NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. S.M.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3315-05T43315-05T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

S. M.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF A.W. and A.R.,

Minors,

and

B.R., J.W. and J.E.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________

 

Argued June 6, 2006 - Decided July 14, 2006

Before Judges Payne and Sabatino.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, FC-07-193-05; FC-07-150-04; FG-07-165-04; FN-07-84-04.

William M. Schreiber argued the cause for appellant (Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Peach, attorneys; William M. Schreiber (Hoffman & Schreiber), co-counsel; John H. Norton, of counsel; Nicholas D. Bliablias and Ben-David Seligman, on the brief).

Maureen Bull, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ms. Bull, on the brief).

Christopher A. Huling, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, Law Guardian, argued the cause for respondents A.W. and A.R., Minors (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney).

PER CURIAM

S.M., the maternal grandmother of A.W., who is presently age thirteen, and A.R., who is presently age six, appeals the Family Part's determination denying her custody of A.W. and A.R. after the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) had administratively ruled out S.M. as a suitable caretaker. DYFS had ruled out S.M. following revelations that S.M. had previously been investigated by out-of-state child welfare authorities and that S.M. had falsely denied the existence of that prior investigation when questioned about it by a Family Part judge. S.M. also appeals the Family Part's denial of pre-adoption visitation with her grandchildren following the termination of the parental rights of her own daughter B.R.

We affirm.

I.

S.M. presently resides in Georgia where she is a schoolteacher. She has two grown daughters, B.R. and Alicia. Up until about 2002, S.M. had fairly regular contact with B.R.'s daughters, A.W. and A.R. At times, the grandchildren would visit S.M. in Georgia.

Both minor children are now in the legal custody of DYFS, as the result of proceedings stemming back to 1999. In February of that year, DYFS commenced an abuse-and-neglect action against B.R. with respect to the older child A.W., principally because of allegations that B.R.'s paramour had sexually molested A.W. At that time, the Family Part granted DYFS temporary custody care and supervision of A.W. Police subsequently arrested the paramour. DYFS initially placed A.W. with a paternal grandparent, but after problems with that placement arose, A.W. was returned to B.R.'s care after B.R. gave birth to A.R. in September 1999.

In February 2000 DYFS received a referral from A.W.'s school reporting that B.R. had beaten A.W. with a belt. After a second referral of another beating in January 2002, A.W. was placed with B.R.'s godmother, B.R.H., with B.R.'s consent. A.W. has resided with the godmother since that time, a period of over four years.

In March 2003, the godmother informed DYFS that B.R.'s paramour had been present during A.W.'s weekend visits at B.R.'s home. Eventually, DYFS substantiated the allegation, and determined that B.R. was continuing to allow A.W. to have ongoing contact with her paramour. This led DYFS in August 2003 to remove the younger child, A.R., from B.R.'s care. A.R. was temporarily placed with a maternal aunt, but soon thereafter was placed with her sister A.W. in the care of the godmother.

In earlier stages of this matter, DYFS considered S.M. as a potential relative placement option for her two grandchildren. It ordered a psychological evaluation of S.M. in Georgia. The evaluation was performed in May and June of 2004. Initially, the State of Georgia did not approve S.M.'s home, due to the extensive criminal record of her then-husband, A.R.M. On November 10, 2004, the State of Georgia approved S.M.'s home after S.M. separated from A.R.M. and initiated divorce proceedings.

Subsequently, however, DYFS learned in the latter part of November 2004 that S.M. herself had a history with child welfare authorities in the State of Arizona. In particular, it came to light that in the 1980s S.M. had improperly permitted her own child, Alicia, to have continued contact with S.M.'s then-husband, W.H., despite the fact that W.H. had sexually molested Alicia. This new information was flatly contrary to what S.M. had stated to Judge Floria, who had been handling the guardianship matter, on the record and in open court at the conclusion of a permanency hearing on July 16, 2004. S.M. had been present in the courthouse that day for the permanency hearing because she had submitted affidavits to Judge Floria expressing concerns about her grandchildren's care by B.R.'s godmother, and had indicated a desire to care for the grandchildren herself, either temporarily or permanently.

