STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. PETAR PETROVIC

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3119-05T13119-05T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

PETAR PETROVIC,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________________

 

Submitted December 6, 2006 - Decided January 9, 2007

Before Judges Lefelt and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 05-034.

Petar Petrovic, appellant pro se.

Michael M. Rubbinaccio, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Bradford Seabury, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Petar Petrovic appeals his conviction for maintenance of lamps, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, and driving while on the revoked list, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. We affirm.

While on routine patrol at 12:27 a.m. on March 27, 2005, Officer Kenneth Hunt of the Pequannock Township Police Department observed a white van traveling northbound on Route 23 with a broken right tail-light. The vehicle, operated by defendant, was pulled over, at which time the officer requested defendant's credentials. Defendant produced an insurance card and a valid New York driver's license. However, a check of his New Jersey driving status revealed that defendant's driving privileges were suspended. Defendant was issued two summonses: maintenance of lamps, contrary to N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, and driving while on the revoked list, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40.

Defendant pled not guilty to the charges. Trial commenced in Municipal Court on July 25, 2005, with defendant waiving his right to counsel and insisting that the matter proceed. Prior to the commencement of the defense case, the judge decided to adjourn the matter to permit defendant an opportunity to secure counsel and to make inquiry to the Motor Vehicle Commission concerning an alleged administrative error that defendant believed was relevant to the charges.

Defendant retained counsel, who appeared before the court on August 22, 2005 and requested an adjournment of the trial, which the court granted. The court placed all parties on notice that there would be no further adjournments. The trial resumed on September 19, 2005. At the conclusion of the trial, defendant was convicted of both offenses. The court imposed fines and penalties, as well as a 180-day driver's license suspension and a twenty-day jail sentence.

Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division where a de novo review of the record was conducted. The judge found the record revealed that defendant's privileges to operate a motor vehicle in New Jersey were suspended on numerous occasions between 1996 and 2004. As to the 2004 suspension, the court found there was proper mailing of the Notice of Suspension and Order of Suspension advising defendant that he was suspended indefinitely, effective June 20, 2004, and that his privileges would not be restored unless defendant received written notice. The court agreed the record supported defendant's claim that he had satisfied all of his outstanding financial obligations to the Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC), formerly the Division of Motor Vehicles, but that fact did not establish defendant's entitlement to operate a motor vehicle in New Jersey. Rather, the court found that "defendant received a clear unambiguous notice from the [MVC] that upon expiration of the suspension period, [defendant] may apply for restoration[,]" which defendant did not do. The court concluded that it had "no choice but to find [defendant] guilty . . . ." Defendant was re-sentenced in accordance with the sentence imposed by the Municipal Court, except with respect to the custodial sentence. The court reduced the custodial sentence from twenty days to ten days because the underlying offense which triggered the initial stop, the broken tail-light, is not an offense for which an enhanced sentence could be imposed. N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff's brief does not conform to Rule 2:6-2. It appears, however, that plaintiff's arguments on appeal are that he did not have a trial or did not have a fair trial and that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

After carefully reviewing the record in light of the written arguments advanced by the parties, we conclude that the issues presented by defendant are without sufficient merit to warrant extensive discussion in this opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the Law Division judge in his oral opinion delivered on January 20, 2006. The findings and conclusions of the judge are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). We add the following.

Defendant does not dispute that he was notified that his privileges to operate a motor vehicle in New Jersey were suspended, nor does he dispute that he has never been notified that his driving privileges have been restored. Instead, he contends, as he did below, that the driving abstract is not valid and represents a fabrication from the MVC.

In our review of the Law Division decision, our task is to determine whether there is sufficient credible evidence to uphold the Law Division decision. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). Proof of a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) defendant operated his motor vehicle in New Jersey and (2) at the time of the operation, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in New Jersey was revoked. It is evident from the record that defendant's contentions on appeal challenge the administrative record of his driving status in New Jersey. To resolve his claims, he must first pursue his administrative remedies. State v. Ferrier, 294 N.J. Super. 198, 200 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 148 N.J. 461 (1997). Defendant has not availed himself of those remedies, despite evidence in the record that he was given an adjournment of the trial before the Municipal Court to attempt to address his concerns. He may not, in defense of the motor vehicle charge, separately attack the administrative suspension when he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the MVC. Ibid.

Affirmed.

 

We note that in the Notice of Appeal, pro se appellant spells his first name as "Petar." In the pro se appellant's brief and reply letter, it is "Peter." The Complaint/Summons, Municipal Court Conviction, Judgment on Appeal, Motor Vehicle Commission Certified Abstract of Driver History Record, State of New Jersey Automobile Insurance Surcharge and Collection Notice of Proposed Suspension, Motor Vehicle Commission Order of Suspension, and transcripts all reflect "Petar."

(continued)

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6

A-3119-05T1

January 9, 2007

 


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