STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. CHITRANJAN S. RANAWAT

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3696-05T13696-05T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHITRANJAN S. RANAWAT,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________________________________

 

Submitted November 8, 2006 - Decided December 27, 2006

Before Judges Payne and Lihotz.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. BMA-001-16-05.

Rem Zeller, attorneys for appellant (Joseph P. Rem, Jr., of counsel and on the brief; James B. Seplowitz, on the brief).

John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor attorney for respondent (Annmarie Cozzi, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, Chitranjan S. Ranawat, appeals from his conviction for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a), after a trial de novo in Superior Court. R. 3:23-8(a). We affirm.

As recited in Judge Conte's Law Division written opinion:

[O]n October 8, 2004, at approximately 9:00 p.m., defendant was observed by Patrolman Frank Visaggio of the Demarest Police Department. He watched as defendant failed to make a complete stop at the stop sign on Hardenburg Road. Defendant made a left turn onto Anderson Avenue, but almost struck the patrolman's vehicle. Patrolman Visaggio had to slam on his brakes to avoid an accident. He immediately made a u-turn, stopped defendant's vehicle using his overhead lights . . . and requested driving credentials. The officer observed defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watched as he fumbled with his wallet before locating the registration card. Also, the odor of alcoholic beverage emanated from the driver's side of the vehicle. Defendant then admitted to consuming "two glasses of wine" earlier in the evening.

After processing the driver's license, Officer Visaggio conducted field sobriety tests. First, he conducted the one leg stand test and instructed and demonstrated how the test was to be performed. Further, he asked if defendant had any injuries that would prevent him from completing the test. Defendant responded he has arthritis in his knees and ankles, then attempted the test. Visaggio stopped the test because defendant was unsteady. Second, Visaggio conducted the ten paces and turn test. He immediately stopped the test for the defendant's own safety. Again, defendant was unsteady on his feet and slurred his speech. Third, Visaggio conducted the memorization test[,] instructing defendant to count backwards from 99 to 77. Defendant stopped at a "couple of points" during this test. Based upon these observations, defendant was placed under arrest, put in the patrol car uncuffed, and transported to headquarters.

Officer Glynn, who previously arrived on the scene, waited for the impound tow truck to arrive. The officer conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and found a half empty bottle of wine.

After arriving at the police station with defendant, Visaggio again observed defendant's bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and sway while standing. Defendant was advised of his Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)] rights, placed in a holding cell, and had the standard breathalyzer consumption [sic] statement read to him. Defendant refused to submit to the breathalyzer test. Again, Visaggio read the statement to defendant. He refused to submit to the test for a second time. Subsequently, defendant was issued summonses for disobeying a stop sign, careless driving, driving while intoxicated, refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, and possession of an open alcohol container.

After trial in the Demarest Municipal Court, defendant was found guilty of careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, and refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a). Defendant was acquitted on the charges of failure to stop, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144, possessing an open alcoholic beverage container in a motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-51b, and driving while intoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendant's sentence included a seven-month suspension of his driver's privileges, twelve hours of instruction at the Intoxicated Driver's Resource Center and applicable fines and assessments. Both his conviction and sentence were upheld after the trial de novo in the Law Division.

The scope of appellate review is limited. We determine whether the record contains sufficient credible evidence to uphold the findings of the Law Division judge. State v. Avena, 281 N.J. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 1995).

"[B]ecause a breathalyzer refusal case is properly a quasi-criminal matter, the constitutionally required burden of proof is the one applicable to criminal cases: proof beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 94-96 (2005); see also Thus, each element of the statute must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. Cummings, supra, 184 N.J. at 95.

A conviction under the implied consent statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2(a), requires findings by the municipal court as set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a, which provides, in pertinent part:

[T]he municipal court shall revoke the right to operate a motor vehicle of any operator who, after being arrested for a violation of [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50], shall refuse to submit to a test provided for in [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2] when requested to do so . . . .

The municipal court shall determine . . . whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on the public highways or quasi-public areas of this State while the person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . whether the person was placed under arrest, if appropriate, and whether he refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer; and if these elements of the violation are not established, no conviction shall issue.

[N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.]

The State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that "(1) the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated; and (3) defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test." Badessa, supra, 185 N.J. at 312 (quoting State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488, 490 (1987)). Defendant does not dispute he was arrested for driving while intoxicated or that he twice refused the officer's request to submit to a breathalyzer examination. His challenge is to the existence of probable cause.

To justify a stop, an officer need only have "an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a motor vehicle violation." State v. Puzio, 379 N.J. Super. 378, 381 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Smith, 306 N.J. Super., 370, 380 (App. Div. 1999). Here, Officer Visaggio clearly met this threshold requirement after defendant's vehicle, while making a left turn into oncoming traffic, almost struck the officer's patrol car.

As to the probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated, the objective facts of intoxication relied upon by the Law Division judge include: Officer Visaggio's observations of the odor of alcohol emanating from the driver's side of the vehicle, defendant's blood shot eyes, slurred speech, swaying while standing, fumbling with his wallet in locating credentials, admission that he consumed "two glasses of wine" at dinner, and difficulty in performing the psycho-physical tests. Based on the totality of these observations, Officer Visaggio had a well-grounded suspicion that defendant's drinking "so alter[ed] his . . . normal physical coordination and mental faculties as to render [him] . . . a danger to himself as well as to other persons on the highway," State v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 590 (2006) (citations omitted), which established probable cause for his arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The subsequent acquittal, after trial, of the charge for driving while intoxicated does not defeat the existence of sufficient probable cause for defendant's arrest.

We are satisfied that there was sufficient credible evidence present in the record to uphold the Law Division's determination. See Avena, supra, 281 N.J. Super. at 333.

Affirmed.

 

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December 27, 2006