Although S.M. was not sworn in as a witness at the July 16, 2004 proceeding, the record clearly reflects that S.M. repeatedly made false statements to Judge Floria about her prior involvement with child welfare authorities. The pertinent colloquy was as follows:

THE COURT: [S.M.], thank you for joining us. The original portion of these proceedings were confidential. I asked you to come in now because we're going to be addressing you at this point in time.

I've ordered that the Division expedite the interstate [investigation] that is underway in Georgia. I understand that information has come to light that may or may not be correct.

You were married -- when were you married to your present husband?

[S.M.]: In September of . . . 2000.

THE COURT: 2000. Was he the individual that you lived with when you lived in Arizona?

[S.M.]: No.

THE COURT: Okay. When you were in Arizona, were you with another male?

[S.M.]: Yes, I was.

THE COURT: Okay. At that time were there allegations brought against him regarding sexual abuse of one of your daughters?

[S.M.]: No.

THE COURT: Never happened?

[S.M.]: No.

THE COURT: Okay. . . . let me make it more general. Have there ever been in any state allegations brought by [Alicia] against any gentleman you may have been involved with?

[S.M.]: No.

At the State's request, the court asked S.M. to provide any other names that she had used, as well as the name of the husband that she had lived with in Arizona. S.M. furnished the court with those names.

It was after receiving this additional information that DYFS learned of S.M.'s prior involvement with child welfare authorities in Arizona. This led DYFS on January 3, 2005 to send the following letter to S.M., ruling her out as a potential caretaker for her grandchildren. The letter stated as follows:

[T]his letter is to officially advise you that the Division is no longer considering you as an appropriate relative resource for placement for [A.W. and A.R.]. This is based on your prior child protective issues in New Jersey and Arizona Child Welfare Dept.

[DYFS] is therefore ruling you out due to your failure to disclose or provide the information of your past involvement with [DYFS] . . . as well as [the] Arizona Child Welfare Department to [DYFS].

You are advised that you have the right for an administrative appeal within ten working days upon the receipt of this letter.

After receiving this correspondence, S.M. submitted a request to DYFS on January 24, 2005 for what is known as a dispositional review. On February 9, 2005, DYFS denied S.M.'s request for that review because the children were in a "kinship" home with B.R.'s godmother, who wished to adopt them if guardianship were granted to DYFS. DYFS' administrative review officer did indicate to S.M. that she would investigate the local office's decision to issue the rule-out letter. S.M. then retained counsel. On March 7, 2005, S.M.'s attorney requested that DYFS advise him of the status of S.M.'s application and requested all documents related to the "rule out" decision.

On April 11, 2005, the administrative review officer, in a letter to S.M.'s counsel, again denied S.M.'s request for a dispositional review. This second letter stated that:

The children's current placement is a kinship/relative placement because at the time of the initial placement [S.M.'s] daughter asked that the current caretaker be approved and presented her as her godmother and close family friend. This caretaker also cared for [S.M.'s] daughter [B.R.] on occasion when she was a minor. The fact that the relationship between the current caretaker and [S.M.] and her daughter is no longer amicable does not change her status. The record indicates that this relationship was damaged by [B.R.'s] behavior, and was not the fault of the caretaker. The Division has also recommended to the court that it is in the best interest of the children to remain in this placement. I also have no authority to review a case where a best interest of the child determination has been made, even if the caretaker selected was a foster parent with no connection with the birth family. That is a decision solely made by the case work staff involved and the Court.

The administrative review officer further explained:

I do want to further note that it would be unlikely that the "rule out" of [S.M.] would have been overturned if she had been eligible for a review. The Court stated the plan was to seek permanency through adoption but [S.M.] stated to me at the time she asked for a review that she wanted the children so that she could return them to their mother.

