STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. KAREN BORN

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4373-04T34373-04T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ONE 2000 MAZDA MIATA

NEW JERSEY REG. NO.

MTN23W VIN JM1NB3536Y0139923,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________

 

Submitted January 10, 2006 - Decided January 30, 2006

Before Judges Skillman and Sabatino.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Monmouth County, DC-014016-03.

Mark S. Carter, attorney for appellant.

Luis A. Valentin, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent, (Edward Washburne, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Karen Born, the former owner of a 2000 Mazda Miata, seeks review of the Law Division's order granting forfeiture of that motor vehicle to the plaintiff State of New Jersey and denying her claim of replevin. We find no merit to her contentions on appeal, and affirm.

The pertinent facts may be briefly summarized as follows. On August 22, 2003, the Tinton Falls Police Department received a call from a motorist at about 8:20 p.m., reporting that a red Mazda Miata was being driven erratically on Route 18. A Tinton Falls traffic officer, Wayne VanLew, noticed a Mazda fitting that description pass him, and began pursuing the vehicle. The Mazda continued to change lanes abruptly. Officer VanLew signaled the Mazda to stop, flashing the patrol car's lights, activating its siren and sounding its horn. The Mazda did not stop. Instead, it continued to evade the patrol car and eventually pulled off of Route 18. The pursuit discontinued at that point. Ms. Born, the driver of the Mazda, was arrested later that evening, and her vehicle was found parked at a local golf course.

On March 29, 2004, appellant pled guilty to third-degree eluding, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2, for her unlawful refusal to stop her motor vehicle. In light of appellant's significant prior criminal history and numerous traffic infractions, the Law Division imposed a sentence of four years of imprisonment, which appellant apparently continues to serve.

The State filed a civil action in the Law Division to forfeit the seized Mazda, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et seq. Appellant, meanwhile, filed an action for replevin of the Mazda in the Special Civil Part. The two civil cases were consolidated. After various procedural events not germane to this appeal, the trial court entered summary judgment on February 28, 2005, granting forfeiture of the Mazda to the State and implicitly denying appellant's claim of replevin.

Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court prematurely granted summary judgment to the State before the discovery period had expired and before the State had responded to discovery requests, including a demand for depositions. We summarily reject that argument, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Perri's oral opinion of February 28, 2005. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only a few observations.

A plaintiff may file a summary judgment motion at any time after thirty-five days from the service of the complaint. R. 4:46-1. Although discovery frequently should be completed before the court entertains summary judgment, cf. Bilotti v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 206 (1963), that general practice need not be observed in cases where it is readily apparent that continued discovery would not produce any additional facts necessary to a proper disposition of the motion. Cf. R. 4:46-5 (authorizing courts to deny or continue summary judgment motions to accommodate further discovery of facts that would be "essential" to oppose the motion).

Here, as part of the factual basis supporting her guilty plea to eluding, the appellant acknowledged under oath that she "knew that [she had received] a signal. . . to pull over and deal with the police officer." She further admitted that she "understood by not stopping [that she was] breaking the law." Those sworn acknowledgments, voluntarily placed on the record in the related criminal matter without any civil reservation on admissibility, conclusively establish that appellant knowingly violated the law in her operation of the motor vehicle. State v. Fuqua, 303 N.J. Super. 40, 44 (App. Div. 1997)(defendant's knowledge is an essential element of the offense of eluding). Appellant's admitted illegal use of the seized property fully authorizes its forfeiture to the State. See N.J.S.A. 2C:64-3(j) (establishing presumption that seized property supporting criminal conviction was used in furtherance of an unlawful activity). Further discovery would not have altered that inescapable conclusion. There was simply no genuine issue of material fact left to be resolved. See R. 4:46-2; Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520 (1995).

 
Affirm.

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-4373-04T3

January 30, 2006