SHERRY LOPRETE v. GENNARO STANGO

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0647-05T10674-05T1

SHERRY LOPRETE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GENNARO STANGO,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________________________________

 

Submitted June 21, 2006 - Decided July 17, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Coburn.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County,

FD-07-1827-00.

Damico, Del Sardo & Montanari, attorneys for

appellant (Michael E. Damico, on the brief).

Anthony H. Guerino, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Gennaro Stango appeals from an order entered on September 23, 2005, requiring him to pay a share of college costs for the parties' daughter, un-reimbursed medical expenses for the parties' children, and plaintiff's counsel fees. After carefully considering the record and briefs, we are satisfied that all of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). However, we add the following comments.

While married to others, the parties had two children together, Jennifer, who was born on November 25, 1987, and Michael, who was born on July 5, 1989. The parties never lived together, and plaintiff has sole custody of Jennifer and Michael. Jennifer is attending Susquehanna University in Pennsylvania, where the annual cost is $25,000, but after deductions for scholarships and loans, the annual balance is $16,590.

Defendant, who is about sixty-seven, is a licensed electrician and has his own business, earning about $30,000 per year. He has never attempted to maintain a relationship with Jennifer. Two of the three children of his marriage attended community colleges.

Plaintiff is about forty-five. She and the children live with her sister, where plaintiff is paid $125 per week to care for her mother and her sister's child. She is supposed to receive child support from defendant.

On June 1, 2005, an order was entered, which among other things, set the arrears for child support at almost $19,000; ordered defendant to pay child support at $234 per week; ordered him to pay $5,697 of outstanding medical bills totaling $9,190, his share being sixty-two percent of the total; ordered him to pay $5,387 towards Jennifer's tuition at college; and ordered him to pay plaintiff's counsel fees in the amount of $2,329. On September 9, 2005, a consent order was entered requiring payment of the counsel fee award directly to counsel and $5,000 toward arrears.

On September 23, 2005, the order under appeal was entered. In relevant part, considering the appeal, the order required defendant to pay $12,000 toward Jennifer's college expenses for 2005, $4,595 toward the prior medical expenses, thereby reducing defendant's share from sixty-two percent to fifty percent, and $3,612.33 in plaintiff's counsel fees and costs, consisting of the prior award of $2,329 plus $1,283.33, representing one-half of the fee and costs plaintiff incurred in responding to the last motion.

On the issue of counsel fees, defendant claims that the judge failed to expressly apply the factors set forth in R. 5:3-5(c). In making that argument he fails to note that most of the award was simply an incorporation of the amount set forth in a prior order. He did not appeal that order, and thus there is no basis for setting aside the present award insofar as it included the previously ordered $2,329. While the judge's finding might well have been more detailed with respect to the additional $1,283.33, we have exercised our original jurisdiction in that regard. After considering the certification submitted by plaintiff's counsel and the factors contained in R. 5:3-5(c), we are satisfied that the award was proper.

Defendant's responsibility to share in the cost of Jennifer's college education had been previously decided and was the subject of the June 1, 2005, order, from which no appeal has been taken. Moreover, the evidence submitted at the testimonial hearing of September 23, 2005, demonstrated beyond question the fairness of requiring defendant to share in the college expenses to the extent ordered. It is quite apparent that the judge considered the application in relation to the Newburgh factors. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982). Defendant argues that his age, ill health, and lack of a college education supported his claim that had he lived with Jennifer, he would not have contributed to her college costs. But the children of his marriage attended community college at his expense, and there is no reason to suppose that he would not have provided a regular college education had they had the ability, as Jennifer does, to follow that course. While paying for a share of Jennifer's college costs will be a burden for him in light of his income, he would hardl y be the first parent to take out loans to meet that obligation. He complains that he has not had contact with Jennifer for eight years and she did not consult with him about her decision to attend college, but he admitted at the hearing that he had made no attempts whatsoever to have a relationship with Jennifer. Considering all the evidence, we are satisfied that the judge properly insisted on defendant living up to his legal obligation to underwrite a substantial portion of Jennifer's college expenses.

With respect to the un-reimbursed medical bills, defendant complains that they were not supported by detailed bills. But as plaintiff points out, the bills had been previously submitted, and there was a prior order directing defendant to pay sixty-two percent of the total. All the order of September 23, 2005, did was reduce defendant's share to fifty percent. We perceive no basis for his complaint, particularly because no appeal was filed with respect to the earlier order, which was based on medical bills submitted.

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-0674-05T1

July 17, 2006