LINDA D. STEWART v. BOARD OF REVIEW, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3533-04T13533-04T1

LINDA D. STEWART,

Claimant-Appellant,

vs.

BOARD OF REVIEW, NEW JERSEY

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and BURLINGTON

COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION,

Respondent-Respondent.

__________________________________

 

Submitted: February 14, 2006 - Decided March 9, 2006

Before Judges Cuff and Lintner.

On appeal from a Final Decision of the Board of Review, Department of Labor, 42,138.

Conley & Sozansky, attorneys for appellant (Richard M. Conley, of counsel and on the brief).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alan C. Stephens, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Claimant, Linda D. Stewart, was employed by the Burlington County Board of Taxation (Board of Taxation) for approximately ten and one-half years, serving the last three years as the Burlington County Tax Administrator. On December 31, 2003, when her appointment expired, she was replaced. Claimant appeals from a final decision of the Board of Review that denied her application for additional benefits in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-60. We affirm.

Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits effective January 4, 2004, and collected benefits until the claim was exhausted. She also applied for additional benefits under the Workforce Development Partnership Act, N.J.S.A. 43:21-57 to -66 (WDPA).

In a decision mailed on December 20, 2004, the Appeal Tribunal affirmed a deputy's determination holding claimant ineligible for WDPA benefits. The Board of Review affirmed.

The Appeal Tribunal found that her separation from work "was an isolated separation due to her discharge," because the record did not demonstrate that claimant was permanently discharged and that she was unlikely to return because of a substantial reduction in work opportunities in her previous job classification. Thus, in its decision of December 20, 2004, the Appeal Tribunal held claimant ineligible for additional unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-60a. On February 4, 2005, the Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal. This appeal followed.

The sole issue in this case is whether claimant was eligible for additional unemployment benefits under the WDPA. The burden of proof rests upon claimant to establish her right to unemployment benefits. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997).

Under the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -56, an unemployed individual is entitled to receive unemployment benefits if he or she satisfies all conditions of eligibility and is otherwise not subject to disqualification. N.J.S.A. 43:21-4; N.J.S.A. 43:21-5. In 1992, the Legislature amended the Unemployment Compensation Law by enacting the WDPA. Under the Workforce Development Program (Program), an individual may receive twenty-six weeks of approved job training, plus additional unemployment compensation for a maximum twenty-six-week period in an amount equal to his or her previous weekly benefit rate. N.J.S.A. 43:21-61. To receive additional benefits under this program, an individual must enroll in a job training program sponsored by a service provider approved by the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance. The training must be for an occupation which has a projected shortage of trained workers, and it also must serve to facilitate a substantial enhancement of the individual's marketable skills and earning power. Assembly Labor Committee Statement, Assembly No. 1406, L. 1992, c. 47, 1; N.J.S.A. 43:21-57; N.J.S.A. 43:21-60(e).

In addition, WDPA benefits are available to an unemployed person in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-60 only if the individual:

a. Has received a notice of permanent termination of employment by the individual's employer or has been laid off and is unlikely to return to his previous employment because work opportunities in the individual's job classification are impaired by a substantial reduction of employment at the worksite . . . .

Further, N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1 provides:

(a) An individual will be eligible for additional unemployment benefits during training only if the individual:

. . . .

2. Is permanently separated from employment and is unlikely to return to such employment due to a substantial reduction in work opportunities in the individual's job classification at his or her former worksite.

Claimant argues she was eligible for WDPA benefits because she was permanently terminated from her position rather than laid off. She argues that a "permanent termination" alone satisfied WDPA benefit eligibility criteria and that she is not required to demonstrate that she "is unlikely to return to [her] previous employment because work opportunities in [her] job classification are impaired by a substantial reduction of employment at the work-site." N.J.S.A. 43:21-60a. Claimant misreads this provision. To be eligible for additional benefits, an applicant for WDPA benefits must show that she is unable to return to her former position due to a workforce reduction, which has effectively eliminated the position. Ibid.

