STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. WILLIAM PITTMAN

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2478-04T42478-04T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM PITTMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________

 

Submitted February 8, 2006 - Decided March 9, 2006

Before Judges Parker and Grall.

On appeal from Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,

Indictment No. 03-10-1328.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

attorney for appellant (Amira R. Scurato,

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel

and on the brief).

William Pittman, appellant pro se, on the

supplemental brief.

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General,

attorney for respondent (Lora B. Glick,

Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant William Pittman appeals from a final judgment of conviction and sentence. Tried to the court, he was convicted of two fourth-degree crimes: peering, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3c, and impersonating a police officer, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-8b. The judge sentenced defendant to two consecutive eighteen-month terms of incarceration and imposed a $100 VCCB assessment, a $150 SNSF assessment, and a $30 LEOTEF penalty.

The peering charge was based on defendant's conduct on March 24, 2000. Around eight o'clock in the evening, Margaret Sterlacci looked from her kitchen window and thought she saw movement in her backyard. Wondering what she saw, she moved to the dining room window for a better view. As she did, she made eye contact with defendant, who was standing on the air-conditioner condenser near the window. When she screamed and banged on the window frame, he fled.

Sterlacci recognized defendant from previous encounters. In March of 1998, she saw him near the sliding glass doors leading from her yard to her family room. He was reaching above the door. When Sterlacci confronted him, he explained that "skinheads" were chasing him and asked to use her phone. She called the police, and they both waited until the police arrived. Defendant remained outside on her terrace, which was lit, and Sterlacci remained at the door. They spoke and looked at one another. A few days later, she saw defendant "creeping" on the grass in her yard. Her outdoor lights were on and she saw clearly enough to recognize defendant as the person she had met days earlier. She saw defendant on another occasion walking in her neighborhood.

In 2003, Sterlacci read a newspaper article reporting that defendant was arrested and charged with peering. She again called the police and asked them to take action.

The charge of impersonating an officer was based on defendant's conduct after Sterlacci's 2003 report to the police. On the afternoon of June 21, 2003, Sterlacci received a phone call from a man who identified himself as James Stonson of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office. He said he was calling to inquire about the police report she had filed. Her caller I.D. showed that the call came from a private number. No person named James Stonson was employed by the prosecutor's office.

She repeated her account of the three incidents involving defendant. The caller questioned: "Oh, you just think that he is a peeping Tom?" When Sterlacci explained her views to the contrary, the caller asked, "Well, were you afraid that he was going to rape you?" The caller then asked whether she could identify the person by voice. At that point, Sterlacci realized that she was speaking with defendant. When she asked for his phone number, he ended the conversation.

Two days later, Sterlacci noticed that her caller I.D. system had recorded a call at 2:25 p.m. on June 21, 2003 from a number registered to defendant. She recalled having received a call a few minutes before the call from the person who claimed to be Stonson, but she had not answered that call. Sterlacci again called the police. An officer responded and photographed defendant's name and phone number displayed on Sterlacci's caller I.D.

Defendant presents two arguments on appeal. He contends that the evidence was inadequate to support his convictions because it was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of either crime. He further contends his consecutive, maximum sentences are based on aggravating factors found by the judge in violation of his right to trial by jury as construed by the United States Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).

Our review of the record convinces us that both arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant an extended discussion in a written opinion. We add a brief explanation for that conclusion with respect to each argument. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt when the entirety of the State's direct and circumstantial evidence, viewed most favorably and given the benefit of all reasonable inferences, permits a reasonable trier of fact to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 80 N.J. 587, 591 (1979); State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 459 (1967). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979). In this case, the eyewitness testimony provided compelling direct evidence that defendant was the person who peered into Sterlacci's window. The circumstantial evidence of defendant's identity as the person who impersonated a representative of the prosecutor's office was more than adequate to support a finding of his guilt of that crime.

Because defendant's maximum sentences were based solely on judicial findings about his prior criminal record, he cannot rely on Blakely. See State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 489-90 (2005). Because "there is no presumption in favor of concurrent sentences," findings relevant to consecutive sentences need not be made by a jury. State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 513 (2005). In this case, the imposition of consecutive sentences for distinct crimes committed several years apart was well within the judge's discretion. State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986).

Affirmed.

 

Defendant also submitted a single page pro se supplemental brief indicating his intention to raise additional issues, which he does not identify, about the representation he received below and improper prosecutorial conduct. Defendant implies that the additional claims depend on facts that are not part of the record, which he intends to raise on an application for post-conviction relief.

(continued)

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A-2478-04T4

March 9, 2006