STEVEN GOODE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5482-04T35482-04T3

STEVEN GOODE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent-Respondent.

 

Submitted January 24, 2006 - Decided March 3, 2006

Before Judges Hoens and R. B. Coleman.

On appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the Department of Corrections.

Steven Goode, appellant pro se.

Nancy Kaplen, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Walter C. Kowalski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant, Steven Goode, an inmate at East Jersey State Prison, appeals from the final administrative agency decision of respondent, Department of Corrections (DOC). DOC affirmed a hearing officer's adjudication finding Goode guilty of committing a prohibited act, *.004, fighting with another person, and affirmed the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon him. See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)*.004. We affirm.

The disciplinary charge was based on the reports of three corrections officers about an incident on May 11, 2005. SCO Mills reported that at 10:20 a.m., he saw Goode and another inmate, Theoharides, "throwing punches at each other." SCO Mills activated the riot bell, summoning a team of other corrections officers. SCO Edwards reported that he, too, saw Goode and Theoharides "exchanging blows with each other." According to his report of the incident, SCO Edwards intervened, "grabbed inmate Goode, [and] took him down" while another officer, SCO Bates, grabbed Theoharides. SCO Bates reported that he heard SCO Edwards yell for someone to sound the riot bell. When SCO Bates turned around, he saw that Goode and Theoharides "were fighting." He confirmed that SCO Edwards "grabbed Goode" and that he subdued Theoharides.

Other corrections officers who responded to the riot bell confiscated a shirt from Theoharides that had blood on it and a tube sock that was wrapped around a padlock and that also had blood on it. Sgt. Mitchell conducted a preliminary investigation into the incident. He reported that "Goode was bleeding profusely from his head" apparently as a result of having been hit with the lock in the sock. Goode was taken to the medical unit where his head wound was sutured. While he was at the medical unit, Goode told Officer Cunningham that he had been distributing the laundry when he and the other inmate "had a verbal argument and I/M Theoharides did strike him with what he believed to be a lock in the sock and then a fight ensued."

Based on these observations, Goode was charged with two prohibited acts, *.004, fighting with another person, and *.306, conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the correctional facility. During the investigation into the incident, Goode stated "[w]e had an argument about the laundry. He [the other inmate] told me to come into the closet, I said we can do this right here. He hit me with something."

At the hearing on the charge, Goode stated that he relied on "the case of Stephen v. Beyer," that he was "acting in self defense," that he "was attacked" and that the other inmate was "the aggressor." Counsel substitute argued that because Goode was hit with the lock in the sock he "had the right to defend himself."

Goode also requested that four inmates be questioned. Each of them produced a written statement. Inmate Dean stated that he saw the two men talking, looked down, and then saw them fighting. He was unable to state how the fight started. Inmate Goodwin stated that he was in his cell reading and did not see the incident. Inmate Walker provided a written statement that he saw Theoharides swinging the lock and sock at Goode. Inmate Ryan wrote that he saw a "verbal conversation, which led to [Theoharides] throwing a sock with a lock, striking Goode in the front of the head and in the back of the head. [And that he saw] Goode begin to punch [Theoharides] several times after and during the time of this sock with a lock being swung at him."

After considering all of this evidence, the hearing officer found Goode guilty of prohibited act *.004 based on the following reasoning:

SCO mills reports he observed Goode and Theoharides exchanging punches. Goode pleads guilty, stating he was assaulted and defended himself. Theoharides does admit hitting Goode with a weapon. However, Goode's response was not simple self-defense. First of all, Goode states he told Theoharides, we can do this right here, meaning he wanted to fight. Second, when the officer observed the inmates exchanging punches, Theoharides had no weapon on him. At that point it became a fight. Goode did not have to involve himself, he could have walked away. Staff observations and Goode's statement indicate to me this was a fight. Charge upheld.

