PREETI S. RATH v. UDAYA K. RATH

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2933-03T12933-03T1

PREETI S. RATH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

UDAYA K. RATH,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________

 

Submitted: November 28, 2005 - Decided March 10, 2006

Before Judges A. A. Rodr guez and Alley.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, FM-03-45679-91.

Udaya K. Rath, appellant pro se.

Preeti S. Rath, respondent, has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

On January 27, 2004, appellant Udaya K. Rath, filed a notice of appeal from a post-divorce judgment order entered on December 11, 2003, "and other dates," between September 2002 to December 11, 2003. At the outset, we note that all but the appeal from the December 11, 2003 order are time-barred. An appeal from a final judgment or order must be taken within forty-five days from the order of that judgment or order. R. 2:4-1. The December 11, 2003 order is affirmed.

These are the pertinent facts. Appellant and Preeti S. Rath (mother) were married in May 1962. They were divorced on September 15, 1993. The parties are the parents of three sons and one daughter. One son and the daughter are emancipated. The other sons are twenty-seven year old twins, who are autistic, mentally retarded and developmentally disabled. The mother cares for their needs on a full-time basis. They live in the former marital home in Medford. Appellant currently resides in California.

The final judgment of divorce provided that appellant would pay the mother child support in the amount of $320 per week, as well as permanent alimony. From 1995 to 1999, appellant filed a series of motions regarding his obligations to mother. Appellant challenged the resulting orders to us. Rath v. Rath, No. A-0487-99T5 (App. Div. Nov. 14, 2000). We affirmed all orders except one, concerning allegedly improper tax exemption, which we remanded for modification. Rath, supra, slip op. at 5.

Currently, the twins each receive $535 per month each in Social Security disability benefits and are each covered by Medicaid. There is also a Special Needs Trust established for their benefit, which pays them approximately $200 per month. In addition, appellant pays $10 support per week for the twins' pursuant to the court order. In September 2002, Judge Hogan denied appellant's request to modify the alimony obligation based on changed circumstances. In October 2003, Judge Hogan denied appellant's motion to reduce his support obligation and granted the mother's cross-motion to place a lis pendens to appellant's San Diego real property. As stated before, appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal from these orders.

On December 11, 2003, Judge Michael J. Hogan denied appellant's motion: (1) to lift the sanctions on his San Diego property; (2) to enforce the return of savings bonds appellant alleges were in the mother's possession; (3) for access to the Special Needs Trust; and (4) to alter the custody arrangement. At the same time, Judge Hogan granted the mother's cross-motion: (1) to enforce the court order already requiring appellant to provide proof of life insurance; and (2) to direct the Burlington County Probation Department to begin Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.77 enforcement procedures against appellant.

On appeal, appellant contends that the judge erred with respect to several decisions. From our careful review of the record, we conclude that these arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We merely make the following observations.

Appellant contends that there have been significant changes in circumstances to warrant a reduction in his spousal support obligation since Judge Hogan's December 11, 2003 order. We note that appellant withdrew his changed circumstances application before the judge ruled on the issue. Therefore, we cannot consider this issue on appeal because it was not raised in the Family Part. Unless an issue is jurisdictional in nature or substantially implicate the public interest, we will ordinarily not consider an issue not properly raised in the trial court. Nieder v. Royal Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).

Appellant also challenges the denial of his motion to compel discovery documents from the mother. Judge Hogan denied the motion because appellant:

failed to provide the Court with any reason for providing him with the requested documents. Further, having fully examined these issues by way of plenary hearing already, the Court [is] satisfied that [the mother's] CIS is fully credible such that providing each of these documents are both unduly burdensome on the [mother] and unwarranted.

It is settled that we "will generally defer to a trial court's decisions regarding discovery, with review under the discretion standard." Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 2:10-2 (2006). From our review, we conclude that the judge's decision to deny appellant's discovery motion was not an abuse of discretion.

Appellant further contends the judge erred in denying his motion to require the mother to obtain life insurance. The judge noted that "[t]he parties' Property Settlement Agreement required only [appellant] to obtain life insurance. He has failed to provide any reason to now modify this agreement." We concur with the judge's conclusion that there are no facts justifying modification of the agreement. Thus, the decision is entitled to our deference by this Court. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412-413 (1998).

Appellant also contends that the judge erred by not ordering the mother to contribute to child support. The judge found this motion to be "frivolous as there is no question that she already contributes to their support by virtue of being the custodial parent." Moreover, the support guidelines presume that the custodial parents share of rearing expenses. Child Support Guidelines, Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A at 2302 (2006). The mother is the custodial parent of two sons, her support obligations are more than fulfilled through her full-time care of them.

In addition, appellant contends that the decision denying a change in custodial arrangement was erroneous. The judge denied the motion because appellant failed to provide any adequate reasons to modify the custody arrangements. We concur.

Appellant further claims that the denial of his motion to lift sanctions or restrictions on his San Diego property should be reversed. The judge denied the motion because appellant's support obligation remained in arrears and that as long as appellant continued to be in non-compliance with court orders, appellant would be prevented from dissipating his assets. R. 5:3-7 provides that upon a "finding that a party has violated an alimony or child support order the court may . . . grant any of the following remedies, either singly or in combination: (1) fixing the amount of arrearages and entering a judgment upon which interest accrues; . . . (4) economic sanctions; . . . and (8) any other appropriate equitable remedy." A motion to sanction a litigant who disobeys a court order is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Gonzales v. Safe and Sound Security, 368 N.J. Super. 203, 209 (App. Div. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 185 N.J. 100 (2005). A trial court has an array of available remedies to enforce compliance with a court rule or one of its orders. Id. at 115; Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 96 N.J. 336, 345, 476 A.2d 250 (1984). Here, we perceive no abuse of discretion.

Lastly, appellant challenges the granting of the mother's cross-motion directing the Probation Department to begin UIFSA enforcement procedures for his willful failure to pay support. Appellant contends that he has been paying his support obligation all along. However, this assertion is belied by the record. Appellant remains in arrears on his support obligation. We find no abuse of discretion in ordering a UIFSA enforcement procedure.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-2933-03T1

March 10, 2006