DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.C.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1151-05T41151-05T4

DIVISION OF YOUTH AND

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.C.,

Defendant-Appellant,

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF D.C.,

A Minor.

______________________________________________________________

 

Submitted April 4, 2006 - Decided April 25, 2006

Before Judges Lefelt and R. B. Coleman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, FG-13-005405.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.C. (Philip Lago, Designated Counsel, and on the brief).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Division of Youth and Family Services (Jean Reilly, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel; Scott J. Kieserman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief.)

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for the minor child, D.C. (Nancy E. Scott, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, Law Guardian, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

J.C. appeals from the August 22, 2005, order terminating her parental rights to her son, D.C. and awarding the guardianship, care, custody and control of the child to the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS or the Division) to consent to the adoption of the child.

J.C. is the thirty-one-year-old mother of four children, none of whom live with her. She has been a habitual drug and alcohol user dating back to her early teens. She continued those habits while pregnant. D.C.'s father, whose parental rights as to D.C. were also terminated, does not appeal that disposition. The law guardian for the children filed a brief advocating the affirmance of the trial court's decision.

The involvement of the Division with D.C. and his mother, J.C., began when D.C. was born on October 12, 2001. J.C. tested positive for alcohol at delivery. She also admitted to past cocaine and marijuana use. On December 27, 2002, the Division received another referral from a social worker at Jersey Shore Medical Center stating that J.C. had given birth to a female infant, S.C.R., on December 15, 2002. Both J.C. and her daughter tested positive for cocaine at the time of birth. S.C.R. was born at twenty-four weeks gestation and weighed one pound, eight ounces.

On December 31, 2002, the Division caseworker initiated a referral indicating that, during the investigation of the previous referral involving S.C.R., J.C. informed the worker that D.C. had a scar on his left arm from a burn. The incident had occurred six months earlier and J.C. did not seek medical care for D.C. J.C. stated that a hot iron was left on the floor and that D.C. bumped into it. J.C.'s account of the incident was found to be inconsistent and neglect was found to be substantiated. The court, under Docket No. FN-13-117-03C, determined, based upon the fact that J.C. had serious substance abuse issues, had not sought treatment, and was unable to secure adequate housing for herself or her children, that removal of the children from the home was necessary to avoid ongoing risk to their life, safety or health.

J.C. was transported to the Sunrise House inpatient program by the caseworker on January 6, 2003. She completed that program on February 3, 2003 and immediately entered Epiphany House for further substance abuse treatment. D.C. was permitted to reside with her at Epiphany House. J.C. left Epiphany House, however, prior to completing the program. When she left, D.C. was placed into the care of J.C.'s sister, who was also caring for S.C.R.

In April 2003, J.C.'s sister returned physical custody of D.C. to the Division because she could no longer care for him. J.C.'s sister was concerned about D.C. experiencing night terrors, which were disruptive to her family. D.C. also had behavioral problems and threw tantrums frequently.

D.C. was then placed with his current foster family, who wish to adopt him. He has been in their home for approximately two years. The foster parents were able to obtain a special alternative-type school for D.C. to attend. The foster parents have four biological children and their children have a sibling-like relationship with D.C.

In her brief on appeal, J.C. argued the Division did not satisfy its burden of proof:

POINT I: THE ORDER OF GUARDIANSHIP, WHICH TERMINATED DEFENDANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS, MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE DYFS DID NOT PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE EACH OF THE FOUR NECESSARY PRONGS TO JUSTIFY TERMINATION OF DEFENDANT'S PARENTAL RIGHTS.

We reject that argument and affirm the order terminating parental rights substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough written opinion issued by Judge Norman J. Peer at the time of the entry of the order from which defendant appeals.

The best interests of the child standard, utilized to determine whether termination of parental rights is warranted, requires that the following criteria be met by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) The child's health and development have been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his foster parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); DYFS v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-611 (1986).]

The standard of our review of a trial court's findings and conclusions is one of deference to the court's evaluations of credibility and its "feel of the case" given the court's opportunity to observe the witnesses. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998); Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988). The court's findings will not be overturned unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).

In this case, the judge reached his decision after a thorough and comprehensive review of the evidence in light of the applicable law. Contrary to defendant's assertion that the court's findings, and conclusions lack evidential support, we are satisfied from our independent review of the record that the court's findings set forth in Judge Peer's written opinion, are amply supported by substantial credible evidence. We find defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a further written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

We add that defendant acknowledges that D.C. has bonded with his foster parents with whom he has lived since April 2003 and who plan to adopt him. Yet, defendant maintains that severance of the biological ties is not required. The alternative suggested by J.C. was that D.C. be placed with J.C.'s aunt. The court found that placing D.C. with J.C.'s aunt would be similar to placing him with a new foster parent. The aunt is a complete stranger to D.C. and lives out of state. We agree with the court's discretionary determination not to disrupt the relative permanency and stability D.C. has achieved in the foster home.

 
We also note that J.C. argued in favor of placing D.C. with her aunt or some other relative to foster ethnic, racial or cultural identity. To the extent the argument is that D.C., an African-American child, should not be placed with/adopted by Caucasian parents, we reject it. The race of the foster/adoptive parents is not and cannot be a disqualifying factor. The Multi-ethnic Placement Act of 1994 prohibits the delay or denial of any adoption or placement in foster care due to the race, color, or national origin of the child or of the foster or adoptive parents. 42 U.S.C.A. 622. We affirm the trial court's determination.

Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

7

A-1151-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

April 25, 2006