DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. G.N.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1797-05T4

DIVISION OF YOUTH AND

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

G.N.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF C.N.N. AND N.H.N.,

Minors.

____________________________

 

Submitted September 18, 2006 - Decided October 2, 2006

Before Judges S.L. Reisner and Seltzer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, FG-20-21-05.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Mark Tabakman, Designated Counsel, of counsel and on

the brief).

Anne Milgram, Acting Attorney General,

attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel and on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Law Guardian,

attorney for minors C.N.N. and N.H.N.

(Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, G.N., appeals from a trial court order terminating her parental rights to her children, C.N.N. and N.H.N.

Following a lengthy trial, Judge William Daniel issued a ninety-seven page oral opinion, placed on the record on October 31, 2005. In his opinion Judge Daniel made detailed findings of facts, including credibility determinations, and conclusions of law. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that Judge Daniel's factual findings are amply supported by the evidence and his legal conclusions correctly apply the applicable statutory and case law. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A). We also find defendant's appellate contention, that the State failed to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). As we could not improve upon Judge Daniel's thorough and cogent opinion, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated in his oral opinion of October 31, 2005. We add only the following comments.

Defendant has a lengthy history of psychiatric illness. N.H.N., age one year, five months, and C.N.N., age two years, nine months, were removed from her custody on October 7, 2002, after police found defendant and the two children "standing outside of her apartment . . . totally naked." As the judge found, "[t]he children appeared to be dirty and disheveled. [Defendant] was incoherent, rambling and, according to the police, under the influence of something." The children were placed in foster care.

By the time of trial, they had been in foster care for three years. The judge concluded that they had bonded with their foster mother, whom they "view . . . as their psychological parent. Someone consistently there for them and has provided safety, security and nurturing." The foster mother wishes to adopt them. The trial judge credited testimony from the State's expert, Dr. Williams, that "to separate them from their foster 'care taker' would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm."

The judge found that the children do not have a similarly strong bond with defendant and, according to Dr. Williams, terminating her parental rights "would not harm the children." Moreover, despite the provision of services from DYFS, all of the testifying experts, including defendant's expert, agreed that "she remains unable to effectively parent these children." As the judge stated, defendant "has never been able to achieve . . . a level of parenting ability that would allow for reunification with these children. And it's been three years."

If reunited with her children, defendant's parenting plan was to share parenting responsibilities with her paramour, J.T. However, due to defendant's emotional instability and lack of parenting skills, J.T. would not be able to leave the children alone with her. And the judge did not credit J.T.'s testimony concerning the extent of the support his family could offer the couple. The judge also did not find J.T. to be a credible witness in terms of his parenting ability:

[J.T] has not attained a level where he can be the one to be the primary caretaker of these two children. He cannot provide for them financially, provide a stable home for them.

The judge concluded that "even with [J.T.], . . . these children . . . would be placed at risk if they were returned to [defendant's] care in the company of her boyfriend, [J.T.]." This conclusion is supported by testimony from Dr. Williams, whom the judge found credible.

We will defer to the trial judge's factual findings and his conclusions drawn from those findings unless they are "'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (citation omitted). We will likewise defer to the judge's credibility determinations. Id. at 411-12. Judge Daniel's factual findings and conclusions are amply supported by the record. And he properly applied applicable law in determining that termination of defendant's parental rights is in the children's best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347-48 (1999); In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992).

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-1797-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

 

October 2, 2006