STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DENNIS JONES
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4858-04T14858-04T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DENNIS JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________
Argued May 16, 2006 - Decided June 30, 2006
Before Judges Skillman and Payne.
On appeal from Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County,
Indictment No. 04-106.
Dennis Jones, appellant, argued pro
se and filed a pro se brief.
Nicole Eiszner argued the cause for
respondent (John L. Molinelli, Bergen
County Prosecutor, attorney; Annmarie
Cozzi, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel,
Ms. Eiszner and Ms. Cozzi on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After some confusion occasioned by the failure of defendant Dennis Jones to inform his attorney that he had incurred two prior convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI), defendant pled guilty to his third DWI charge, receiving a sentence for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 of a two-year license suspension, plus two additional years of driving only after activating an interlock system designed to prevent drunk driving. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Superior Court, where his arguments were rejected. He now appeals to us, arguing (1) his plea was coerced; (2) his counsel was ineffective; and (3) his plea should be vacated as the result of the prosecutor's withholding of exculpatory evidence regarding the field sobriety tests, the failure to perform a breathalyzer test, and the commission of an illegal search. We affirm the conviction.
The transcript of the municipal plea discloses no basis for a claim of coercion. Although defendant initially was told that he would receive a three-month license suspension, once it was determined that he had two prior DWI convictions and, because his third offense had occurred more than ten years after the second, he was statutorily subject to sentencing as a second-time offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), his sentence was carefully explained, an adequate factual basis for the plea was obtained, and its voluntariness was established as required by R. 7:6-2(a)(1), State v. Kovak, 91 N.J. 476, 484 (1982), State v. Martin, 335 N.J. Super. 447, 450 (App. Div. 2000), and State v. Gale, 226 N.J. Super. 699, 704 (Law Div. 1988). No error occurred.
We decline to address defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which relies upon matters outside the record and should therefore be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to R. 7:10-2. Cf. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). Additionally, we decline to address defendant's remaining legal claims, finding them to have been waived as the result of his guilty plea and to have insufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 470 (2005); State v. Owens, 381 N.J. Super. 503, 508-09 (App. Div. 2005); State v. Robinson, 224 N.J. Super. 495, 500-01 (App. Div. 1988); R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
The sentence further provided for payment of a $500 fine, a $200 surcharge, $30 in court costs, a $50 Violent Crimes Compensation Board assessment, a $75 Safe Neighborhoods Services Fund assessment, and a $4 special assessment surcharge, along with thirty days of community service and forty-eight hours in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center.
(continued)
(continued)
3
A-4858-04T1
June 30, 2006
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