SHERRI CIAROCCO v. BERGEN COUNTY, et al.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
 
 
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0214-04T1

SHERRI CIAROCCO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BERGEN COUNTY, BERGEN COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, JOSEPH
CICCONE, JOSEPH CROWLEY,
JAMES McLARNON and FRANK
BENEDETTO,

Defendants-Respondents,

and

ANTHONY SCOLPINO,

Defendant.
________________________________________________________________

Text Box
 
May 11, 2006

Argued December 21, 2005 Decided

Before Judges Fall, Parker and Miniman.

On appeal from the Superior Court, Law
Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-1453-01.

Thomas N. Ryan argued the cause for appellant
(Laddey, Clark & Ryan, attorneys; Mr. Ryan and
Deborah L. Sheward, on the brief).

Charles J. Sciarra argued the cause for respondents
Bergen County and Bergen County Sheriff's Department;
(Mr. Sciarra, of counsel; Jeffrey D. Catrambone,
on the joint brief).

 

Dina Mastellone argued the cause for respondent
Joseph Crowley (Genova, Burns & Vernoia, attorneys;
Ms. Mastellone, of counsel and on the joint brief).

Michael J. Palma argued the cause for respondent
Frank Benedetto (Nowell, Amoroso, Klein, Bierman,
attorneys; Mr. Palma, of counsel and on the joint
brief).

James V. Zarrillo argued the cause for respondent
Joseph Ciccone (Beattie, Padovano, attorneys;
Francis B. Sheehan, of counsel and on the joint
brief).

David S. Lafferty argued the cause for respondent
James McLarnon.

 
PER CURIAM

In this constructive discharge case asserting claims under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, and Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980), plaintiff Sherri Ciarocco appeals from an order entered on July 28, 2004 granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Bergen County, Bergen County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Joseph Ciccone, Deputy Sheriff Joseph Crowley, Deputy Chief Frank Benedetto and Sheriff's Officer James McLarnon, dismissing the complaint against each of them. See footnote 1
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. Plaintiff was employed in the Bergen County Sheriff's Department from March 1992 until January 21, 2000, when she resigned to accept a position with the Bergen County Department of Public Works (DPW). In January 1999, a new sheriff, Joseph Ciccone, took office. In December 1999, plaintiff was asked to participate in fundraising for Ciccone's next campaign. She had participated in fundraising for two previous sheriffs and willingly undertook the task. In December 1999, she attended a command staff meeting and agreed to plan an upcoming fundraiser. She later testified in deposition that she thought this was illegal but did not report it to anyone at the time. Her duties in planning the fundraiser were to include "[t]he invitations, part of the ticket sales and the handling of the money."
Defendant Deputy Sheriff Joseph Crowley asked plaintiff to perform certain political fundraising tasks during her work time, including preparing mailings. Plaintiff testified that she believed this activity was illegal and told Crowley she did not want to do it. She claimed they had "an argument" about it and that he "yelled" at her. She then spoke to Deputy Chief Frank Benedetto, her immediate supervisor, and told him she thought it was improper for her to stuff envelopes during the work day. She claimed that Benedetto instructed her to stuff the envelopes, which she did for an hour or two. For a period of time, plaintiff handled money for the campaign but that job was taken away from her. She testified that after she was relieved of handling money, she thought the procedures being used were no longer proper. Nevertheless, she complained to Benedetto that she was no longer allowed to handle the money. Plaintiff claimed that Benedetto "implied" her job would be in jeopardy if she did not help with fundraising.
Benedetto took plaintiff to a second command staff meeting in December 1999, about a week after the first meeting, "to tell the other members of the command staff that [she] wasn't going to participate in the fundraiser." After the meeting, plaintiff claimed that "the people in the office . . . more or less stopped socializing with [her] as much as they had been before."
Plaintiff maintained that after she complained, Benedetto began taking work away from her and Ciccone talked to her in an intimidating manner, although she admitted that he did not talk to her often. Although she refused to work on the campaign, plaintiff continued to complain to Benedetto about the procedures used for handling campaign money, specifically that she thought the funds were not being properly recorded. She claimed that Benedetto told her the Sheriff wanted her "out of his face."
Plaintiff testified that Benedetto said she had "to support the sheriff [because] he was depending on [her]." She responded that Ciccone had promised her a raise to a salary of $37,000, a promotion and a title change from principal clerk-typist to confidential assistant as a reward for previous fundraising. When she complained about not getting the raise or the title change, she testified that Benedetto told her it was "too bad."
Plaintiff also complained to Beverly Schmidt, the administrative chief in the Sheriff's Department, and Edward DiNapoli, the union shop steward. Plaintiff told DiNapoli "that they were taking away my job responsibilities, what Lieutenant Crowley had done to me, the way Benedetto was treating me, speaking to me, [and] the way that other people in the building were not speaking to me at that point." DiNapoli responded that she could file a grievance. She did not do so, claiming Benedetto said, "Go ahead, your union isn't strong enough to fight the Sheriff."
Plaintiff also complained to Dominic Novelli, co-chief-of-staff in the county executive's office. She told Novelli she wanted to "transfer out of the Sheriff's Department" because she "felt [she] was being harassed and that [she] was very emotionally upset about what was happening there at the Sheriff's Department." She further told Novelli that "the Sheriff's Department . . . was too politically motivated at that point in time and [she] did not want to be a part of it." She did not remember, however, whether she told Novelli about the political fundraising.
Novelli did not contact plaintiff again, but she did receive a call from defendant Anthony Scolpino, Director of the Bergen County Department of Public Works (DPW), who told her "he had gotten a call from Mr. Novelli and that his secretary was due to retire and that Mr. Novelli wanted him . . . to interview me for the position." A few days later, plaintiff interviewed for the position and was offered the job. She testified that Scolpino "proceeded to tell me that the girls in the office were not going to be happy. That the one girl in particular, Carol Gann, was supposed to get the job. In an effort not to make hard feelings with her, I offered Mr. Scolpino to take Carol's job and have Carol get the job that she had been promised. He said don't make any trouble, keep your mouth shut."
On January 20, 2000, plaintiff submitted a letter to Ciccone formally resigning from the Sheriff's Department because she had accepted a position with the DPW. Her letter stated:
This letter is to inform you that on this date I was advised by the Department of Public Works for the County of Bergen that I have been selected to fill a position in which I had applied for.

