STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. STANLEY GRIFFIN

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4934-04T14934-04T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STANLEY GRIFFIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

 

Submitted January 30, 2006 - Decided March 6, 2006

Before Judges Holston, Jr., and Gilroy.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 83-02-00746.

Stanley Griffin, respondent pro se.

Nancy Kaplen, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (H. John Witman, III, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Stanley Griffin, appeals from an order of the Law Division entered on February 4, 2005, denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

In 1983, an Essex County Grand Jury charged defendant under Indictment No. 83-02-00746 with first-degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2) (Count One); felony murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) (Count Two); conspiracy to commit robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count Three); and first-degree robbery, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (Count Four). On September 6, 1983, defendant pled guilty to the charge of felony murder before Judge Newman. On April 13, 1984, defendant was sentenced to life in prison with a thirty-year parole ineligibility term, and the three remaining charges of the indictment were dismissed. Defendant filed a direct appeal claiming only that his sentence was excessive. After argument on a sentencing calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11, this court affirmed the judgment of conviction on November 5, 1995, concluding "that the sentence imposed by the trial judge does not constitute an abuse of discretion." On March 21, 1988, the Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Griffin, 110 N.J. 309 (1988).

On or about May 29, 1992, defendant filed a petition for PCR contending that his guilty plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the time of the plea. Judge Newman denied the petition by Order of May 29, 1992. Almost four years later, on February 28, 1996, defendant filed an "amended" notice of appeal, together with a "letter in lieu of formal brief in support of motion for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc." On June 20, 1996, this court denied the motion, and dismissed defendant's appeal. On or about June 29, 2001, defendant filed a second petition for post-conviction relief arguing the same grounds as the first, but also asserting that his sentence was "illegal." On June 29, 2001, Judge Vazquez entered an order denying the motion. No appeal was taken from that order.

On February 25, 2004, defendant filed his third petition for PCR to correct an illegal sentence. In the petition, defendant raises the same three claims asserted on his first and second petitions, but also contends that the factual basis for his plea was inadequate, and therefore, the sentence he received pursuant to the plea agreement resulted in an illegal sentence. He also claims that his trial counsel failed to advise him of the "non-slayer defense," that he "[h]ad no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3)(d). Judge Cassini entered an order denying the motion on February 4, 2005, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues:

POINT I.

THE COURT VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT['S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE COURT REFUSED TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE STEMING FROM AN IMPROPERLY ACCEPTED GUILTY PLEA. U.S. CONST. AMEND. 14 AND N.J. CONST. ART. 1, PAR. 10.

We have carefully considered the record and the briefs concerning defendant's argument, and we find it without sufficient merit to warrant discussion herein. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add the following comments.

Rule 3:22-1 does not require that an evidentiary hearing be granted in every PCR proceeding. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). The decision of whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition is discretionary with the trial court. Ibid. Where a "court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief, or that the defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing, then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S. Ct. 140, 139 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1997). We are satisfied that Judge Cassini appropriately concluded that defendant's petition did not in and of itself present sufficient grounds for an evidentiary hearing.

The time requirement for filing a petition for PCR is governed by Rule 3:22-12:

A petition to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time. No other petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after rendition of the judgment or sentence sought to be attacked unless it alleges facts showing that the delay beyond said time was due to defendant's excusable neglect.

[R. 3:22-12(a).]

An "illegal sentence" is defined as a "sentence in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law." R. 3:22-2(c). Illegal sentences include sentences that exceed penalties authorized by statute for the offense, and sentences that are not imposed in accordance with law. State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246-47 (2000). Notwithstanding defendant's attempt to characterize the sentence as "illegal," in order to fit his petition within the exception to Rule 3:22-12, we determine that it is not an illegal sentence as defined in Murray. The defendant presents, although in different wrapping, the same arguments previously asserted or that could have been asserted in defendant's prior petitions, and therefore, the claims are barred. R. 3:22-4.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-4934-04T1

March 6, 2006