IN THE MATTER OF EDWARD J. ROBINSON

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3793-04T13793-04T1

IN THE MATTER OF

EDWARD J. ROBINSON,

Appellant.

 
_______________________________________

Submitted January 9, 2006 - Decided January 23, 2006

Before Judges C. S. Fisher and Yannotti.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission.

Galerman & Tabakin, attorneys for appellant (Jonathan J. Sobel, of counsel and on the brief).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney for respondent New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Emily H. Armstrong, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Edward J. Robinson (Robinson) appeals from a final determination of the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Commission), which denied Robinson's request for a hearing and re-affirmed a $3,000 automobile insurance surcharge imposed by reason of his conviction in 1983 of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the relevant facts. On August 28, 1983, Robinson was convicted in the Egg Harbor Township municipal court of operating a vehicle under the influence in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Based on that conviction, an insurance surcharge was levied pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2)(b) in the amount of $1,000 per year for three years. On March 12, 1984, the Division of Motor Vehicles (Division) issued an insurance surcharge bill and notice of proposed suspension to Robinson. The Division mailed the bill to Robinson at his address of record, in Mays Landing, New Jersey. Robinson was advised that he was required to pay $1,000 surcharges each year for three years. The bill stated that, in the event the surcharge was not paid within 30 days of the billing date, Robinson's driver's license would be suspended. Robinson also was informed that he could request a hearing.

Robinson did not request a hearing and he did not pay the surcharge. On April 11, 1984, Robinson's license was suspended. The Commission mailed additional bills to Robinson on April 12, 1984; September 12, 1985; October 12, 1985; November 12, 1985; September 12, 1986; October 12, 1986; and November 12, 1986. All surcharge bills were sent to Robinson at his Mays Landing address. None of the surcharges was paid.

In 1997, the Division obtained a docketed judgment against Robinson for the unpaid surcharges pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2). On January 6, 2005, the Division of Revenue in the Department of the Treasury issued a notice to Robinson at an address in Henderson, Nevada, advising him that one or more certificates of debt had been filed against him and, because he had not paid the surcharges, the State would pursue further collection remedies, including wage garnishment and reports to a "national credit bureau." The notice stated that $4,606.28 was due and owing. That amount included surcharges in the amount of $3,000, interest of $1,006.28 and collection costs of $600. The notice also stated that Robinson could request an administrative hearing based on disputed material facts or legal issues.

By letter dated February 4, 2005, Robinson's attorney requested a hearing. In the letter, counsel stated, "The disputed issues are whether the imposition of surcharge is appropriate, the length of delay, etc." In another letter dated the same day, counsel stated, "Please note that my client disputes and/or questions the surcharge billing, including the efficacy of the surcharge, the amount of the surcharge and the timing of the surcharge assessment."

The Chief Administrator responded in a letter dated February 15, 2005, denying Robinson's request for a hearing because there were no disputed material facts or legal issues that warranted a hearing. The Chief Administrator stated that the surcharges were imposed because Robinson was convicted of driving under the influence. Robinson was required to pay the surcharges even though he subsequently moved out of New Jersey. The Chief Administrator noted that Robinson had been provided notices of the surcharges and because Robinson did not pay the surcharges, the Commission had filed a certificate of debt for the amounts due pursuant to New Jersey law.

Robinson appeals and argues that the Commission is barred by the statute of limitations in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2 from collecting the unpaid surcharges. Robinson contends that the doctrine of laches should be applied to preclude the Commission from enforcing its claim for payment of the unpaid surcharges. Robinson also argues that the certificate of debt was not entered in conformance with N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2), and the Chief Administrator erred in denying his request for a hearing.

"In light of the executive function of administrative agencies, judicial capacity to review administrative actions is severely limited." George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 27 (1994). Our role in reviewing the action of an administrative agency

is restricted to four inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision offends the State or Federal Constitution; (2) whether the agency's action violates express of implied legislative policies; (3) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (4) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Ibid. (citing Campbell v. Department of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)).]

We have carefully considered Robinson's contentions on appeal and we are satisfied that the Chief Administrator's determination is consistent with the applicable statutes and is supported by substantial and credible evidence.

The surcharges at issue are authorized by N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2)(b). That statute provides in pertinent part that automobile insurance surcharges "shall be levied" for convictions under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 that occur on or after February 10, 1983. Ibid. For the first two convictions, surcharges are levied in the amount of $1,000 per year "for a three-year period." Ibid. The statute further provides:

If, upon written notification from the [C]ommission or its designee, mailed to the last address of record with the [C]ommission, a driver fails to pay a surcharge levied under subparagraph (b) of paragraph (2) of this subsection b., the driving privilege of the driver shall be suspended forthwith until the minimum payment requirement as set forth by rule by the [C]ommission is paid ....

[Ibid.]