The administrative review officer also emphasized S.M.'s deception to Judge Floria about her past history in Arizona, and noted the mother-daughter parallels of S.M. and B.R. in each allowing their children to be exposed to a child molester:

[S.M.] also denied in court under oath that she and her family had been known to DYFS or the Arizona child welfare agency. In fact [,] she was known to both agencies. My review of both of those case records indicated that her agency history mirrored that of her daughter. [S.M.] continued to expose her children to her then husband who was found to have sexually abused one of her daughters. It is for the same reason that the Judge in the current case stated the girls would be unsafe if returned home [to B.R.]. [S.M.'s] history and her stated goal of returning the children to their mother appears to be an indicator that she may not be willing or able to keep them safe from further harm.

The officer's letter concluded as follows:

I hope this helps clarify the reason for the denial of [S.M.'s] request for dispositional review. She is not eligible for any further reviews of this matter.

Despite the conclusive nature of the administrative review officer's "rule-out" correspondence, S.M. and her counsel did not seek timely review of that final agency decision within forty-five days as prescribed by R. 2:4-1(b). Instead, S.M., through her attorney, attempted to intervene in her daughter B.R.'s guardianship case in December 2005. This occurred some eight months after the judge who presided over that trial, Judge Benjamin Cohen, had already entered final judgment terminating B.R.'s parental rights to A.W. and A.R. on March 11, 2005.

Specifically, on December 14, 2005, S.M. filed a pendente lite motion under Docket No. FG-07-165-04 and FN-07-84-04, requesting that she be awarded temporary custody of A.W. and A.R. pending the outcome of B.R.'s appeal of Judge Cohen's March 11, 2005 order of termination, or, alternatively, seeking visitation with the granddaughters pending that appeal. S.M.'s motion was accompanied by a lengthy certification, detailing her version of the family history, including a denial of any wrongdoing on her part when dealing with DYFS and Arizona child welfare agencies twenty years ago, and offering a litany of reasons why she felt placement of her grandchildren with her was in their best interests, whereas placement with B.R.'s godmother was not.

On January 12, 2006, Judge Cohen signed an order allowing DYFS to release limited portions of its records to S.M.'s counsel, including various DYFS correspondence and certain relevant portions of the transcript from B.R.'s guardianship trial. The trial court concurrently issued a protective order regarding all DYFS records obtained by S.M. or her attorneys.

Following oral argument on February 6, 2006, Judge Cohen denied S.M.'s application for custody, and for post-termination/pre-adoption visitation. The judge did so on a variety of procedural and substantive grounds.

Procedurally, Judge Cohen found that S.M.'s effort to obtain judicial review of DYFS' final agency decision ruling her out as a caretaker was untimely and in the wrong forum. The judge observed that S.M. should have appealed DYFS' adverse determination to this court within forty-five days of April 11, 2005, the date of DYFS' administrative review officer's final letter reaffirming the agency's rule-out decision and the reasons for that decision. Judge Cohen also held that S.M.'s attempt to litigate custody of the children, more than eight months after the court had rendered final judgment in March 2005 terminating B.R.'s parental rights, was untimely and did not warrant S.M.'s intervention under R. 4:33 in the guardianship matter, which was already on appeal in this court.

Substantively, Judge Cohen concluded that S.M. had not sustained her burden of demonstrating a basis to change the present custodial placement of the children with B.R.'s godmother, who the judge found had provided "a safe, stable and loving home for [A.W. and A.R.] for the last four years in [A.W.'s] case and two years in [A.R.'s] case." Judge Cohen also rejected S.M.'s attack on DYFS' decision to rule her out as a suitable caretaker, noting that DYFS had expended "considerable time and effort" to assess S.M. with the assistance of Georgia authorities and that DFYS "did not rush to judgment." The judge underscored S.M.'s dishonesty in her July 2004 appearance before Judge Floria. The judge also found that granting S.M. custody of the children in Georgia "might expose them once again to their abusive mother, [B.R.] . . . and pose a serious threat of physical or sexual abuse." In this latter regard, the judge expressed his strong perception that B.R.'s "hand can be discerned behind the scenes in [S.M.'s] application."

