ROBERT AMSES, et al. v. BOROUGH OF AVALON, et al.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
 
 
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
 

ROBERT AMSES, ROBERTA BASILE, A-2666-04T5
ELMER CUMMINGS, JR., HILARY
DAHMS, WILLIAM DAHMS, ROBERT
DOUGHERTY, HARRY FRENCH, RACHEL
GREEN, DAVID KNOCHE, ROSE BOYD
KNOCHE, JOAN LEODORI, ROBERT
ROSATO, STABLE PARTNERS (a
Pennsylvania Limited Partnership),
RAYMOND SANTUCCI, EDWARD VOGEL, JR.,
and MARJORIE ZOOK,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BOROUGH OF AVALON, NEW JERSEY,
JEFFREY HESLEY, PHILIP JUDYSKI
and MARTIN PAGLIUGHI, ANDREW BEDNAREK,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

CAPE MAY COUNTY BOARD OF TAXATION,
PHILILP JUDYSKI, GEORGE RAYMOND BROWN,
III, ROBERT K. THOMPSON and STATE OF
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION,

Defendants.

---------------------------------------
WILLIAM BAYNE,

Plaintiff,

v.

BOROUGH OF AVALON, NEW JERSEY,
JEFFREY HESLEY, PHILIP JUDYSKI
and MARTIN PAGLIUGHI, ANDREW BEDNAREK,

Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________________________

ROBERT AMSES, ROBERTA BASILE, A-2668-04T5
ELMER CUMMINGS, JR., HILARY
DAHMS, WILLIAM DAHMS, ROBERT
DOUGHERTY, HARRY FRENCH, RACHEL
GREEN, DAVID KNOCHE, ROSE BOYD
KNOCHE, STABLE PARTNERS (a
Pennsylvania Limited Partnership),
RAYMOND SANTUCCI AND MARJORIE ROOK,

Plaintiffs,

and

JOAN LEODORI, ROBERT ROSATO
and EDWARD VOGEL, JR.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BOROUGH OF AVALON, NEW JERSEY,
JEFFREY HESLEY, THE CAPE MAY
COUNTY TAX BOARD, GEORGE RAYMOND
BROWN, III, PHILIP JUDYSKI,
MARTIN PAGLIUGHI, ANDREW BEDNAREK,
ROBERT THOMPSON and STATE OF NEW
JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION,

Defendants-Respondents.
----------------------------------------

WILLIAM BAYNE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

BOROUGH OF AVALON, NEW JERSEY,
JEFFREY HESLEY, THE CAPE MAY
COUNTY TAX BOARD, GEORGE RAYMOND
BROWN, III, PHILIP JUDYSKI, MARTIN
PAGLIUGHI, ANDREW BEDNAREK, ROBERT
THOMPSON, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DIVISION OF TAXATION,

Defendants-Respondents.

___________________________________________

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April 7, 2006

Argued March 15, 2006 Decided

Before Judges Conley and Winkelstein.

On appeal from the Tax Court of New Jersey, 3514-2000, 3516-2000, 3518-2000, 3519-2000, 4031-2000 and 4242-2000.

Paul A. Leodori, appellant in A-2666-04T5, argued the cause pro se.

Paul A. Leodori argued the cause for appellants in A-2668-04T5 (Reger, Rizzo, Kavulich & Darnall, attorneys; Mr. Leodori, on the brief).

Stacy Alison Fols argued the cause for respondents Borough of Avalon, Jeffrey Hesley, Martin Paglliughi and Andrew Bednarek in A-2668-04T5 and A-2666-04T5 (Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, attorneys; Ms. Fols, on the brief).

Michael J. Spina, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents the New Jersey Division of Taxation, the Cape May County Board of Taxation, Robert Thompson, George Brown and Philip Judyski in A-2668-04T5 (Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney; Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Julian F. Gorelli, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

 
These back-to-back appeals arise from actions brought by various Borough of Avalon property owners challenging an increase in their real property tax assessments on the basis that other property owners in the Borough were not subject to similar increases and, therefore, did not pay their fair share. Plaintiffs primary cause of action alleged that their due process and equal protection rights were violated, entitling them to compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. After transfer from the Superior Court, Judge Joseph Small, Presiding Judge of the Tax Court, dismissed plaintiffs 1983 action pursuant to General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden, 143 N.J. 336 (1996), and invited consideration of each plaintiff's complaint as individual tax appeals. The plaintiff taxpayers declined this remedy. They also declined to bring tax appeals challenging the assessments of those property owners whose assessments were not similarly increased. Because plaintiffs' persistent 1983 liability attacks upon the individual defendant municipal employees were clearly unfounded, and continued even after a frivolous lawsuit notice and after dismissal of the 1983 cause of action, counsel fees and costs were imposed upon plaintiffs attorneys, Paul Leodori and the firm of Hill Wallack, as a sanction for frivolous filings under R. 1:4-8.
Those plaintiffs who have appealed contend:
POINT I: plaintiffs could not challenge their tax burden under new jersey law in violation of their procedural due process rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

a. new jersey taxpayers do not receive notice of their disproportionate tax burden until months after the time in which to file a tax appeal has expired.

