WILEY REID v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3723-04T33723-04T3

WILEY REID,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent-Respondent.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted March 15, 2006 - Decided March 27, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Graves.

On appeal from a Final Agency Decision of the

New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Wiley Reid, appellant pro se.

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney

for respondent (Michael J. Haas, Assistant

Attorney General, of counsel; Walter C.

Kowalski, Deputy Attorney General, on the

brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant Wiley Reid is in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). He appeals from a Final Administrative Decision by the DOC finding him guilty of committing prohibited act *.101, escape, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a).

On appeal, Reid raises the following argument:

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS DURING DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS WHEN HE WAS DENIED A POLYGRAPH EXAM AND DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT WITNESSES TO PROVE THAT HE WAS IN HIS BED ASLEEP AND NOT OUT ON "ESCAPE."

After reviewing the record and applicable law in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We are satisfied that Reid received all of the procedural due process protections to which he was entitled. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525-33 (1975); see also Jacobs v. Stephens, 139 N.J. 212, 217-22 (1995); McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 193-203 (1995). We add only these brief comments.

On February 23, 2005, the *.101 charge was delivered to Reid by Lieutenant Qualls, who advised Reid of his Use Immunity rights. Reid pled not guilty, and he reserved his statement for courtline.

At the disciplinary hearing, the evidence showed that Reid was living at a halfway house, known as The Harbor, on February 23, 2005, the day of the incident. At approximately 12:50 a.m., while under the supervision of Thomas Wright, Reid took a bag of garbage to a dumpster and then just kept going. Wright told Reid to return, however, Reid continued walking from the halfway house without permission. The police were notified. About four hours later when Reid returned to the halfway house, he told Supervisor Wright that he was in great pain from a toothache and he wanted to get some Motrin.

Reid did not testify at the disciplinary hearing, he did not call any witnesses on his behalf, and he declined the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Counsel substitute, Daryl Stradford, made the following statement on Reid's behalf: "He had a toothache and had pain. He took a Motrin. He went to sleep and came downstairs and was placed on escape. He has no reason to take out garbage. This charge was fabricated."

Reid now claims that he requested a polygraph examination and he also requested a videotape, "which would have shown that [he] was not the person who took the trash out and kept going." The record reveals, however, that Reid never requested either a polygraph or a videotape from the hearing officer or in connection with his administrative appeal. Because these requests were not made during the course of the administrative proceedings, we are unable to consider them now.

The hearing officer determined that Supervisor Wright was a credible witness, and we note that the record does not contain any contradictory evidence or any inconsistencies in the investigative reports. We conclude therefore that the record clearly supports the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer.

A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing must be supported by "substantial evidence." Avant v. Clifford, supra, 67 N.J. at 530; N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (quoting In re Application of Hackensack Water Co., 41 N.J. Super. 408, 418 (App. Div. 1956)).

The scope of our review is limited. "Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the decision of [an] administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963)); accord Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197, 203-04 (App. Div. 2000). Based on our review of the record, we are satisfied there is substantial credible evidence to support the final decision by the Department of Corrections.

Affirmed.

 

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A-3723-04T3

March 27, 2006