With respect to S.M.'s request for visitation pending her daughter B.R.'s appeal of the March 2005 guardianship judgment, Judge Cohen invoked similar concerns about the risks that such contact would pose for the children. The judge noted B.R.'s "documented history of sabotaging every out-of-home placement and her manipulation of the system," and his concern that B.R. and S.M. had planned to "join up in Georgia," so that the children likely would be exposed again to B.R. while visiting their grandmother S.M. The judge also noted that bonding evaluations had confirmed that the children were "thriving" with B.R.'s godmother as their caretaker, would "suffer great harm" if removed from her home, and that releasing the children to their grandmother's care in Georgia would cause "disruption on their lives."

Based on these many considerations, Judge Cohen denied S.M.'s application for custody and visitation. S.M.'s appeal ensued, which was calendared back-to-back with B.R.'s appeal of the guardianship judgment.

II.

S.M. argues on appeal that (1) the trial judge improperly relied on so-called "secret evidence" from B.R.'s guardianship proceedings, which S.M. allegedly had no opportunity to refute, (2) the judge should have afforded S.M. a plenary hearing; and (3) the denial of pre-adoption visitation to S.M. is contrary to the grandparent visitation statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1. We address each of these arguments, none of which is persuasive, in turn.

S.M. characterizes Judge Cohen's decision as being predicated upon "secret evidence" because, in the course of his February 2, 2006 ruling, he alluded to proofs that had been adduced in B.R.'s guardianship trial. At the outset, we observe that B.R. had listed her mother S.M. as a defense witness in the guardianship trial but inexplicably did not call her to the stand. For reasons unclear to us, S.M. also did not attempt to intervene in that trial.

We also note that S.M. has conceded receiving exhibits from the guardianship trial from her daughter B.R., and that a number of the documents contained in S.M.'s appendix on this appeal replicate documents in B.R.'s case. Although we recognize that S.M.'s formal access through the court to limited confidential records from B.R.'s guardianship trial did not afford her with carte blanche access to the entire set of impounded materials, our assessment of the respective records in both appeals persuades us that S.M. has not been deprived of a fair opportunity to understand the reasons for, and an adequate chance to contest, the adverse determinations of both DYFS and the trial court.

Both Judge Cohen, in his February 2006 opinion in this case, and the DYFS administrative review officer, in her April 2005 final "rule-out" letter, made very clear to S.M. why she had been found to be unsuitable to have custody of her grandchildren. The two central reasons for those adverse judicial and administrative findings are S.M.'s past misconduct in allowing her own daughter Alicia to have continued contact with a child molester, and S.M.'s more recent misconduct in falsely responding about those matters when questioned by Judge Floria. These factors should have posed no mystery to S.M., as they involve her own behavior. If contrary proofs existed, S.M. should have presented them to DYFS before it rendered its final rule-out letter or to the Family Part before it made its final custodial determination in B.R.'s guardianship trial.

In her certification filed belatedly with the Family Part after the guardianship trial and DYFS' final rule-out letter, S.M. attempted to explain her dishonest responses to Judge Floria by claiming that she had "been taken by surprise and [became] completely frustrated and disconcerted when [Judge Floria] inquired about an area of my life that had been painful to the point that I had blocked out certain issues and circumstances about my failed marriage and my ex-husband." We sustain Judge Cohen's sound determination to reject this explanation as insufficient to justify S.M.'s misstatements to the court. Although we recognize that S.M. was not placed under oath when questioned by Judge Floria, S.M.'s untruthful responses nevertheless were appropriately considered by DYFS and the trial court as significant indicia of S.M.'s lack of credibility. See N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1) (unsworn prior statements by a party may be used to impeach his or her credibility).

The trial court and DYFS had ample grounds to decline to entrust the two minor children to S.M., whether her misstatements to the court are characterized, as S.M. portrays it, as the "blocking out" of unpleasant memories or, as DYFS contends, deliberate lying. Regardless of the label applied to them, we conclude that S.M.'s repeated misstatements to a Superior Court judge, on the record in open court, presents grave concerns about the veracity of S.M.'s position and about her suitability as a responsible caretaker for two young girls.