b. new jersey taxpayers assessed at true value are prevented from presenting evidence that would establish their inequitable tax burden because of prohibitive filing fees.

c. new jersey taxpayers assessed at true value are deprived of the chance to know the municipality's factual and legal justification for impoSIng an illegal and inequitable tax burden.

d. the presumption that assessments are valid deprives plaintifFs of their due process rights under the united states constitution given that avalon's coefficient of deviation has exceeded 15% since 1999.

e. the court's stay of discovery deprived plaintiffs of their right to due process.

point ii: plaintiffs could nOt challenge their tax burden under new jersey law in violatioN of their procedural due process rights guaranteed by the new jersey constitution.

a. new jersey's doctrine of fundamental fairness mandates that plaintiffs have full discoverY and have their day in court to challenge their inequitable tax burden puRsuant to the doctrine of fundamental fairness.

b. the due process right to appeal an inequitable tax burden is guaranteed by article I, par. 1 of the new jersey constitution.

c. the due process right to appeal an inequitable tax burden is guaranteed by n.j. const., art. viii, . I, par. 1(a).

d. due process under the new jerseY constitution requires giving a taxpayer "adequate notice" to challenge an inequitable tax burden.

e. due process under the new jersey constitution requires giving a taxpayer the opportunity to challenge an inequitable tax burden before a neutral and detached judge.

point iii: plaintiffs could Not challeNge their tax burden under new jersey law in violatioN of their substantive due process rights guaranteed by the united states constitution.

a. PLAINTIFFS HAD NO ADEQUATE REMEDY UNDER N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 EVEN IF THEY APPEALED THEIR OWN ASSESSMENTS TO THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX BOARD SINCE N.J.S.A. 54:3-22 LIMITS THE TAX COURT TO REVISE AND CORRECT AN "ASSESSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VALUE PRESCRIBED BY LAW" AND NOT the PLAINTIFFS' TAX BURDEN.

B. PLAINTIFFS HAD NO ADEQUATE REMEDY UNDER N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 EVEN [IF] THEY APPEALED THEIR OWN ASSESSMENTS TO THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX BOARD SINCE THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX BOARD RULES EFFECTIVELY PROHIBIT PLAINTIFFS FROM PRESENTING THEIR CLAIMS.

C. PLAINTIFFS HAD NO ADEQUATE REMEDY UNDER N.J.S.A. 54:3-21 EVEN IF THEY APPEALED THEIR OWN ASSESSMENTS TO THE TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY SINCE N.J.S.A. 54:51A-6 LIMITS THE TAX COURT TO REFUSE AND CORRECT AND "ASSESSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VALUE PRESCRIBED BY LAW" AND NOT THE PLAINTIFFS' TAX BURDEN.
 
POINT IV: PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT CHALLENGE THEIR TAX BURDEN UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW IN VIOLATION OF THEIR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.

point v: plaintiffs' right to equal protection guaranteed by the united states constitution was violated for at least tax years 1999 through 2003.

point vi: the court must declare that plaintiffs' right to equal protection guaranteed by article, I, paragraph 1 of the new jersey constitution has been violated for tax years 1996 through tax year 2003.

point vii: plaintiffs' fundamental right to be assessed at the same standard of value with all others in avalon as guaranteed by article viii, section 1, paragraph 1 of the new jersey constituTion was violated for at least tax year 1999 through at least tax year 2003.

point viii: the tax court erRed in not declaring hesley's simultaneously acting as the assessor for avalon and the assessor for longport was prohibited pursuant to the new jersey local government ethics law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 since they are "incompatible offices."

point ix: the tax court erred in not declaring hesley's simultaneously acting as the assessor FOR avalon and the zoning officer for avalon was prohibited pursUant to the new jersey local government ethics law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 since they are "incompatible offices."

point x: the tax court erred in not declaring hesley's simultaneously acting as the assessor and zoning officer for avalon and the assessor for longport is prohibited pursuant to the new jersey local government ethics law, N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5 since they are "incompatible offices."

point xi: the tax court's refusal to make any requested declArations pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2a:16-50 et seq. was improper.

