NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. N.M.

 

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1835-05T41835-05T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

N.M.,

Defendant-Appellant,

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF

K.A.J.,

A Minor.

___________________________

 

Submitted May 16, 2006 - Decided May 25, 2006

Before Judges Coburn and S.L. Reisner.

On appeal from the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family

Part, Bergen County, FG-02-60-05.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael C. Kazer, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General,

attorney for the respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Jane S. Blank, Deputy

Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

Law Guardian, attorney for the minor

(Olivia Belfatto Crisp, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, N.M., appeals from a trial court order terminating her parental rights to her son, K.A.J. We affirm.

These are the most pertinent facts. The child was born on August 23, 2003, when defendant was eighteen years old. He was removed from defendant's custody about three weeks after his birth, after she left him with her paramour, who broke the child's arm. Thereafter, she failed to cooperate with the DYFS services needed to enable the child to be returned to her from foster care. After several foster care placements, the child was placed with his paternal grandmother on March 26, 2004.

In December 2004, DYFS initiated termination proceedings. The child's father made an identified surrender of his parental rights conditioned on his mother adopting the child. At trial, N.M. testified that she wanted her son to live with her and her mother. She also contended in the alternative that the child should have been placed with maternal relatives, rather than with his paternal grandmother, a contention she had not raised at any earlier hearing. DYFS had previously considered several maternal relatives and ruled them out as unsuitable.

The State's expert, Dr. Hasson, testified at trial and his report, concerning his psychological evaluation of defendant and his bonding evaluations of defendant and the paternal grandmother, was admitted in evidence. Dr. Hasson testified that defendant and the child had not bonded, she had a personality disorder that made her likely to abuse the child, and she was incapable of parenting him. After observing defendant with her son, he reported her interaction with the child as "very pathological," stating:

The interaction between mother and child was extremely poor. [Defendant] was critical, hostile, and insensitive. She displayed no awareness that she was interacting with a young child. She demanded of him behavior that he could not show. She was angry and repeatedly told him he was a "bad boy." . . . [Defendant] reduced him to tears. She frustrated him and [prevented him] from learning and exploring objects.

Dr. Hasson also concluded based on psychological testing that defendant "has a serious problem with hostility, anger, low frustration tolerance, and impulsivity," characteristics that made her likely to abuse the child. On the other hand, he testified that the child had bonded with his paternal grandmother, who had excellent parenting skills, and that he would suffer severe harm if that bond were severed. Although she wants to adopt him, the paternal grandmother is also willing to let him have continued contact with defendant even after adoption.

In a written opinion dated October 24, 2005, Judge Sween concluded that defendant's failure to cooperate with DYFS and "to expeditiously do what was required of her as requested by the Division and ordered by the court to shorten [the child's] foster home placement was parental neglect." He also credited Dr. Hasson's testimony that the child "would be at high risk if placed in [defendant's] care because she suffer[s] from a personality disorder" and is not capable of parenting the child. Judge Sween also concluded that DYFS had made a "reasonable effort to find relatives to care for [the child]," that his best interest would be served by termination of parental rights to free him for adoption, and that termination would not do more harm than good.

On this appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT I: THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS CONCERNING THE FOUR PRONGS OF THE "BEST INTERESTS" TEST WERE CONCLUSIONARY AND INADEQUATE.

POINT II: THERE DID NOT EXIST CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE DIVISION PROVED EACH PRONG OF THE BEST INTERESTS TEST.

A. UNDER THE FIRST PRONG, PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS AN "IMMATURE" PARENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THAT TYPE OF "HARM" WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE TERMINATION OF HER PARENTAL RIGHTS.

B. UNDER THE SECOND PRONG, THE DEFENDANT CAN BECOME FIT IN TIME TO MEET THE NEEDS OF K.A.J., AND A DELAY IN PERMANENT PLACEMENT WILL NOT ADD TO THE HARM.

C. UNDER THE THIRD PRONG, AWARDING KINSHIP LEGAL GUARDIANSHIP TO THE PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO TERMINATING THE DEFENDANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS EVEN IF THE PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER WAS WILLING TO ADOPT.

D. UNDER THE FOURTH PRONG, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WILL CAUSE MORE HARM THAN GOOD BECAUSE THERE WERE NO COMPELLING REASONS TO SEVER THE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that all of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and that Judge Sween's decision is supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A); Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 4ll-12 (1998). We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Sween's written opinion. We add the following comments.

It is clear from the judge's findings, and supported in the record by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant has no ability to care for the child herself and has no bond with him. Defendant claims that her relatives did not received the "rule out" letters DYFS claims to have sent them. But even if that were true, defendant does not adequately address the reasons why DYFS ruled them out. Nor does she explain why the trial court erred in terminating parental rights in favor of the paternal grandmother, as opposed to maternal relatives. And the record does not support defendant's trial testimony urging the court to return the child to her custody, so that they could both live with her relatives. The State's expert described defendant's interaction with the child as "critical, hostile, and insensitive." Given defendant's immaturity and emotional problems, it would not be in the child's best interest to let him live with defendant and her family.

The record amply supports Judge Sween's conclusion, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of parental rights was in the child's best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); New Jersey DYFS v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-05 (1986).

Affirmed.

 

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A-1835-05T4

May 25, 2006