We also perceive no unfairness in the trial court and DYFS relying upon S.M.'s past misconduct, in allowing her one of her former husbands, a child molester, continued access to her daughter Alicia, in the 1980s after being directed by child welfare authorities to cease that contact. We are mindful that S.M.'s improper conduct occurred two decades ago, and that she is now gainfully employed as a schoolteacher and has apparently been commended for her work in the classroom. Nevertheless, we see no abuse of discretion in DYFS and the trial court having considerable reservations about granting S.M. custody of the children here. Those reservations are underscored by the disturbing parallels between the behavior of B.R. and of S.M. in allowing their children to remain in the company of child molesters.

We find inapposite the various cases cited by S.M. expressing the general proposition that litigants should not have their interests adjudicated without notice and an opportunity to be heard, and to understand the nature of the proofs against them. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McCrath, 341 U.S., 123, 170, 71 S. Ct. 624, 648, 95 L. Ed. 817, 853 (1951); United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 457, 474 (3d Cir. 2001); Nicoletta v. North Jersey District Water Supply Comm'n, 77 N.J. 145, 162 (1978). Those cases have no bearing here, where the reasons why S.M. was found to be an unsuitable custodian were clearly made known to her by DYFS in its April 2005 correspondence and by DYFS' papers filed in opposition to S.M.'s December 2005 motion. The incidental references to B.R.'s prior guardianship trial articulated by Judge Cohen in his oral decision do not warrant a reversal or remand simply because S.M. may not have obtained from the court or from her daughter B.R. the entire record of the guardianship trial.

The reasons why S.M. was ruled out, and the evidence associated with that result, were plain and obvious. S.M. had more than am ample opportunity, with the assistance of her successive attorneys, to offer any competing proofs to the court. Indeed, S.M. submitted to the court in December 2005 an eighty-five page certification, with 114 pages of exhibits, all of which was duly considered before the trial court ruled against her in February 2006. The certification reflects that S.M. was acutely conscious of the problems raised by her past inappropriate conduct, and had tried to rebut those concerns with her own narrative account of the circumstances and a plethora of supporting documents.

In sum, we are satisfied that S.M. was afforded a fair opportunity to be heard, and that the grounds for DYFS and the trial court denying her custody were amply disclosed.

Similarly, we reject S.M.'s claim that a plenary hearing was required to resolve S.M.'s December 2005 motion for custody and visitation. As we have previously recognized, a plenary hearing is not required on every application to the Family Part involving custody matters, but only those raising genuine and material issues of fact. See R. 5:8-6 (requiring plenary hearings in custody matters only where the contested issues are "genuine and substantial"); Barblock v. Barblock, 383 N.J. Super. 114, 127 (App. Div. 2006) (under the unusual facts of the case, no plenary hearing was required to authorize mother's relocation of her children out of state, over the father's objection, where no material factual disputes were demonstrated) certif. denied, ___ N.J. ___ (May 23, 2006); see also Pfeiffer v. Ilson, 318 N.J. Super. 13, 14 (App. Div. 1999) (upholding a trial court's order granting a removal application without a plenary hearing in certain circumstances emphasizing that a plenary hearing is not necessary in every case, but "rather only where a prima facia showing has been made that a genuine issue of fact exists bearing upon a critical question such as the best interests of the children").

Here, no plenary hearing was warranted for several reasons. As a threshold matter, we agree with DYFS that S.M. could have sought appellate review in this court on its final rule-out decision within forty-five days of the administrative review officer's April 11, 2005 letter. R. 2:4-1(b). Even putting that opportunity aside, we also note the potential for S.M. to have sought to intervene earlier in her daughter's guardianship trial under R. 4:33-1. Although we need not decide here whether a timely intervention request should or should not have been granted, the failure of S.M., who had been listed as a defense witness for that very trial, to attempt to bring her concerns regarding these children to the attention of the court diminishes the alleged "materiality" of her motion eight months later attempting, in effect, to unravel the trial court's guardianship determination.

Moreover, for the substative reasons expressed in Judge Cohen's oral opinion, which we have summarized above, S.M.'s demand for a plenary hearing on custody was appropriately rejected. We concur with Judge Cohen that S.M.'s prior acts of misconduct sufficed to disqualify her as a suitable caretaker, and, moreover, that transferring custody to S.M. from the able care of the godmother would have foisted disruptive havoc upon the children, who are entitled to permanency. In re Guardianship of J.P., 180 N.J. 494, 505 (2004) (citing In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., Jr., 161 N.J. 396, 404 (1999). No plenary hearing was necessary in these particular circumstances.