Here, it is undisputed that Robinson was convicted on August 28, 1983 of driving under the influence in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. The Division levied the surcharges in accordance with N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2)(b) by providing notice to Robinson's last address of record in Mays Landing. The bills placed Robinson squarely on notice that he would be required to pay surcharges in the amount of $1,000 annually for a three-year period. Robinson also was informed that his driving privileges would be suspended if he failed to pay the minimum amount required. Moreover, Robinson was informed that he could request a hearing to contest the surcharges and he failed to make such a request. It is undisputed that Robinson did not pay the surcharges.

The surcharge statute also permits the Director (now the Commissioner) to:

issue a certificate to the Clerk of the Superior Court stating that the person identified in the certificate is indebted under this surcharge law in such amount as shall be stated in the certificate . . . . The docketing of the entries shall have the same force and effect as a civil judgment docketed in the Superior Court, and the [C]ommission shall have all the remedies and may take all of the proceedings for the collection thereof which may be had or taken upon the recovery of a judgment in an action, but without prejudice to any right to appeal.

[N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2).]

On or about October 29, 1997, the Division filed with the Clerk a certificate of debt against Robinson for the unpaid surcharges.

Robinson argues that the Commission's action in securing a certificate of debt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2) is subject to the statute of limitations for civil actions commenced by the State. The statute provides in pertinent part:

a. Except where a limitations provision expressly and specifically applies to actions commenced by the State or where a longer limitations period would otherwise apply, and subject to any statutory provisions or common law rules extending limitations periods, any civil action commenced by the State shall be commenced within ten years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.

b. For purposes of determining whether an action subject to the limitations period specified in subsection a. of this section has been commenced within time, no such action shall be deemed to have accrued prior to January 1, 1992.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2.]

The statute was enacted in response to decisions by our Supreme Court abolishing the common law doctrine of nullum tempus, which exempted the State and local governments from generally applicable statutes of limitations. New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Borough of Somerville, 139 N.J. 582, 586-87 (1995).

It is clear, however, that the statute does not bar the Commission's action in filing the certificate of debt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2). The filing of a certificate of debt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2) is not the "commencement of a civil action" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2. However, even if the statute of limitations were applicable to the filing of a certificate of debt, according to the plain language of the statute, the ten-year limitation period did not commence to run until January 1, 1992. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2(b). Here, the Division filed the certificate of debt in 1997 which was well within the ten-year limitations period.

Robinson also argues that the doctrine of laches should be applied to preclude the Commission from taking any action to collect the surcharges. We disagree. Laches has been defined as "such neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, operates as a bar in a court of equity." Lavin v. Bd. of Educ., 90 N.J. 145, 151 (1982)(quoting 2 Equity Jurisprudence 419, at 171-72 (5th ed. 1941)). Laches is the "inexcusable delay in asserting a right." Atlantic City v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 N.J. Super. 57, 60 (App. Div. 1949)(citations omitted).

There was no inexcusable delay here. The Division promptly imposed the surcharges after Robinson's 1983 conviction. The surcharge statute was amended in 1994 to allow the Commission to enforce collection of the unpaid surcharges by filing a certificate of debt. L. 1994, c. 64, 1. The certificate was filed in 1997. There was no inexcusable delay on the part of the Commission in imposing the surcharges and filing the certificate of debt.

Robinson additionally argues that the certificate of debt was not entered in conformance with N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35(b)(2) because he did not receive notice that the certificate of debt had been filed until January 6, 2006. It appears that Robinson re-located out-of-state sometime after 1983. Robinson failed to provide the Division with a change of address, as required by N.J.S.A. 39:3-36. If Robinson did not receive notice as he claims, it was due to his own failure to comply with N.J.S.A. 39:3-36.

In addition, Robinson asserts that the Chief Administrator erred by denying his request for a hearing. Again, we disagree. The Chief Administrator invited Robinson to submit factual evidence of an error in his New Jersey driver history but Robinson did not contest the fact that he was convicted in 1983 of violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Robinson also contends that the record does not contain the certificate of debt filed on October 29, 1997 but the respondent's brief includes a copy of the Clerk's record, which shows that the certificate was filed on that date. Moreover, the record includes all of the facts relevant to Robinson's assertions that the filing of the certificate of debt was barred by the statute of limitations and the laches doctrine. We therefore are convinced that the Chief Administrator properly denied Robinson's request for a hearing.

 
Affirmed.

The Commission was established in 2003 by the enactment of L. 2003, c. 13, 4, which is codified as N.J.S.A. 39:2A-4. The Division was abolished and its functions, powers and duties were transferred to the Commission and are exercised by the Chief Administrator. N.J.S.A. 39:2A-4(b). Any reference in the law to the Division or its Director "shall mean and refer to the [C]omission, unless otherwise" provided in the law. N.J.S.A. 39:2A-4(c).

(continued)

(continued)

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A-3793-04T1

January 23, 2006