PATRICIA A. WILSON v. BOARD OF REVIEW et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5546-04T25546-04T2

PATRICIA A. WILSON,

Claimant-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW and

GLOUCESTER COUNTY COLLEGE,

Respondents-Respondents.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted May 24, 2006 - Decided July 26, 2006

Before Judges Stern and Parker.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the

Board of Review, Department of Labor, 48,975.

Patricia A. Wilson, appellant pro se.

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General of New

Jersey, attorney for respondent Board of

Review (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney

General, of counsel; Jennifer B. Pitre,

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Claimant Patricia A. Wilson appeals from a decision rendered on January 13, 2005 by the Board of Review (Board) affirming the determination of the Appeal Tribunal that claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits. We affirm.

Claimant was employed as an instructor at Gloucester County College until August 28, 2004, when she resigned allegedly because of "the stress associated with teaching the hard-to-serve. There was a lot of stress working with that group, and it caused my blood pressure to spiral. I was not a healthy or happy camper." Claimant further testified that high blood pressure "runs in [her] family." She acknowledged, however, that her doctor did not suggest that she leave her job because of the high blood pressure. After hearing the testimony, the Appeal Tribunal determined that claimant was precluded from receiving benefits because she left her job voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).

In this appeal, claimant argues:

POINT ONE

CLAIMANT'S LEAVING HER JOB WITH EMPLOYER TO BE RELIEVED OF THE STRESS INDUCED ELEVATED BLOOD PRESSURE BECAUSE OF FACTORS RELATED TO THE WORK CONSTITUTES GOOD CAUSE ATTRIBUTABLE TO WORK AND, THEREFORE, SHE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED FOR BENEFITS.

Claimant contends that (1) she was not given a full and impartial hearing; (2) her "chosen field of endeavor is instructor at the college level . . . . Teaching 50 to 60 or more adults daily with compounded behavioral issues is not what she bargained for at $20 an hour with no benefits. Also, her special education training was for children in grades k-12, not adults who need psychiatric help;" (3) "[e]nduring poor working conditions without a personal physician, medical plan or emotional and financial support created stress;" (4) "[t]he medical documentation seems to have been dismissed, or not read;" (5) "[c]laimant has maintained normal blood pressure and visual acuity without any medication since she left the college;" (6) she "quit because of the stress caused by poor working conditions[, which] constitutes good cause and is attributable to the work;" (7) her "complaints regarding clients fell upon death [sic] ears;" (8) "[s]he's been forced to accept immaturity, disrespect and verbal assaults by girls younger than her daughter, as well as older women . . . . [N]ot to react is a great cause of stress;" and (9) claimant met her "burden of showing good and sufficient cause for . . . voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5."

A telephone hearing was conducted before the Appeal Tribunal on November 4, 2004. Claimant was the only witness and testified under oath. Although claimant argues that "medical documentation seems to have been dismissed, or not read," the only "medical document" contained in the record is a letter dated November 8, 2004, from James J. Malecka, D.O., stating in its entirety:

This letter is to verify that you were seen in my office on May 20, 2004. At that time you related that you had run out of your blood pressure medication (Dyazide) and had been having some visual problems. Your blood pressure was 170/100. You were given a prescription for Dyazide and an eye examination was recommended. You were seen again on June 19, 2004. At that time your blood pressure was 134/86. Blood work was also obtained at that time. Your cholesterol was found to be 298. Lipitor 10mg/day was prescribed. You have not been seen in this office since June 19, 2004.

If further information is required please do not hesitate to contact this office.

Very truly yours,

[signed] James J. Malecka, D.O.

Although Dr. Malecka's letter indicates claimant's condition on May 20, 2004, it does not indicate that her condition was such that she should leave her job, nor does it indicate that her job caused her condition. While claimant may have been unhappy in her position, nothing in the record before us indicates that she left her job with good cause attributable to the work, as required by N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) to qualify for unemployment benefits. An employee who leaves work voluntarily has the burden of proving that she did so for good cause attributable to the work. Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997); Morgan v. Bd. of Rev., 77 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 1962).

Our scope of review of administrative decisions is narrowly circumscribed. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). Our role is to determine "'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record' considering 'the proofs as a whole,' with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility." Ibid. (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). We may not engage in an independent assessment of the evidence, In re Taylor, supra, 158 N.J. at 656, and we must accord a strong presumption of reasonableness to the decision of an administrative agency. Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 525 (1982). We give great deference to an agency's decisions, State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 159 (1964), but we do not act simply as a rubber stamp. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). An administrative decision will be reversed only when it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Ibid.

Applying these principles to the record before us, we are satisfied that the Board's decision was neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable. Claimant failed to carry her burden to prove that she left work for good cause attributable to the work.

 
Affirmed.

The doctor's letter is dated after the hearing but the record indicates that the Appeal Tribunal invited claimant to submit "medical documentation" after the hearing.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-5546-04T2

July 26, 2006