DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. D.D.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0967-05T40966-05T4

A-0967-05T4

DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY

SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.D.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY

SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

N.D.,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF G.M.D., a Minor.

____________________________________

 

Submitted March 22, 2006 - Decided April 7, 2006

Before Judges Wecker, Fuentes and Graves.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,

Monmouth County, FG-13-65-05.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

attorney for appellants (Alison Perrone,

Designated Counsel, on the brief in

A-0966-05T4; Christine B. Mowry, Designated

Counsel, on the brief in A-0967-05T4).

Zulima V. Farber, Attorney General, attorney

for respondent (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant

Attorney General, of counsel; Deirdre Fichter,

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, Law

Guardian for minor G.M.D. (Daphne G. Fields,

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants N.D. and D.D., a husband and wife who were living together when this trial took place, appeal final orders of the Family Part entered on September 9, 2005, terminating the parental rights of each of them respecting their daughter, G.M.D., who was born May 3, 2003. Since September 14, 2003, when she was four months old, G.M.D. has been in the care of foster parents who wish to adopt her.

These are the facts adduced from evidence at trial. Defendant N.D., the child's father, a Vietnam War veteran, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder in 1987. Ultimately, N.D. was discharged from military service for medical reasons. He also has a history of alcoholism and drug abuse, specifically using cocaine and heroin. He also has a lengthy history of depression, including several suicide attempts and psychiatric hospitalizations. He requires psychotropic medications and monitoring. He has had involvement with the criminal system, and in his two prior marriages, several restraining orders were entered against him. N.D. has three adult sons from his first marriage.

Defendant D.D. also has a history of substance abuse and mental illness. D.D. has received treatment for bipolar disorder for approximately fifteen years. She requires numerous medications to treat that disorder and related conditions of depression and anxiety, as well as treatment for her heroin addiction. Both D.D. and N.D. are on methadone maintenance programs.

N.D. and D.D. met at a drug clinic at Monmouth Medical Center. They were married on September 1, 2001. On May 3, 2003, D.D. gave birth to G.M.D.

The New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (the Division) became involved with G.M.D.'s family less than one month after G.M.D. was born. D.D. became suicidal during her pregnancy with G.M.D., apparently while certain of her medications were stopped. On May 19, 2003, two weeks after the baby's birth, D.D. overdosed on heroin in an admitted attempt to take her own life. The Aberdeen Police Department immediately contacted the Division, reporting that D.D. had overdosed and that N.D. did not appear to be capable of caring for G.M.D. on his own. A Special Response Unit (SPRU) worker arrived at the police station where N.D. was present with G.M.D. N.D. reported to the worker that he was an alcoholic. A police officer informed the SPRU worker that the police had received two prior calls with respect to N.D. In 2002, N.D. had threatened suicide with a knife, and in April 2003, a call came from the Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital where N.D. was treated, reporting that N.D. had threatened to kill somebody. Having received this information, the Division sought an alternate placement for G.M.D. G.M.D. was temporarily placed with her maternal grandparents after N.D. signed a fifteen-day consent form authorizing the placement.

One day after G.M.D. was placed with her maternal grandparents, the Division had her removed from that home upon receiving background information relating to the grandfather's history of alcoholism and reporting that he once had been charged with a weapons offense. Next, the Division contacted N.D.'s three adult sons in an attempt to locate a relative who could care for G.M.D. One son, Ni.D., agreed to care for G.M.D., and G.M.D. was briefly placed under his care.

On May 21, 2003, N.D. revoked his consent to have G.M.D. temporarily placed with a relative, and the child was returned to his care under the terms of a new case plan that both parents signed. The Division's assigned caseworker, Mickenson Moise, contacted N.D.'s treating psychologist at the VA Hospital, Doctor Joseph Schumacher, who reported that N.D. "is in the right state of mind to care for [G.M.D.]." Another case plan was signed eight days later, which set forth the terms upon which G.M.D. was to be placed in N.D.'s care. Under the new case plan, both parents were expected to continue with counseling, but D.D. was "to remain out of the home until cleared by the Division." The Division had offered to identify day care providers for G.M.D., but N.D. declined the offer.

