SCOTT SMITH et al. v. SCOTT SMITH, et al.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0983-05t50983-05T5

SCOTT SMITH and STEED EDWARDS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MICHAEL LIPUT and KARLA LIPUT

t/a MICHAEL LIMOUSINES,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

CHARLES PULASKI,

Defendant.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted June 6, 2006 - Decided June 22, 2006

Before Judges Lefelt and Seltzer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic

County, Docket No. L-3264-94.

George N. Polis, attorney for

appellants.

Benjamin Podolnick, attorney for

respondents (Victor M. Saul, on the

brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs, Scott Smith and Steed Edwards, were injured while riding in a limousine driven by defendant, Charles Pulaski, and allegedly owned and managed by defendants Michael Limousines of Atlantic City, Inc.; Michael Liput; and Karla Liput. In 1995, plaintiffs obtained and recorded a default judgment of $26,468 against defendants. Almost ten years later, on March 16, 2005, Karla Liput (defendant) moved to vacate the judgment against her and Judge Todd granted the motion because defendant had not been properly served and had no prior notice of plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs appealed, seeking to reinstate the judgment.

Apparently, defendant's ex-husband had accepted service of plaintiffs' complaint at the business location of Michael Limousines. Defendant was not living with her husband at the time as they were in the process of being divorced, a divorce complaint having been filed on about June 15, 1994. She became aware of the judgment years later only after she attempted to sell her home.

Plaintiffs assert that "it appears that [defendant] owned the property where service of process was made, and apparently was a principal and officer of Michael Limousines." Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that defendant has "apparently . . . benefited through equitable distribution in her 'husband's' business operations, was the co-owner of the building where service of process was made, was an officer or principal of the business and, importantly, she can be fully indemnified by her ex-husband pursuant to a 1999 Consent Order," which was obtained in the divorce proceedings.

Our problem with plaintiffs' argument is that service on defendant was not properly accomplished. See R. 4:4-4(a)(1). There was no proof that the business location was defendant's "dwelling place or usual place of abode" or that her husband was "authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process" on her behalf. Ibid. Unless grounds for laches or estoppel are present, defective service voids a default judgment. See Sobel v. Long Island Entn't Prods., Inc., 329 N.J. Super. 285, 294-95 (App. Div. 2000). The record does not disclose any conduct by defendant that would justify laches or estoppel.

There is no evidence that defendant knew or should have known about this litigation. There were no notices sent to defendant's home or place of work, nor any other documentation that would have notified her. In addition, the record reflects that defendant never received the summons and complaint and never received notice of the judgment until she tried to sell her property in February 2005. Under such circumstances, the claimed equitable reasons to enforce this judgment are of no solace to plaintiffs, and Judge Todd correctly vacated the judgment. R. 4:50-1(d),(f).

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

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A- 0983-05T5

June 22, 2006