STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOSEPH M. STOCKS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3808-03T43808-03T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH M. STOCKS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted July 18, 2006 - Decided August 18, 2006

Before Judges Parker and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment

No. 02-08-1008.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney

for appellant (James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the

brief).

Theodore J. Romankow, Prosecutor of Union

County, attorney for respondent (Steven J.

Kaflowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel;

Amy F. Newcombe, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Joseph M. Stocks appeals from the sentence imposed in a judgment of conviction entered after he pled guilty to first degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a; second degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5; three counts of fourth degree assault by a motor vehicle (as downgraded), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1c(2); and three motor vehicle offenses: driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; and driving while suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40. After the appropriate mergers, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen years and the appropriate mandatory fines and penalties.

These charges arose out of a motor vehicle accident on the New Jersey Turnpike on August 26, 2001. After leaving a nightclub with his girlfriend, defendant entered onto the Turnpike in the wrong direction and struck a mini-van, causing the death of his girlfriend, Maria Cordero, and injuries to three of the four people in the van.

Defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was .16 when tested two hours after the accident, and extrapolated to be .20 at the time of the accident. Defendant was traveling approximately eighty miles per hour at the time of the accident.

After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial judge imposed aggravating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3),(6) and (9) and no mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b). In imposing the sentence, the judge stated:

We are dealing here with a first degree charge, that being aggravated manslaughter. There has been a loss of life and these are the most difficult cases I believe to sentence because we are not dealing with an individual who committed a depraved act purposely or knowingly. The charge here deals with reckless behavior manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life but, nonetheless, it is a crime.

There were a number of choices made by Mr. Stocks that night. The first was to drive in the first place. He was a suspended driver for failure to pay, I believe, insurance surcharges. He shouldn't have been driving at all.

Secondly, he was driving under the influence of alcohol at approximately twice the legal limit. Nonetheless, he chose to drive. He went the wrong way down the New Jersey Turnpike for miles at a high rate of speed. He did not pull over. He did not stop. He did not seek help. He just kept on going. Tyrone Johnson, who followed Mr. Stocks, [reported that] Mr. Stocks almost collided with numerous vehicles. Luckily they were able to move out of the way. Mr. Stocks did not heed Mr. Johnson's honking horn, he did not pull over after the near misses with the other vehicles. Again, he just kept on going in face of imminent disaster. His actions here were not only reckless, they were grossly reckless.

I did view the videotape just prior to trial and in that videotape it's evident that while the authorities were trying to extricate Miss Cordero from that tangled car, Mr. Stocks was more interested in getting his cell phone. Although he was interfering with those rendering aid to Miss Cordero and he was told as such, he repeatedly tried to get back in that car to gain his cell phone. I did see him urinating towards the rear of the car while the authorities were rendering aid to Miss Cordero. His actions here are inexcusable yet, nonetheless, I fear that if I do find aggravating factor one, it could be viewed as double counting.

Although the defendant's acts exceeded the mental state and the element required for aggravated manslaughter, I do believe that his plea allocution did not distinguish what constituted recklessness under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life from those circumstances of the offense that show that it was committed in an especially heinous or cruel or depraved manner. Therefore, I do not find aggravating factor No. 1 although that is not to deprecate the seriousness of this offense.

Likewise, I do not find aggravating factor 2, the gravity and seriousness of the harm inflicted on the victim is certainly evident here. Miss Cordera [sic] lost her life yet, nonetheless, that was a circumstance involved in the plea of guilty to Count One. It was also a circumstance considered in taking the plea to Counts Three, Four and Five regarding Deidre Moore, Cejerni (phonetic) Moore and Breanna Moore respectively. Therefore, I will not find aggravating factor 2 because, again, I believe it would be double counting.

I did review Mr. Stocks' case history. The five violations of probation from June of 1996 through June of 1999 on the two charges on which he was adjudicated indicate to me that there is a risk that he will commit another offense. He did not do well on probation despite numerous, numerous chances. Therefore, I will count that as an aggravating factor.

There is a prior record to consider, albeit a slight record, for possession of 50 grams or less of marijuana and conspiracy to receive or bring into the state stolen property. These are juvenile charges but, nonetheless, they do constitute aggravating factor 6.

There is a huge need to deter here. I recognize many, many people go into bars and drink alcohol but, nonetheless, they are faced with choices, faced with choices of getting behind the wheel and Mr. Stocks was faced with the choice of getting behind the wheel and driving the correct way down the Turnpike. He was driving the wrong way and not pulling over.

Drinking alcohol, as noted by Mr. Olive, is not a crime but driving while intoxicated and having that intoxication result in the death of someone is certainly a crime, it is a first degree aggravated manslaughter, and there is a huge need to deter that conduct.

I do find aggravating actors 3, 6 and 9. I do not find any mitigating factors here. The fact that the defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious harm, probably because he was intoxicated, does not constitute mitigating factor 2. Just because a person gets himself drunk does not excuse his conduct, does not excuse his thought process, does not excuse the contemplation that his driving while drunk will cause serious or threaten serious harm. To think otherwise is just unfathomable.

I do not - I certainly do not find mitigating factor 5. There is no evidence that Miss Cordero did anything to put Mr. Stocks behind the wheel of that car, to have him drive in the manner he did. She may have been his drinking partner, as Mr. Olive said, but that certainly, certainly does not excuse or even enter into Mr. Stocks' actions here.

Mitigating factor 7 does not apply because of this prior history of delinquency as set forth before. I do not find any evidence to support mitigating factors 8 or 9. The defendant's lack of remorse here is not a factor in this conclusion either. I recognize that there may have been reasons why Mr. Stocks did not express remorse before today's date but I also recognize that he is taking care of the victim's son and you did express contrition here but, nonetheless, I don't find anything that would lead this Court to believe that he will not get behind the wheel of a car again and commit an offense like this.

I don't find mitigating factor 10 primarily because of the numerous violations of probation. There is nothing to indicate that he will respond affirmatively to probationary treatment when he violated so many times in the past.

As to mitigating factor 11, I do recognize that Mr. Stocks has two children of his own and shows a great deal of attention to Miss Cordero's child as well. I also recognize that both Mr. Stocks' children are with their mother and there is nothing excessive about the hardship that would be dealt to these children more so than any other defendant sentenced to a state prison sentence.

As far as a willingness to cooperate, there is no extraordinary cooperation here at all. The statement given to the police is certainly not the cooperation contemplated by the statute. I am not finding mitigating factor 12.

I do find aggravating factors 3, 6 and 9 outweigh the nonexistent mitigating factor.

The judge then imposed the sentence indicated above.

In this appeal, defendant argues:

POINT ONE

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS WERE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD, AND THE SENTENCE IMPOSED CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION

We have carefully considered the record in this matter in light of defendant's arguments and the applicable law. We find insufficient merit in his arguments to warrant discussion in a written opinion. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Scott J. Moynihan at sentencing on June 4, 2003.

Affirmed.

 

This matter was originally scheduled for the excess sentence calendar on December 13, 2005. That panel transferred the case to the plenary calendar to be fully briefed.

(continued)

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A-3808-03T4

 

August 18, 2006