Less than four months later, the Division learned that the parents were not abiding by its terms, and as a result, G.M.D. was placed at risk. On September 14, 2003, Bayshore Medical Center contacted the Division with information that D.D. had arrived at the hospital complaining of abdominal pain and appearing intoxicated and unstable. The hospital reported that D.D. had left her child alone in the waiting room. The caseworker who responded to the hospital's referral also reported that D.D. was intoxicated and that her breath smelled of alcohol. The caseworker attempted to obtain contact information for relatives with whom G.M.D. could be placed, but D.D. was not forthcoming with such information. D.D. informed the caseworker that N.D. was in jail. The Division subsequently learned that N.D. had recently been arrested and charged with possession of cocaine.

On September 14, 2003, G.M.D. was placed in foster care with her now pre-adoptive family. The following day, the Division filed a verified complaint alleging that N.D. and D.D. allowed their daughter to be placed at substantial risk of injury. On October 1, 2003, Judge Norman J. Peer signed an order requiring N.D. and D.D. to submit to psychological examinations with Doctor Alan Lee and to attend a substance abuse evaluation. In addition, Judge Peer ordered N.D. and D.D. to attend Mental Illness/Chemical Addiction (MICA) treatment. The order also provided for N.D. and D.D. to have weekly visitation with their daughter, conditioned upon their compliance with the requirements of the order. However, on October 21, 2003, the Division learned that the parents did not appear for their scheduled substance abuse evaluations and did not call to explain their failure to appear.

In October, shortly after the baby's placement with her foster parents, the Division learned that her condition had been diagnosed as a failure to thrive. She was being followed by the Infant-Toddler Assessment Program at Jersey Shore Medical Center, whose reports indicated that she showed signs of fetal alcohol syndrome, and that she was at high risk for developmental delays.

The caseworker rescheduled the parents' substance abuse evaluation, and the parents appeared for the rescheduled appointment on November 5, 2003. Following their evaluations, the substance abuse counselor recommended that N.D. continue his outpatient treatment at the VA hospital. The counselor further recommended that D.D. continue with intensive outpatient services for her substance abuse issues and that the Division monitor her participation in the treatment program. On November 10, 2003, D.D.'s counselor contacted D.D.'s caseworker to inform her that D.D. was "doing fair, not good" and that D.D. had been failing to attend her Monday substance abuse treatment group for weeks. In November 2003, D.D. relapsed on heroin.

In January 2004, the Division sought to identify a blood relative of G.M.D. with whom she could be placed, as the biological parents were failing to comply with their treatment goals. On January 2, 2004, one of N.D.'s adult sons from a prior marriage, A.D., informed the Division that he was unable to care for G.M.D. and asked that the Division stop contacting him. Subsequently, on January 22, 2004, D.D. informed the caseworker that there were no relatives with whom G.M.D. could be placed. On January 8, 2004, D.D.'s visitation was suspended by Judge Peer for failure to comply with her substance abuse treatment requirements. Prior to the suspension of D.D.'s visitation, the Division had mild concerns regarding her conduct during visits, as she had fallen asleep during one visit and had brought sugary foods for G.M.D. against the caseworker's request. N.D. and D.D. both failed to show up for their scheduled psychological evaluations with Dr. Lee on January 13, 2004. On January 22, the Division learned that D.D. was not participating in a substance abuse program in which random urine samples are taken.

On February 14, 2004, N.D. contacted his caseworker to inform her that he would be leaving his wife, likely to live with his mother, and that he would be moving out of the house during the next weekend. N.D. indicated that he thought that he could have visitation with his daughter on the weekends if he was not living with D.D. On February 25, the Division learned that N.D. was still living with D.D., and on March 9, 2004, N.D. confessed that they were still living together.

On March 4, 2004, Dr. Schumacher contacted N.D.'s caseworker. Dr. Schumacher indicated that although he does not routinely comment on his clients' history, he would make an exception. The doctor stated that N.D. had anti-social traits, major depressive disorder, and borderline personality disorder. He informed the caseworker that N.D. had been attending his individual therapy sessions less regularly. Dr. Schumacher stated that he shared the caseworker's concern that N.D. appeared more focused on maintaining his relationship with D.D. than with regaining custody of G.M.D., and he joined in the caseworker's concern that N.D.'s psychiatric issues may prevent him from effectively caring for G.M.D.

In March 2004, the Division learned that D.D. was failing to comply with her substance abuse treatment goals. D.D. informed the caseworker that she was attending her substance abuse group twice a week, but that she was not providing urine samples because she had been attending the same group for long enough that the group would know whether she was using. D.D.'s counselor, however, reported that D.D. had not been participating in the group, and he suspected that she had been high on two occasions. He stated that no medication prescribed for D.D. could produce a positive test result on screening for opiates. In routine screening on March 17, 2004, both D.D. and N.D. tested positive for opiates. D.D. also tested positive for cocaine.