a. the tax court ignored the plain language of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 and refused to declare that avalon should each year assess all properties at fair market value.

b. the tax court ignored the legislative intent behind N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.

c. the tax court ignored plaintiffs' entitlement to a strict construction of the plain langauge of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 because of its constitutional derivation.

d. the tax court failed to construe the plain language of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 in favor of plaintiffs against avalon.

e. the tax court completely ignored the common law antecedents of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 in failing to require avalon to assess all propErties at fair market value each year.

f. the tax court improperly ignored the presumption that all taxpayers must bear their fair burden of taxation in failing to properly interpret N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.

g. the tax court failed to recoGnize that it is mandatory and not discretionary that N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 requires an assessor to assess all properties at true value each year.

h. the tax court's reliance on switz and city of newark does not support the conclusion that N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 excuses avalon from each year assessing all properties at fair market value which avalon admits it did not do for at least tax year 1999 through tax year 2003.

i. the tax court is not a "superlegislature" and cannot rewrite N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.

j. the tax court failed to declare that defendants have violated N.J.S.A. 54:52-14 and that plaintiffs are entitled to relief under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et SEQ.
 
K. THE TAX COURT FAILED TO DECLARE THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 54:52-6c AND THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 ET AL.
 
L. THE TAX COURT FAILED TO DECLARE THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 54:52-6h AND THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 ET SEQ.

M. THE TAX COURT FAILED TO DECLARE THAT DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED N.J.S.A. 54:51A-23 AND PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RELIEF.

N. THE TAX COURT FAILED TO DECLARE THAT ALL DEFENDANTS HAVE CONVERTED THE STATUTORY ASSESSMENT PROCESS IN AVALON INTO A CRIMINAL RACKETEERING ACTIVITY FOR TAX YEARS 1 999 THROUGH TAX YEAR 2003 IN VIOLATION OF N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 ET SEQ.
 
POINT XII: PLAINTIFFS HAD NO PLAIN, SPEEDY OR EFFICIENT REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THEM TO CHALLENGE THEIR INEQUITABLE TAX BURDEN UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW THEREFORE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO RELIEF PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. 1983.

POINT XIII: DEFENDANT GEORGE RAYMOND BROWN, III IS A CAPE MAY COUNTY EMPLOYEE AND THE OFFICE OF THE NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL IS BARRED FROM REPRESENTING HIM.

POINT XIV: DEFENDANT GEORGE RAYMOND BROWN, III AS THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX ADMINISTRATOR HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION WHICH SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL JULIAN GORELLI FROM SIMULTANEOUSLY REPRESENTING DEFENDANT BROWN, THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX BOARD, THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX BOARD PRESIDENT PHILIP JUDYSKI AND THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION.

POINT XV: DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL JULIAN GORELLI IS PROHIBITED FROM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS BROWN, THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX BOARD, THE CAPE MAY COUNTY TAX BOARD PRESIDENT PHILIP JUDYSKI, THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF TAXATION AND ROBERT K. THOMPSON PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 59:10a-2 SINCE ALL WERE ACTING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND ENGAGED IN WILLFUL MISCONDUCT BY ALLOWING AVALON TO VIOLATE N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.
 
We have considered these contentions in light of the record, applicable law and Judge Small's numerous oral decisions, as well as his January 16, 2004, written opinion on the sanctions. We are convinced the contentions on appeal do not require any additional opinion from us, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A),(E), except for the following comments.
Throughout the tortured duration of these cases, plaintiffs repeatedly sought compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 to address the inequities they claimed were perpetrated by the Avalon tax assessor in terms of increases in their tax assessments without corresponding increases in other Avalon property owners' assessments. Just as repeatedly, and patiently, Judge Small correctly pointed out they had available remedies under state tax laws. Further, to the extent plaintiffs challenged the validity per se of Avalon's assessment maintenance program, authorized by N.J.S.A. 54:4-23, he pointed out, properly so, that the amendment to N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 enacted during the course of this litigation (L. 2001, c. 101, effective June 14, 2001) mooted the issue. And see Regent Care Ctr., Inc. v. Hackensack City, 362 N.J. Super. 403, 415 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 373 (2003) ("Performing a district-wide revaluation or reassessment every year would be the means best designed to meet [the constitutional] mandate [for equality of tax treatment and burden]. That is simply not feasible. . . . Periodic revaluations or reassessments are feasible and are necessary to maintain uniform and non-discriminatory assessments."). Further, the County Tax Board's order directing Avalon to conduct a revaluation, effectuated in 2004, also mooted the broader concerns underlying the litigation.
N.J. Const. Art. VIII, I, par. 1(a) provides:
Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules. All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State for allotment and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed according to the same standard of value, except as otherwise permitted herein, and such real property shall be taxed at the general tax rate of the taxing district in which the property is situated, for the use of such taxing district.
 