Lastly, we consider S.M.'s application for post-termination pre-adoption visitation with her grandchildren under the Grandparent Visitation Statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

a. A grandparent . . . of a child residing in this State may make application before the Superior Court, in accordance with the Rules of Court, for an order for visitation. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child.

b. In making a determination on an application filed pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the following factors:
 
(1) The relationship between the child and the applicant;
 
(2) The relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the applicant;
 
(3) The time which has elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant;
 
(4) The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing;
 
(5) If the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement which exists between the parents with regard to the child;
 
(6) The good faith of the applicant in filing the application;
 
(7) Any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant; and
 
(8) Any other factor relevant to the best interests of the child.

[N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1]

DYFS argues that S.M. cannot invoke a right to visitation under the statute because the parental rights of S.M.'s daughter, B.R., have already been terminated in anticipation of her children's adoption by B.R.'s godmother upon the completion of the appellate process. However, the main case DYFS relies upon in advancing this argument, In re Adoption of Child by W.P., 163 N.J. 158, 163 (2000), is not factually on point because that case involved an application by biological grandparents' for visitation after nonrelatives had already adopted the child in question. Our Supreme Court has not yet reached the question of whether N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 affords grandparents potential visitation rights in the pre-adoptive post-termination context, such as the present case. We need not resolve that issue here, because even if, for the sake of argument, such pre-adoptive grandparent visitation may be appropriate in certain situations, the record before us amply supports Judge Cohen's prudent determination to deny S.M. such visitation on the merits.

As Judge Cohen noted, the children have been thriving in the competent care of B.R.'s godmother for more than two years. Although the record suggests that S.M. and the godmother were at one time friends, their relationship has indisputably deteriorated. Indeed, S.M.'s certification sharply criticized the godmother's care for the children in numerous respects. The children's mother, B.R., was denied visitation pending her own appeal of the guardianship judgment. There obviously is a substantial nexus between S.M. and B.R., as reflected by B.R. sharing confidential exhibits with her mother and listing her as a potential trial witness. The trial court also appropriately considered S.M.'s own past misconduct, which we have detailed above in our discussion of the custodial issues.

Bearing all of these considerations in mind, we affirm Judge Cohen's decision to deny S.M.'s visitation under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, as a determination supported by substantial credible evidence. See Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (findings of a trial judge sitting without a jury are "considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence"); see also Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-13 (1998) (due to the particularized expertise of Family Court judges in family matters, enhanced deference is accorded to Family Court fact finding). In particular, we perceive that at least seven of the eight factors recited in subsection (b) of N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 collectively weigh against permitting such visitation with S.M. at this time. In sustaining that result, we have not overlooked the fact that the children, particularly the older child A.M., used to have extended summer visits with their grandmother. The bare fact of such prior visits, however, does not undermine the wisdom of the trial court's determination that it would not be in the children's best interests to resume them nearly a year after the guardianship judgment and with an application for adoption by the godmother anticipated upon the conclusion of the instant appeal.

In sum, we affirm the Family Part's denial of custody and visitation to S.M. in all respects.

 

In a companion opinion issued today, we affirmed the Family Part's termination of B.R.'s parental rights in Docket No. A-4220-04T4.

This daughter of S.M. coincidentally has the same initials as her niece A.R. We shall therefore refer to her by the fictitious name of "Alicia."

To avoid confusion from the similarity of initials, this opinion will hereafter refer to B.R.H. as "B.R.'s godmother" or "the godmother."

S.M.'s appeal was subsequently placed on a different calendar to accommodate S.M.'s request for oral argument. B.R.'s appeal was submitted on the papers.

The fifth factor enumerated in that subsection, concerning the effect of a grandparent's visitation on the time-sharing arrangements of divorced or separated parents, is inapplicable here. N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.l(b)(5).

(continued)

(continued)

24

A-3315-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

July 14, 2006