To that end, please accept this letter as my formal resignation from the Bergen County Sheriff's Department as I will be laterally transferring my employment within the County of Bergen.

In addition, I was also advised that this department's personnel division will need to complete M-1 Forms on my behalf. Once this task is completed, my transfer of employment will begin in the Department of Public Works, however, my last day of employment will be Friday, January 21, 2000.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

Sherri Ciarocco
 
Plaintiff now characterizes this as a "forced resignation" or "constructive discharge." That same day, Benedetto asked his lieutenant to watch plaintiff pack up and escort her from the building. She testified that she was "humiliated at that point and . . . was crying."
Plaintiff began working at the DPW on January 24, 2000. She testified she was given no training and no work to do. When she complained to Scolpino that his retiring secretary said she was too busy to train her, Scolpino said he would speak to the secretary, but nothing changed. On February 11, 2000, just two weeks after beginning her new job at the DPW, plaintiff called in sick, leaving a message on Scolpino's voice mail. That day, her mother called from Florida to say she was not feeling well, and the next morning plaintiff flew to Florida. She called Scolpino from Florida asking for extra time off to help her parents, but Scolpino said that was unacceptable. She felt Scolpino "was very uncompassionate, unsympathetic to the fact that my parents needed help and I didn't really have much of an alternative but to help them."
On or about February 22, 2000, plaintiff sent a letter of resignation to the DPW. The letter stated:
Due to unexpected circumstances, I have no alternative but to resign from my position with the Department of Public Works effective February 25, 2000. I will be utilizing my accrued sick time from February 22, 2000 through Friday's date.

Thank you for the opportunity to work for you and the considerations you gave me.