As a result, New Jersey taxpayers are to "be treated in a manner comparable to other similarly situated taxpayers." Township of W. Milford v. Van Decker, 120 N.J. 354, 361 (1990). "The dominant principle . . . is equality of treatment and burden . . . . " Switz v. Middletown Twp., 23 N.J. 580, 593 (1957). See also Murnick v. City of Asbury Park, 95 N.J. 452, 458 (1984).
"Not every deviation, however, is of constitutional dimension. Mathematical precision is not required." Id. at 459. And too, a "municipality may revise assessments in years other than years of municipal-wide revaluation for legitimate reasons." Township of W. Milford v. Van Decker, supra, 120 N.J. at 362. "Assessors cannot be expected to do nothing in years between district-wide revaluations or reassessments." Regent Care Ctr., Inc. v. Hackensack City, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 416.
Application of these principles has not been without its difficulties, however. See In re Appeals of Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 25 (1961); Baldwin Constr. Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Tax., 16 N.J. 329 (1954). Responding to the Court's invitation in Kents for legislative action to resolve all tax assessment discrimination claims, 34 N.J. at 33, the Legislature adopted L. 1973, c. 123 (Chapter 123).
As a consequence, most claims of property tax discrimination are resolved under N.J.S.A. 54:1-35a through application of what is commonly referred to as the Chapter 123 ratio. N.J.S.A. 54:3-22; N.J.S.A. 54:4-62; N.J.S.A. 54:51A-6. That ratio establishes the average ratio of assessed value to true value for all taxable properties within a taxing district. 1530 Owners Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, 135 N.J. 394, 397 (1994). The statute defines a "common level range" as "that range which is plus or minus 15% of the average ratio for [the taxing] district." N.J.S.A. 54:1-35a(b). The "average ratio" is the ratio of assessed value to true value as promulgated annually by the Director of the Division of Taxation's Table of Equalized Valuations. N.J.S.A. 54:1-35a(a); 1530 Owners Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, supra, 135 N.J. at 397. The Chapter 123 ratio is computed according to an established formula, is based on a study of sales recorded during a one-year sampling period, id. at 398, and establishes a rebuttable presumption of the validity of the common level assessment, Murnick v. City of Asbury Park, supra, 95 N.J. at 462.
It is, then, Chapter 123 which, in most instances, "establishes both the right to and measure of relief." 1530 Owners Corp. v. Borough of Fort Lee, supra, 135 N.J. at 399. "If the assessment ratio applied to a parcel substantially exceeds the assessment ratio applied generally in a taxing district, the taxpayer has a right to relief." Murnick v. City of Asbury Park, supra, 95 N.J. at 458.
Under this statutory structure, the property owners can appeal either their assessment or another property owner's assessment to the county tax board by filing a petition of appeal and paying, at most, $150. N.J.S.A. 54:3-21; N.J.S.A. 54:3-21.3. N.J.S.A. 54:3-21a provides in pertinent part:
[A] taxpayer feeling aggrieved by the assessed valuation of the taxpayer's property, or feeling discriminated against by the assessed valuation of other property in the county . . . may on or before April 1, or 45 days from the date the bulk mailing of notification of assessment is completed in the taxing district, whichever is later, appeal to the county board of taxation by filing with it a petition of appeal[.]

[Emphasis added.]
 