This interpretation of the statute is supported by legislative history and the expressed purpose of the legislation. The purpose of the Program was to provide aid through benefits and training grants to those individuals who had been permanently displaced from the workforce. Assembly Labor Committee Statement, Assembly No. 1406, L. 1992, c. 47, 1; N.J.S.A. 43:21-57. In 1992, the Legislature found that, due to the severe downswing in the nation's economy in the 1980s, many individuals had become permanently displaced from the workforce, that New Jersey employers (in particular) were reporting serious difficulties in finding skilled workers for a wide range of jobs in certain sections of the State's economy, and that the shortage of skilled labor would continue during the 1990s and beyond. N.J.S.A. 43:21-57. The Legislature further declared that "[t]he effectiveness of current programs to retrain displaced workers during the time that they receive unemployment benefits [was] hindered by the limited duration of those benefits, which often [drove] displaced workers into short-term retraining programs with limited skill enhancement . . . ." N.J.S.A. 43:21-57e. Thus, N.J.S.A. 43:21-60a "is economically driven legislation that has the obvious purpose of enabling individuals who are economically displaced from their employment to be paid benefits while acquiring new skills to reenter a more marketable area of the economy." Bonilla v. Bd. of Review, 337 N.J. Super. 612, 615-16 (App. Div. 2001).

Here, the nature of claimant's employment and the circumstances of her termination are relevant. The County Tax Administrator is appointed by the Board of Taxation to a three-year term, and once the term expires, it may be renewed at the Board of Taxation's discretion. Prior to the notification letter of December 11, 2003, Stewart was unofficially notified that she would not receive a second term. A second term would have accorded Stewart tenured status as tax administrator. Stewart indicated that the Board of Taxation's decision not to reappoint her was not reflective of her performance, but that the Board of Taxation Commissioners had decided to fill the position with another candidate. There were no mass layoffs occurring at the Board of Taxation or in Burlington County at the time of her termination. In fact, claimant clearly stated that the Board of Taxation simply "wanted someone else" for the position.

Claimant was not "economically displaced from [her] employment," ibid.; rather, she was simply replaced by another individual. Her argument rests on a skewed reading of N.J.S.A. 43:21-60a. Notably, the agency's implementing regulation, N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1, makes no mention of a layoff. It simply provides that to be eligible for additional unemployment benefits during training, the person must be "permanently separated from employment and . . . unlikely to return to such employment due to a substantial reduction in work opportunities in the individual's job classification at his or her former worksite." Ibid. Nevertheless, the regulation is consistent with the statutory intendment to award additional benefits only to an individual who "is unlikely to return to his previous employment because work opportunities in the individual's job classification are impaired by a substantial reduction of employment at the worksite." N.J.S.A. 43:21-60a.

Construing the statute and regulation, this court held that an employee who resigned from her job for health reasons attributable to the work, and who was not disqualified for unemployment benefits, was ineligible for WDPA benefits. Bonilla, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 612. In Bonilla, citing N.J.S.A. 43:21-60 and N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1, we held:

It is thus clear that to obtain additional benefits during training, the claimant must be fired or laid off and be unlikely to return to that job because of a 'substantial reduction of employment at the worksite."

[Id. at 616 (quoting Appeal Tribunal decision) (emphasis added).]

Thus, regardless of whether an individual is laid off or terminated from her employment, the individual will be eligible for WDPA benefits only if she cannot return to her employment because of a substantial reduction in work opportunities in her former position at the former worksite. N.J.S.A. 43:21-60a; N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1; Bonilla, supra, 337 N.J. Super. at 616; Rubenstein v. Bd. of Review, No. A-4102-01 (App. Div. March 18, 2003) (slip op. at 2). Here, claimant's former position, Burlington County Tax Administrator, was not abolished, but continues in existence. Claimant clearly did not qualify for benefits because her separation was not due to a substantial reduction of opportunities in her prior job classification.

The judicial capacity to review administrative agency decisions is limited. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210; Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985). Moreover, "in reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210. "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). "Unless a court finds that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Ibid.; see In re Warren, 117 N.J. 295, 296 (1989).

The Board of Review's findings and decision determining Stewart ineligible for additional unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-60a and N.J.A.C. 12:23-5.1(a) are correct, wholly in accord with the governing statutes and regulations, and are amply supported by substantial credible evidence. The Board of Review's decision is, therefore, affirmed.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

9

A-3533-04T1

March 9, 2006

 


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