STYERTOWNE APARTMENTS, LLC v. MICHAEL CURRAN
Annotate this CaseNOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2679-04T52679-04T5
STYERTOWNE APARTMENTS, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL CURRAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________________________
Argued March 7, 2006 - Decided May 3, 2006
Before Judges Coburn, Lisa and S.L. Reisner.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Special Civil Part, Passaic
County, LT-2281-04.
Michael R. Curran, appellant, argued the
cause pro se.
Benjamin A. Karfunkel argued the cause for
respondent (Carlet, Garrison, Klein & Zaretsky, attorneys; Mr. Karfunkel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This dispute between plaintiff Styertowne Apartments, LLC ("Styertowne"), a landlord, and defendant Michael Curran, Styertowne's tenant, concerns that portion of the judgment awarding the landlord court costs plus $600 in late fees due under a written lease.
Styertowne's first contention is that the appeal is untimely. We agree and therefore dismiss the appeal without considering Curran's substantive arguments.
The judgment was entered on September 27, 2004. On November 4, 2004, Curran filed a motion for reconsideration. On December 9, 2004, the trial court denied the motion as untimely, while granting Styertowne's motion for turnover of the late fees previously paid into court by Curran. Although the judge said that he would "do this Order right now," the only order releasing the money was filed on December 21, 2004. Curran filed his notice of appeal on February 4, 2005.
Initially, we take note of Curran's argument that no judgment was entered on September 24, 2004. He bases that argument on the fact that all he received was the trial judge's written opinion dated September 24, 2004. But this was a Special Civil Part case, and Curran's argument overlooks
Rule 6:6-5, which provides that "upon determination by a judge sitting without a jury, the clerk shall note the judgment on the jacket and it shall take effect forthwith. The clerk shall thereupon enter the judgment and tax the costs." The record contains nothing to suggest that the clerk failed to follow the rule. Therefore, we will assume the judgment was entered in accordance with the rule.
Initially, Curran was obliged to file his appeal within 45 days of September 27, 2004; in other words, by Thursday, November 11, 2004. Even if we assume that his motion for reconsideration, which was filed on November 4, 2004, was timely, despite the twenty-day rule contained in Rule 4:49-2, and that the running of the time for appeal was suspended by the filing of the motion, Curran's notice of appeal was still unduly late. That is so because Rule 2:4-3(e) provides that "[t]he remaining time shall again begin to run from the date of the entry of an order disposing of such motion." Just before Curran filed his motion for reconsideration, the notice of appeal had to be filed in less than one week. Since the order denying his motion was filed on December 21, 2004, the notice of appeal was due about one week later. But Curran did not file his notice of appeal until February 4, 2005, making it late by around 37 days. Curran, an attorney admitted to practice in this State, did not file a motion to extend the time for appeal, as is required by
Rule 2:4-4, and, in any case, has not met the "good cause" requirement of that rule. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.
Dismissed.
(continued)
(continued)
3
A-2679-04T5
May 3, 2006
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