The hearing officer recommended that sanctions of fifteen days of detention, ninety days loss of commutation time and ninety days of administrative segregation be imposed. He explained that the sanctions were necessary to deter fighting, that Goode had "involve[d] himself in a physical altercation [when he] could have walked away from it." On May 27, 2005, Assistant Superintendent Broadus-Smith upheld the decision of the hearing officer.

On appeal, Goode raises the following arguments for our consideration.

POINT I

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE TO A PRISON REGULATORY PROHIBITION AGAINST FIGHTING IN PRISON RESULTS IN A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

POINT II

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHERE THE HEARING OFFICER FAILED TO PROPERLY ASSESS THE DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE.

We have reviewed these arguments in light of the record and the applicable legal principles and find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a formal written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We therefore affirm and add only the following observations.

In reviewing DOC decisions respecting discipline of inmates, we apply the standard of review applicable to final agency decisions in general. As a result, our review is limited to a determination of whether the factual findings of the agency are based on substantial credible evidence in the record. Where there are no factual disputes which required findings by the agency, we need only consider whether the actions of DOC were arbitrary or capricious. See Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); Burris v. Police Dep't, Township of West Orange, 338 N.J. Super. 493, 496 (App. Div. 2001). The burden of demonstrating that the action of DOC was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the individual who is challenging that action. See McGowan v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); Barone v. Dep't of Human Services, 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 355 (1987).

First, we reject Goode's due process argument. Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution and inmates are not entitled to the full spectrum of rights that are due a criminal defendant. Rather, prisoners are entitled to certain limited protections prior to the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525-33 (1975). Here, Goode was in fact afforded all of the due process rights to which he was entitled.

In particular, we find no support for Goode's self-defense argument. Goode recognizes that there is no provision in DOC regulations permitting self-defense in the prison disciplinary context. Nevertheless, Goode asserts that the failure of DOC to promulgate regulations recognizing self-defense in disciplinary proceedings violates his constitutional rights.

Although it might be constitutionally permissible for DOC to eliminate this defense in prison disciplinary proceedings entirely, we need not address Goode's constitutional claim here. See Donadio v. Cunningham, 58 N.J. 309, 325-26 (1971)("[A] court should not reach and determine a constitutional issue unless absolutely imperative in the disposition of the litigation."); State v. Salerno, 27 N.J. 289, 296 (1958)(a constitutional challenge to a criminal statute should be avoided when other grounds are present to support review); Shire Inn, Inc. v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 321 N.J. Super. 462, 469-70 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 132 (1999).

A hearing officer in a prison disciplinary proceeding is not prohibited from considering, in an appropriate case, whether an inmate charged with an offense, such as fighting, was only acting in self-defense. Indeed, the record before us on appeal amply demonstrates that the hearing officer considered Goode's self-defense argument but rejected it. Our review compels us to reach the same conclusion.

 
The facts in the record demonstrate that the two inmates engaged in a mutual verbal dispute, that Goode told the other inmate that they did not need to go to the closet but could "do it right here," that the other inmate hit Goode as part of the fight that ensued, that the fight between the two continued as the riot bell sounded and that the fight did not end until officers arrived and pulled Goode and the other inmate apart. Those facts, which are largely undisputed in the record, demonstrate that Goode engaged in behavior inconsistent with self-defense. See State v. Bowens, 108 N.J. 622, 628 (1987); State v. Rivers, 252 N.J. Super. 142, 150-51 (App. Div. 1991). On the contrary, those facts provide substantial credible evidence for the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, and of DOC, that Goode engaged in conduct constituting the prohibited act of fighting for which imposition of disciplinary sanctions was appropriate.

Affirmed.

During the hearing, Goode entered a guilty plea to the *.306 charge, conceding that he was guilty of causing the officers to respond to the riot bell. Although the sanctions imposed for this offense were combined with the sanctions for the *.004 charge, we will consider on appeal only the significance of the fighting charge for purposes of that disciplinary sanction.

(continued)

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A-5482-04T3

March 3, 2006