CATHERINE KUHN, n/k/a CATHERINE FINNEGAN v. THOMAS KUHN

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-6279-04T56279-04T5

CATHERINE KUHN,

n/k/a CATHERINE FINNEGAN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

THOMAS KUHN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________________

 

Submitted December 21, 2005 - Decided January 17, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Graves.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,

FM-12-0753-96.

Thomas Kuhn, appellant pro se.

Respondent did not file a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Thomas Kuhn appeals from two post-judgment Family Part orders dated May 27, 2005. Plaintiff has not participated in this appeal. Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration.

1. Failure to follow Judge Rea's earlier Court Order for full accounting as to the amount of arrears from the Probation and accounting of the receivership of the $16,000.00 (Defendant's share of marital home) the Plaintiff failed to be held accountable for its location. There was a failure by the Court to accept documentation from Middlesex County Probation Dept. from 1996, as to having no knowledge of receiving the $16,000.00 in the Plaintiff's account. This was dismissed as hearsay evidence. The Court put the Defendant in jail for Contempt of Court for lack of payments, while Plaintiff embezzled $16,000.00 and is not held responsible or penalized.

2. Court Ordered full accounting and imputed income required of the Defendant but same was not required of the Plaintiff. Actions discriminatory. Plaintiff must show full discovery.

3. Statements in the hearing of May 27, 2005 by Mr. White are proven to be inaccurate as they refer to Defendant['s] status in bankruptcy and description of property.

4. The issue of the importance of the final restraining order entered by the Plaintiff falsely was not addressed or considered by the Court. This holds the Defendant back from gaining employment. Final restraining order must be removed and expunged from record.

5. Failure of Court to follow higher courts decisions as to modification of alimony. Not ordering full discovery of Plaintiff's income and net worth. Failure to recognize the Defendant's decline in income and net worth. Spousal support must be fully reversed.

6. Failure of the Court to acknowledge or order accounting of current value of marital home increase of Plaintiff's net worth. Full discovery of Plaintiff's actual net worth must be ordered.

After carefully considering each of these contentions, in light of the record and the applicable law, we are satisfied that defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Except as set forth below, we affirm.

At the outset of the proceedings on May 27, 2005, the trial court noted: that defendant sought "to reduce or terminate alimony based upon an alleged change of circumstances," and it also noted that "[t]he same application has been litigated numerous times since the divorce was entered. Counsel for plaintiff points out that this is the tenth go round on this particular application."

During oral argument before the trial court, and in his brief submitted in support of this appeal, defendant frequently refers to various orders other than the two orders entered on May 27, 2005. We have not been furnished with copies of those orders, however, and any disputes regarding matters that were not addressed in the May 27, 2005, orders are not before us.

During oral argument on May 27, 2005, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Okay. Here's the first item of law that you need to know about, which I'm sure came to your attention throughout your prior applications. Temporary loss of employment does not trigger a change in circumstances.

MR. KUHN: It may be temporary from where you're sitting and having a job, it's not temporary when I'm unemployed --

THE COURT: So say you.

MR. KUHN: -- and now they're sending me to training . . . they're not saying that you're not skilled and worked in the field for 30 years. Both the Federal and the State address it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KUHN: You do have skills but they're not wanted [in] today's work force.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KUHN: So, it's not a temporary.

THE COURT: All right. You've been out of work for a short period of time?

MR. KUHN: Correct.

THE COURT: All right, that's temporary. Let's see where you go as far as getting a job.

There was also a discussion regarding the status of defendant's support arrears. According to defendant, he is entitled to receive a $16,000 credit towards his outstanding arrears. When the trial court asked plaintiff's attorney whether defendant should receive such a credit, plaintiff's attorney acknowledged that he was not sure whether the Probation Department's records were accurate, and he suggested that the probation officer in charge of defendant's account should explain whether defendant was entitled to the credit he was seeking.

The trial court stated that "according to probation . . . [you owe] $26,000 in arrears. So . . . let's wait until the issue is ripe . . . when you get close to the $16,000 figure, then we'll bring in a probation officer to tell us whether or not you still owe $16,000 or whether or not you're entitled to a credit."

While we appreciate the trial court's attempt to arrive at a practical solution, in our view, the arrears dispute should be resolved sooner rather than later. Both parties are entitled to a fair resolution of this issue, and a prompt resolution will ensure that defendant is not unfairly subjected to adverse consequences from unnecessary enforcement proceedings.

We affirm the orders under review substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court on May 27, 2005, except for the denial of defendant's application to receive a $16,000 credit toward his arrears. That matter is remanded to the trial court.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

We note that this is the third time defendant has appealed in this matter. In his last appeal, we affirmed the trial court's denial of his application to modify alimony, Finnegan v. Kuhn, No. A-0013-04T1 (App. Div. September 7, 2005) (slip op. at 8), and defendant was also unsuccessful in appealing a prior order that denied his application to terminate alimony. Finnegan v. Kuhn, No. A-0031-02T1 (App. Div. June 11, 2003) (slip op. at 7).

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A-6279-04T5

January 17, 2006