N.D. and D.D. met with Dr. Lee for psychological evaluations in March 2004. Dr. Lee's conclusions were negative concerning the ability of either parent to serve as an effective caretaker for G.M.D. Dr. Lee found that N.D.'s "thoughts and thought process were clearly guided by a pervasive sense of anger and hostility." Dr. Lee also noted that N.D. "often spoke loudly with frequent regular usage of profane and vulgar language, as though this was a common part of how he speaks, with frequent hostile references throughout." Dr. Lee concluded that N.D. "is not supported to be an independent caregiver with the minor child at this time." The doctor further opined that N.D.'s "prognosis for significant lasting personal change is realistically quite bleak."

Dr. Lee noted D.D.'s history of substance abuse, depression, and criminal activity. Dr. Lee stated that "[D.D.'s] current situation remains highly tenuous and unstable, and she is not currently supported for reunification with [G.M.D.] at this time." Dr. Lee added that "[D.D.'s] prognosis for making significant and lasting personal change is quite bleak."

The Division filed a complaint for guardianship, seeking the termination of the parental rights of N.D. and D.D., on September 29, 2004. Judge Peer signed a case management order on January 20, 2005, addressing various discovery issues. That order required N.D. and D.D to submit to psychological evaluations with Doctor Andrea Lynn Sollitto. In addition, Judge Peer ordered that G.M.D.'s biological parents and foster parents all submit to bonding evaluations. All evaluations to be offered at trial were to be provided to all counsel by April 15, 2005, and the date for trial was set for the first week of May 2005.

In February 2005, Dr. Sollitto conducted the psychological and bonding evaluations ordered by Judge Peer. Dr. Sollitto described her findings in a report dated April 21, 2005. With respect to D.D., Dr. Sollitto found that "[i]t is likely [D.D.] cannot read her child properly. She expresses profound depression and although she expresses love for the child, her own health problems undermine her effectiveness as a parent." Dr. Sollitto found N.D. to be irritable and moody and believed that his conflict with D.D. was a major stressor. Dr. Sollitto stated that "[N.D.] expresses love for his child and the desire to raise her, but the level of stressors in his life is likely to undermine his effectiveness as a parent."

Turning to the bonding evaluations, Dr. Sollitto reported that G.M.D. identified N.D. as her father, but when asked to identify her mother, G.M.D. pointed outside the room, despite D.D. being in the same room with G.M.D. at the time. In contrast, when G.M.D. was in a room with her foster parents, she spontaneously pointed to her foster father, identifying him as her father, and she referred to her foster mother as "Mommy." In sum, Dr. Sollitto made the following findings and recommendations:

Findings from this evaluation as well as information from personal histories raise significant concerns regarding the mental health and parental fitness of [N.D.] and [D.D.]. I do not recommend reunification with [G.M.D.] given the severity and chronicity of these concerns.

[N.D.] and [D.D.] have made efforts to comply with professional recommendations, including participating in individual and couple's counseling, parenting classes, anger management classes (for [N.D.]), and AA/NA meetings. [D.D.'s] psychiatric history and chronic drug use preclude her, however, from being able to parent a child. She continues to misuse prescription medication and, in fact, puts her own health at risk. [D.D.'s] psychiatric condition is not curable. Furthermore, she cannot care for herself let alone a child. [N.D.] admitted he has to be responsible for his wife and acknowledged that she could not parent [G.M.D.]. [D.D.'s] psychological profile can best be described as hypomanic, chronically depressed and anxious and unstable. She is very childlike in her approach to the world and needs to be protected, mainly from herself.

[N.D.'s] efforts to reform are commendable, but his stability cannot be guaranteed. As Dr. Schumacher points out[,] he is at high risk for relapse and the methadone, which he is now trying to wean from, keeps him stable and less prone to anger. [N.D.] tends to be irritable and moody and easily stressed. This undermines his ability to effectively parent a child. He, too, experiences excessive anxiety and depression and his personality can best be described as edgy, irritable and depressed.

I agree with Dr. Lee that [N.D.'s] and [D.D.'s] chronic mental health and substance abuse issues preclude them from being capable of parenting. Reunification with the birth parents would subject [G.M.D.] to the risk of abuse and neglect.

In the bonding evaluations, [G.M.D.] was more comfortable with her father and showed no signs of attachment to her mother. Her behavior indicated she was in familiar and comfortable surroundings with the foster family and her bond to them is not unusual given the length and early timing of her placement.

