METROPOLITAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATES v. LEGAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE OF LIFE INC.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2502-05T32502-05T3

METROPOLITAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LEGAL CENTER FOR DEFENSE OF

LIFE INC.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

CITY OF ENGLEWOOD and ENGLEWOOD

POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

____________________________________________

 

Submitted July 12, 2006 - Decided August 9, 2006

Before Judges Fuentes and Graves.

On appeal from Superior Court of

New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen

County, Docket No. C-254-04.

Richard F. Collier, Jr., attorney for

appellant.

Lawrence H. Kleiner, attorney for

respondent.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Legal Center for the Defense of Life, Inc., appeals from the order of the Chancery Division, General Equity Part, denying its application for the imposition of sanctions against plaintiff Metropolitan Medical Associates pursuant to the frivolous litigation statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and R. 1:4-8. This is the second time this matter is before us. In the first appeal, Metropolitan Med. Assocs. v. Legal Ctr. for Def. of Life, Inc., No. A-1246-04T3 (App. Div. Oct. 7, 2005) (slip op. at 10), which also concerned the question of sanctions, we held that:

[T]he motion judge did not provide sufficient analysis or application of [the applicable legal principles] to permit this court to conduct a meaningful review of the conclusion embodied in the September 24, 2004 order [denying defendant's application for sanctions]. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate that order, and remand for further proceedings, followed by findings of fact and conclusions of law.

On remand, the motion judge issued a memorandum of opinion denoted as a "Supplemental Decision," in which he outlined the history of the litigation between the parties and the procedural posture of the case when it came before him. Thereafter, the court once again denied defendant's application for sanctions. We now affirm.

We will not restate the facts that led the parties to be embroiled in this litigation. These facts were set out at length in our prior unpublished opinion. We thus incorporate them by reference here.

In our view, the key to resolving the issues raised by defendant lies in the procedural history of the case. Acting on plaintiff's application, the trial court entered an order to show cause, without restraints, against defendant on July 23, 2004. The order provided for a return date of August 6, 2004. On July 30, 2004, defendant served plaintiff with notice, pursuant to R. 1:4-8(b)(1), demanding, inter alia, that plaintiff withdraw its complaint against it or face sanctions under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1.

R. 1:4-8(b)(1) authorizes the aggrieved party to advise the offending party "that an application for sanctions will be made within a reasonable time thereafter if the offending paper is not withdrawn within 28 days of service of the written demand." (Emphasis added.) Here, the return date of the order to show cause preceded the expiration of this twenty-eight day deadline.

On the return date, the court conducted a hearing, after which it dismissed plaintiff's complaint, concluding that the matter should proceed in the United States District Court. Thus, defendant received the relief it sought under R. 1:4-8(b)(1) well before any potential application for sanctions could have been filed. This, in essence, is the basis for the trial court's denial of defendant's application.

Furthermore, as correctly noted by the motion judge, because plaintiff's action was dismissed at the pleadings stage, there is no record from which to determine whether the complaint against defendant "was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury; or . . . was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1b(1), (2).

Affirmed.

 
 
 

(continued)

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4

A-2502-05T3

August 9, 2006

 


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