribunal, which required Iappelli to refund $1,976 in overpaid unemployment compensation benefits. We affirm the Board's decision.

Between 2005 and 2006 claimant worked for three different employers: Caruso Landscaping, Freehold Nissan, and Sun National Bank. Following her discharge from Caruso Landscaping, claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits on June 25, 2006. Iappelli collected benefits in the amount of $284 a week from July 1, 2006 through December 23, 2006. This amount was based upon her past combined wages from Caruso, Freehold Nissan, Sun National, and an unreported employer, Prime Fabricators. When the Division of Unemployment Insurance of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (the Division) notified her previous employers that they would be assessed for the claimant's unemployment benefits, Prime Fabricators protested, claiming Iappelli had never been an employee at their facility. Moreover, Iappelli had never represented to the Division that she had been employed by Prime Fabricators.

Following an investigation, the Division determined that Iappelli had been credited mistakenly for wages from Prime Fabricators, and she was consequently overpaid a weekly benefit of seventy-six dollars in excess of her entitled benefit. The Director issued a demand for Iappelli to refund the overpayment which had accrued in the amount of $1,976. Iappelli appealed the Director's demand to the Appeal Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal held a hearing on December 11, 2007, and ultimately affirmed the Director's determination that Iappelli was liable to refund the overpaid portion of her unemployment benefits. Iappelli appealed the decision to the Board of Review. On January 30, 2008, the Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision. This appeal followed.

Our scope of review of administrative agency decisions is quite limited. If the Board's factual determinations are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, we must accept them. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency, even if we would have reached a different result. Ibid. In addition, we will not disturb the agency's decision unless we conclude that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Ibid. Thus, our scope of review of an agency decision is restricted to the following four inquiries:

(1) Whether the agency's decision offends the State or Federal Constitution;

 
(2) Whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies;

(3) Whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its actions; and

 
(4) Whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Id. at 210-11.]

Iappelli contends that she is without fault for the inadvertent benefit calculation, which included Prime Fabricators. She asserts that she should not be liable for an overpayment that she was not aware of nor responsible for bringing about.

"N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d) requires the full repayment of unemployment benefits received by an individual who, for any reason, regardless of good faith, was not actually entitled to those benefits." Bannan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Fischer v. Bd. of Review, 123 N.J. Super. 263, 266 (App. Div. 1973) (holding claimant was required to refund erroneously paid unemployment benefits even though she applied for them in good faith)). The Division is expressly authorized by statute to recover benefits erroneously paid at any time within four years after the benefits in question were paid. N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d).

Further, N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2 sets forth three limited circumstances under which a waiver of recovery may be granted: (1) "[w]here the claimant is deceased"; (2) "[w]here the claimant is disabled and no longer able to work"; or, (3) "[w]here the recovery of the overpayment, as determined by the Director with the Controller's concurrence, would be patently contrary to the principles of equity." The Administrative Code further clarifies:

(d) For purposes of determining under (a)3 above whether the recovery of the overpayment would be "patently contrary to the principles of equity," the Director and Controller shall consider whether the terms of a reasonable repayment schedule would result in economic hardship to the claimant.

[N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2.]

However, it is the exception and not the rule that repayment of unemployment benefits to which a recipient was not entitled will be waived.

Recovery of erroneously distributed benefits furthers the purpose of our unemployment compensation laws. Bannan, supra, 299 N.J. Super. at 674. Moreover, the public interest would be imperiled were the Unemployment Trust Fund to be depleted by the failure to recover benefits erroneously paid to unentitled recipients, however blameless they may be. Ibid.

We recognize there may be some hardship created for beneficiaries when repayment of erroneously distributed benefits is required. As we noted in Bannan, "virtually every recipient of unemployment benefits who by definition lacks adequate sources of income and relies upon the initial representation that benefits will be paid, uses the payments to meet expenses and faces difficulty repaying sums that are subsequently determined to have been erroneously disbursed." Id. at 676. Where the interests of such individuals and those of society in general are at odds, we are loathe to apply principles of estoppel against governmental agencies. Id. at 675. That the individual must suffer hardship is a most unfortunate consequence, albeit a necessity in order to preserve the broader public interest in the unemployment compensation system. Ibid.

We acknowledge that the record tends to show that claimant acted in good faith in applying for unemployment benefits and, indeed, there appears to have been no fault on her part leading to the overpayments. Nonetheless, claimant has not demonstrated that a repayment schedule of the excess benefits she received would result in economic hardship to her.

The findings of the administrative agency are not disputed and such findings are binding upon this court. Simply stated, the claimant received an overpayment of benefits, which she is obligated to repay.

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

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A-3558-07T3

June 3, 2009