IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE BUTLER, POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOWNSHIP OF SCOTCH PLAINS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5094-04T25094-04T2

IN THE MATTER OF SUZANNE BUTLER,

POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOWNSHIP OF

SCOTCH PLAINS

________________________________

 

Submitted: May 31, 2006 - Decided June 16, 2006

Before Judges Kestin and Seltzer.

On appeal from the Merit System Board, CSV-9890-03.

Picillo Caruso O'Toole, attorneys for appellant Suzanne Butler (Patrick P. Toscano, Jr., of counsel and on the brief).

Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, attorneys for respondent Township of Scotch Plains (James L. Plosia, Jr., of counsel and, Arthur R. Thibault, Jr., on the brief. Douglas W. Hansen, Attorney for Township of Scotch Plains, joins in the brief).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney for the Merit System Board (Todd A. Wigder, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

Suzanne Butler, a police officer in Scotch Plains, appeals from a decision of the Merit System Board upholding the disciplinary action of the appointing authority imposing a ninety-day suspension from duty without pay, along with two additional conditions: that Butler successfully complete anger management training and counseling, and that she pass a fitness-for-duty psychiatric examination. In reaching its final decision, the Board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions contained in the initial decision rendered by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Strauss.

On appeal, Butler contends that the appointing authority failed to comply with the forty-five-day time limit for filing charges, established in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-147 and in the Attorney General's Guidelines (Guidelines) governing such matters, and that the Guidelines were not followed when the appointing authority failed to interview her. Butler argues also that the Board's decision is against the weight of the evidence, that the findings of fact upon which it is grounded are unreasonable, and that those findings were based on matter that should not have been considered. Finally, Butler asserts that the ninety-day suspension was arbitrary, capricious and excessive, and should be modified. We reject all the arguments advanced and affirm.

The disciplinary charges arose from an off-duty confrontation between Butler and a citizen on the roadway outside Butler's home. Butler was charged with misconduct, conduct unbecoming a public employee, discriminatory conduct, and other sufficient cause in reacting excessively to the circumstances in both conduct and words, and misusing her authority as a police officer.

No good purpose will be served by reiterating the details of the facts and circumstances recounted by the witnesses, including Butler herself, at both the departmental hearing and the contested case proceeding before the ALJ. The record reflects those facts and circumstances. Based on considerable evidence developed in the contested case hearing, the ALJ found that Butler had, indeed, engaged in the conduct charged. Those findings, grounded in part on credibility determinations, are amply supported by the evidence and are therefore binding on appellate review. See In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 655-61 (l999); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980).

Based upon those findings, the ALJ and the Board concluded that the charges of conduct unbecoming a public employee and other sufficient cause had been proven, but that the charge of discriminatory conduct had not been established. They determined that Butler had acted in a discourteous manner, excessively under color of her authority, without the "personal integrity expected of a police officer, which is necessary to engender the respect of the public[,]" and that she had humiliated the citizen with whom the confrontation occurred. Those findings and conclusions, borne out by the record, involved administrative agency judgments that were in no way arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Therefore, they call for our deference. See Taylor, supra, 158 N.J. at 657.

Butler's contentions regarding the forty-five-day rule and the applicability of the Guidelines were not raised below, either on the departmental level or in the contested case. Therefore, in the absence of plain error, see R. 2:10-2, argument on those grounds will not be entertained. See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973). In the circumstances, we discern no departure from principles of substantial justice in the omission to comport with some details of the Guidelines, and the record does not support the contention that the forty-five-day rule was violated.

No other issue raised on appeal has sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D),(E). The disciplinary sanction imposed was well suited to the infractions found.

Affirmed.

 

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A-5094-04T2

June 16, 2006