A biological parent's rights may be terminated only upon a showing that each element of a four-pronged test has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 612 (1986). The elements have been codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a):

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;
 
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

 
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and
 
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

[Ibid.; see also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11.]

"The four criteria . . . overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interest." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).

The right of parents to enjoy a relationship with their children is of constitutional dimension. K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 346 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)); In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 161 N.J. 396, 404 (1999); A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 599. Parents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental liberty interest in raising their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982); Stanley, supra, 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S. Ct. at 1212-13, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 558-59; A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 599.

"The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions." Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118 (1979). This presumption, however, is not always true. The constitutional right to enjoy a relationship with one's children is not absolute. In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 471 (2002); K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347. Parental rights are "tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children." J.N.H., supra, 172 N.J. at 471 (citing K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347).

At trial before Judge Peer on May 2, 3, 5, 11, and 16, 2005, eight witnesses testified. The Division called five witnesses: Dr. Sollitto, Mr. Moise, N.D., D.D., and Andrea Alton, a Division caseworker who was assigned to this matter just weeks before trial. N.D. called three witnesses: Ms. Gaynor, Ni.D., and N.D., Jr., another of N.D.'s adult sons. Judge Peer denied a written request from D.D. to adjourn the trial as a result of the Division's failure to provide Dr. Sollitto's report and other supporting documents by April 15, 2005, the date required by the January 20 case management order. See R. 5:12-3. In response to defendants' application, Judge Peer noted that a decision to adjourn the trial would likely result in a delay of at least four months, and that permanency for G.M.D. was paramount. Significantly, neither D.D. nor N.D. completed cross-examination of Dr. Sollitto until May 16, and on May 11, counsel for D.D. reported that he had had the opportunity to "review thoroughly Dr. Sollitto's report . . . ."

At trial, Dr. Sollitto's testimony largely echoed the findings in her report. She reiterated her finding that "[G.M.D.] was very bonded" with her foster parents. She described D.D's various mental health issues, and stated, "I don't think she can adequately take care of herself much less a child." Dr. Sollitto also doubted N.D.'s ability to parent effectively, because of his level of stress, his anxiety, and his anger issues. Dr. Sollitto's conclusion, within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, was that G.M.D.'s reunification with her biological parents was not indicated. Elaborating on the basis for her conclusion, Dr. Sollitto stated:

I feel that [D.D.] is incapable of parenting a child given her psychological condition. [N.D.], I felt, is experiencing and has experienced chronically too much stress and is at high risk for relapse without a child in the home.

To put the child in the home with the given burden of taking care of his wife who, whose behavior is unpredictable. A child's behavior is unpredictable to a certain extent, but with a mental disorder it's in an adult, it's more unpredictable. You don't know whether her mood is going to be positive, depressed, suicidal. We just don't know. To put a child into that mix, I think would put the child at unnecessary risk for harm or neglect.

Judge Peer's written opinion dated August 31, 2005, was transmitted to all counsel on September 9, 2005. The judge found that the Division had carried its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the requisite statutory elements for terminating defendants' parental rights. Judge Peer reasoned that the parents' compliance with case plans had been inconsistent, that this inconsistency had resulted in G.M.D.'s being placed at risk of harm, and that reunification with N.D. and D.D would result in her being placed at further risk of harm. The judge found that the Division had made diligent efforts to pursue alternatives to the termination of parental rights through its unsuccessful efforts to identify relatives with whom G.M.D. could be placed. Finally, Judge Peer concluded that the termination of the parental rights of N.D. and D.D. would not result in more harm than good. Given her biological parents' psychological and substance abuse issues, G.M.D.'s continued placement with and planned adoption by her foster parents was in her best interests. Judge Peer signed orders on September 9, 2005 terminating defendants' parental rights.

On appeal, D.D. contends that because the child was removed from both parents so early in her life, and because there visitation was limited once the child was placed in foster care, D.D. did not have the opportunity to fully bond with her. D.D. also contends that even if neither she nor N.D. could care for the child alone, together they could do so, and the Division did not provide them with enough support separately or together to prepare them to care for their child.