The Board may hear the appeal in a manner it "deem[s] just," including compelling the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence such as books, deeds or other instruments of conveyance. N.J.S.A. 54:3-22a and b. If the Board is satisfied that the ratio of assessed valuation of the subject property to its true value exceeds the upper limit or falls below the lower limit of the common level range, it is required to revise the taxable value, either up or down. N.J.S.A. 54:3-22c. A party who is dissatisfied with the judgment or determination of the Board may seek relief by filing a complaint in the Tax Court. N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1a. R. 8:12(a) requires that $200 be paid upon the filing of a complaint in the Tax Court for the parcel of property whose assessment is being challenged.
To be sure, Chapter 123, and individual tax appeals to reduce one's assessment or to increase another's assessment, do not provide "the sole discrimination remedy in satisfaction of a taxpayer's constitutional right to relief." Murnick v. City of Asbury Park, supra, 95 N.J. at 462. In egregious cases of discrimination, a taxpayer retains a constitutional right to relief beyond the Chapter 123 remedy. Township of W. Milford v. Van Decker, 120 N.J. at 365; Murnick v. City of Asbury Park, supra, 95 N.J. at 455. "Although we agree with the importance of stability in tax assessments, that goal may not override the constitutional right of a taxpayer to substantially equal treatment at the hands of a tax assessor," id. at 461-62, or the New Jersey Constitution's guarantee that real estate should be "assessed according to the same standard of value." Township of W. Milford v. Van Decker, supra, 120 N.J. at 364. "[R]elief [in egregious cases] should be granted upon a showing which satisfactorily reveals unequal treatment in violation of State law and a reasonable basis for compensating for the wrong, whether the wrong be visited invidiously or be the aftermath of a failure to comply with the law." In re Appeals of Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., supra, 34 N.J. at 29.
Thus, in Township of W. Milford v. Van Decker, supra, 120 N.J. at 357, 361-63, the Court found that reassessing only properties that were the subject of a recent sale constituted impermissible spot assessment in violation of both the uniformity clause of the New Jersey Constitution and the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. It further found that "[t]his case presents an egregious case of discrimination, and as such, is one of a narrow few that falls outside the scope of Chapter 123." Id. at 365. The remedy the Court utilized for the constitutional violation was to strike the Township's assessment and restore the previous year's assessed valuation. Ibid. See Centorino v. Tewksbury Twp., 347 N.J. Super. 256, 262-63 (App. Div. 2001), certif. denied, 172 N.J. 175 (2002). Compare Regent Care Ctr., Inc. v. Hackensack City, supra, 362 N.J. Super. at 417-19.
But what an aggrieved taxpayer does not have is a compensatory and punitive 1983 damages remedy. In General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden, supra, 143 N.J. 336, the taxpayer brought a 1983 action claiming that the municipal defendants violated its due process rights by reassessing its plant at an excessive value in retaliation for the taxpayer's appeals from prior assessments. The Court noted that, although commonly described as a local property tax, the tax constitutes a state tax for purposes of determining the availability of 1983 relief. Id. at 349. Citing the holding of the United States Supreme Court in National Private Truck Council v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 115 S. Ct. 2351, 132 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1995), which prohibited state courts from providing relief under 1983 if state law provides an adequate remedy for relief from unconstitutional tax assessments, the Court held that the remedies for discriminatory tax assessments under New Jersey law, which we have previously delineated, are adequate to preclude 1983 suits. 143 N.J. at 340, 346, 350. In short, the Court determined that New Jersey law provides a taxpayer an effective remedy for challenging the constitutionality of a tax assessment without proceeding under 1983. Id. at 349.
The Court further noted that important policy decisions also weigh in favor of precluding relief under 1983 in tax cases. Id. at 350. For example, permitting taxpayers to circumvent the December deadline imposed to appeal to the County Board of Taxation would result in a longer statute of limitations in tax appeal cases, thereby thwarting the express intent of the Legislature, introducing uncertainty into the administration of the tax laws and circumventing the statutory scheme for tax appeals. Id. at 350-51. And too, the Court noted that a tax assessor who violates a taxpayer's constitutional rights runs the risk of removal by the Director of the Division of Taxation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.29.
Plaintiffs, however, believe that a tax appeal would have been futile because such an appeal only would have addressed the assessment being appealed, and would not have addressed their inequitable tax burden by examining the properties that were not reassessed. But, as we have said, plaintiffs could have challenged those assessments in a tax appeal, of course, with proper notice to the property owners. Moreover, plaintiffs could have sought the restoration of the previous year's assessments of all properties, as set forth in Van Decker. Intent on obtaining compensatory and punitive damages relief pursuant to 1983, plaintiffs only raised the claim for a tax "roll back" with respect to the 2000 tax year and abandoned it thereafter. As appellant Leodori stated below: "My case has been a 1983 case from day one."
As to appellants' conflict contentions raised in points VIII, IX and X, the only issues raised here that were not substantively disposed of by Judge Small, the undisputed fact is that these claims were not included in any properly filed pleading. We decline, as did Judge Small, to adjudicate them.
As to the sanction, we do no more than reject the contention that because R. 1:4-8(b)(3) imposes "joint" liability upon a law firm for "violations committed by its partners, shareholders, associates and employees," Hill Wallack's settlement here with Avalon for $20,000 absolves appellant Leodori of the remainder. Settlement with a jointly responsible party does not ipso facto release another equally responsible party from the remaining liability. Newman v. Isuzu Motors Am., Inc., 367 N.J. Super. 141, 149-52 (App. Div. 2004). Appellant is entitled to no more than a credit for the amount of the settlement.

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Affirmed.

A-2666-04T5