NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. Y.T. et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4542-04T4

A-5437-04T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

Y.T. and J.J.,

Defendants-Appellants,

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF

D.T.,

A Minor.

___________________________

 

Submitted January 31, 2006 - Decided February 15, 2006

Before Judges Coburn, Collester and S.L. Reisner.

On appeal from the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family

Part, Morris County, FG-14-27-04.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellants (Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel for Y.T., on the

brief; Alison Perrone, Designated Counsel for J.J., on the brief).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General,

attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Carla Livingston, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Law Guardian, attorney for minor D.T. (Nancy E. Scott, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants, Y.T. and J.J., appeal from a trial court order terminating their parental rights to their child, D.T.

Following a plenary trial, Judge Critchley issued a lengthy oral opinion on April 4, 2005, in which he made detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Our review of his decision is limited to determining whether it is "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). Further, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 413. We have considered the record with that standard in mind.

We review the most pertinent facts, beginning with the child's situation because her unique needs were critical to the judge's decision. D.T. was born on June 16, 1999, and at the time of trial had been in DYFS custody since March 28, 2003, almost two years. She has severe behavioral problems, which make it difficult to find her a permanent placement. She has been in four different placements, including a maternal aunt, a paternal aunt, a foster family, and the Holly Center. The Division's plan is to place her in a therapeutic foster home.

Defendants have a history of domestic violence and drug problems. The child was first removed from their custody when her mother, Y.T., was arrested for various outstanding warrants and driving with a suspended license. At the time, defendant J.J. was also in jail, for nonpayment of child support. As a result, D.T. and her fifteen year old brother were left at home alone for an extended period of time. When their situation was discovered, D.T. was placed temporarily with one of her aunts. Thereafter, Y.T. was found to have a cocaine problem, which has continued. She refused to submit to a drug test during the trial, and the trial judge inferred from her refusal that she was still using cocaine. Y.T. also suffers from bipolar disorder and depression and has a history of abusive relationships with men. She does have a significant bond with D.T., but the judge found that the child's desperate need for stability outweighed the potential harm of separation from her mother, who was not able to act as a parent.

The judge credited J.J.'s testimony that he now has his drug problem under control, but he has other problems that render him unable to act as a parent. He lives with his mother and has a spotty employment record. He also lacks parenting skills. An expert witness described J.J. as "sweet, passive, and well meaning," and the judge agreed. But the judge concluded that, due to the child's severe behavioral problems, "[her] needs are extreme," and J.J. was not prepared to meet her needs. At the time of trial, J.J. had failed to complete parent education programs "that were identified as crucial in his situation, to arm him with the skills necessary to deal with [D.T.]" Even J.J.'s expert described him as "immature, dependent, reticent and has difficulty taking responsibility for his past actions." She recommended psychotherapy for him and concluded, as the judge put it, that "at some point down the road, [J.J.] might be able to care for [D.T.]" Further, J.J. does not have a strong parental bond with the child. The judge also found that D.T. "is at a critical juncture, maybe a last-chance juncture for a reasonably healthy and happy life." While J.J. is interested in D.T., he is not able to act as her parent.

On this appeal, J.J. raises the following issues:

POINT ONE: THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DIVISION FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT TERMINATION WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD.

A. [D.]T. Has Not Been Harmed By Her Relationship With J.J.

B. J.J. is Willing and Able to Provide a Safe and Stable Home to [D.]T.

C. As Dr. Smith Recognized, Termination of Parental Rights Will Do More Harm than Good Particularly Since [D.]T. is Residing in a Group Home and Will Not Even Be Considered for Adoption for an Indefinite Amount of Time.

Y.T. raises the following contentions:

POINT I: THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DIVISION FAILED TO PROVE THE SECOND AND FOURTH PRONGS OF THE "BEST INTERESTS" TEST BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

A. SINCE A DELAY IN PLACEMENT WOULD NOT HAVE ADDED TO THE HARM TO D.T., UNDER THE SECOND PRONG THE DEFENDANT WAS ABLE TO BECOME PARENTALLY FIT IN TIME TO MEET THE NEEDS OF D.T.

B. UNDER THE FOURTH PRONG TERMINAITON OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WILL DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

1. PERMANENCY AND STABILITY COULD HAVE BEEN SECURED WITHOUT TERMINATING THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS OR ENDANGERING D.T.'S HEALTH OR SAFETY.

2. THE DIVISION FAILED TO CONSIDER D.T.'S "SIBLING RIGHTS."

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that all of defendants' arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

While we sympathize with the defendants' difficult life situations, we defer to the trial judge's conclusions, which are amply supported by the record. Applying the correct legal standard, Matter of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999), the trial judge properly concluded on this record that termination of both defendants' parental rights was in D.T.'s best interests. We affirm for the reasons stated in his cogent opinion.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

6

A-4542-04T4, A-5437-04T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

February 15, 2006