N.D. contends that he was denied due process by the late service of the Division's expert report and the denial of his request for an adjournment. But defendants had approximately two weeks to review Dr. Sollitto's report and prepare their cross-examination, as well as their response. We do not condone the late service of Dr. Solitto's report, but we are satisfied that neither defendant was prejudiced by its late receipt or by the judge's understandable refusal to adjourn the trial. We reject N.D.'s contention that he was denied a fair trial because the Division was permitted to call him as a witness. N.D. also contends that the court should have considered the alternative to termination presented by N.D.'s adult son's testimony that he would assist his father in caring for the child.

We recognize that this is not a case of abuse, but rather of the parents' separate and combined inability to provide safe and effective parenting within any reasonable time frame. This child is entitled to a permanent, safe, nurturing home, and it is unreasonable to expect her to wait for either or both of her parents to solve the problems that have prevented them from giving her that home. As unfortunate as that may be, it is the child's best interest that is foremost, and she cannot wait indefinitely.

Judge Peer's detailed and thoughtful written findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding each of the statutory elements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) are well supported by the record, and his findings warrant our deference. A Family Part judge's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless "'they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 413.

The judge drew well-supported conclusions respecting each of the first three required elements of proof. First, he concluded that "[d]ue to both parents' severe mental health and substance abuse issues, they are unable to adequately parent [G.M.D.], resulting in her removal from the home when she was less than three weeks old." Next, he concluded that "[r]eunification of [G.M.D.] with her biological parents would subject her to the risk of further abuse and neglect. Although the parents in this case may be willing to confront their issues, they are unable to overcome them." Third, the judge was satisfied that "[t]he Division made diligent efforts to provide services to [N.D.] and [D.D.] . . . . The Division appropriately considered the alternatives that were available in terms of relative placements. Unfortunately, none turned out to be viable resources."

Finally, as to the fourth and most critical element, the judge reached these conclusions:

The termination of the parental rights of Defendants will not do more harm than good to the child, [G.M.D.] It is in [G.M.D.'s] best interest to remain in the home where she currently resides. [G.M.D.] is strongly bonded to her foster parents, with whom she has lived since September 2003. Dr. Solitto [sic] noted that [G.M.D.] identifies her foster parents as "mommy" and "daddy" and appeared happy and relaxed around them. She was much more animated and interactive with the foster parents than with her biological parents. Defendants cannot adequately plan for the needs of their daughter due to the severity of their mental health and substance abuse issues. The prognosis for both parents has been deemed "bleak" by Dr. Lee. [G.M.D.'s] health and safety would be at risk if placed with her biological parents.

Each of the trial judge's findings of fact concerning the four criteria for terminating parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence. G.M.D.'s health and safety have been put at risk by her biological parents. Given the severity of her biological parents' psychological and substance abuse issues, reunification likely would endanger her health and safety in the future. Expert testimony supports the judge's findings that N.D. and D.D. are either unwilling or unable to make the progress necessary to eliminate the harm that G.M.D. would face if she were reunited with them. The Division made diligent attempts to provide G.M.D.'s biological parents with the services that they need to address the circumstances that gave rise to the Division's involvement, and the Division also tried diligently to identify a blood relative with whom G.M.D. could be placed. Finally, the evidence adduced at trial supports the judge's finding that termination of the parental rights of N.D. and D.D. will not do G.M.D. more harm than good. This young child, who does have some bond with her father, less with her mother, is entitled to a permanent adoptive home in the absence of evidence that either of her parents is likely to be able to provide such permanence in the foreseeable future.

Affirmed, substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Peer in his August 31, 2005 written decision.

 

Although originally captioned "G.D.," we have referred to the child throughout as "G.M.D."

From 1969 to 1970, N.D. served as a United States Marine in Vietnam. The record indicates that many of his company were killed in combat, and that N.D. was wounded twice and received a Purple Heart.

The record indicates that D.D.'s father was acquitted on those charges in 1998.

Mr. Moise's first name is incorrectly spelled "Nickenson" in the transcript.

The transcript incorrectly states that Bayshore Hospital contacted the Division in December rather than September.

On November 13, 2003, N.D. and D.D. stipulated that N.D. was incarcerated on September 13, 2003 and that he left G.M.D. in D.D.'s care. In addition, the biological parents admitted that on September 12, 2003, D.D. arrived at Bayshore Medical Center intoxicated, and that she had left G.M.D. alone or with strangers more than once.

On or about October 21, 2003, Division caseworker Stacey Gaynor was assigned to this matter in place of Mr. Moise.

Correspondence from a substance abuse evaluator to Judge Peer indicates that N.D.'s positive screening could have been the result of his taking a prescription pain medication.

(continued)

(continued)

22

A-0966-05T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

April 7, 2006