Sincerely,

Sherri Ciarocco
 
Plaintiff later tried to obtain other county jobs without success. She blamed this on interference by Scolpino but had no documents or specific allegations to support this claim, except a hearsay statement that a lieutenant in the Bergen County Police Department purportedly told her, "We have to rescind your job offer . . . there was a problem with the paperwork. . . . Apparently the county put a freeze on your hiring."
On July 19, 2000, plaintiff wrote a letter to County Executive William "Pat" Schuber, claiming that "five solid offers of employment [had been made to her] and all were rescinded" because "Mr. Scolpino has been giving my potential employers a poor reference on my behalf and has refused to acknowledge my previous work record within the Sheriff's Department. He is making judgments and slandering my work reputation and ethics for some personal vendetta." Plaintiff claimed she knew of Scolpino's poor references because "he admitted his actions to his personal friend which were then related to me." She further claimed that she left the DPW job after two weeks because "[n]ot only was the transfer uncomparable [sic] to the work I was accustomed to doing, my emotional issues over my assignment with the Sheriff's Department were overwhelming."
Nevertheless, in early Fall 2000, plaintiff wrote to Ciccone asking to be re-employed in her old position. See footnote 2 On September 21, 2000, Ciccone responded to plaintiff's letter, indicating that there were no openings at that time.
On February 15, 2001, plaintiff filed her complaint in Bergen County Superior Court against Bergen County, the Sheriff's Department and the five individual defendants. The case was later transferred to Morris County. After extensive discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.
On February 10, 2004, Judge Thomas Manahan granted summary judgment, dismissing the complaint against Scolpino. On July 28, 2004, Judge Manahan granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. The judge concluded that the CEPA claim was time-barred because it was filed more than one year after plaintiff resigned from the Sheriff's Department; and that the evidence did not support plaintiff's Pierce or constructive discharge claims.
Plaintiff appeals from the July 28, 2004 order and argues that (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were material facts in dispute; (2) the CEPA claim is not time-barred because she remained a county employee until February 2001; (3) the trial court erred in dismissing the retaliatory constructive discharge claim under Pierce because the evidence demonstrated that she did complain to an outside authority; and (4) a reasonable person would have found plaintiff's working conditions intolerable.

I
 
Plaintiff initially argues that summary judgment was improper because there were material facts in dispute. In our review of the record, however, we have found that the decision granting summary judgment was not based on disputed factual issues, as will be discussed herein.
II
 
Plaintiff contends that the CEPA claim was not time-barred because the one-year statute of limitations did not accrue until she resigned from the DPW on February 22, 2000. Plaintiff has not appealed from the dismissal of her claims against Scolpino, however, and her appeal addresses only the claims against the Sheriff's Department and the individual employees thereof.
CEPA provides a cause of action for retaliation against an employee for speaking out against, or declining to participate in, employer actions that violate the law or public policy. Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70, 77 (2005). To establish a prima facie claim under CEPA, an employee must demonstrate that:
(1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3c; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.

[Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003).]
 
A CEPA action must be instituted "within one year" of "the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment." N.J.S.A. 34:19-5 and -2(e). The claim accrues on the date of the actual discharge, suspension or demotion that constitutes the alleged retaliatory action. Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. Super. 38, 48 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 210 (2001). "Adverse employment action" can also include "many separate but relatively minor instances of behavior directed against an employee that may not be actionable individually but that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory conduct." Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003).
Here, plaintiff alleges a number of instances of "bad acts," the last being her alleged constructive discharge. Where there is a claim of constructive discharge under CEPA, "the retaliatory action is the creation of intolerable conditions which a reasonable employee cannot accept." Daniels v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 340 N.J. Super. 11, 17-18 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 86 (2001). Because the CEPA violation cannot occur any later than the date the resignation was tendered, the statute of limitations began to run on that date. Id. at 13.
Plaintiff contends that it was her resignation from the DPW, not the Sheriff's Department, that triggered the statute of limitations. All of her allegations of retaliatory acts after her resignation from the Sheriff's Department, however, were included in her claim against Scolpino, which has been dismissed and not appealed. Plaintiff cannot, therefore, argue that retaliatory acts continued after her resignation from the Sheriff's Department when she has abandoned her claims against Scolpino.
Moreover, in granting summary judgment in favor of Scolpino, the trial judge found that there were no CEPA or Pierce violations by Scolpino and no adverse employment action while plaintiff was employed at DPW. Again, plaintiff has not challenged that ruling on appeal. Nevertheless, she argues that the trial court concluded only that Scolpino had not engaged in any conduct that would have provoked her to "blow the whistle," not that Scolpino did not engage in retaliatory conduct linked with mistreatment she suffered in the Sheriff's Department. The record indicates otherwise. The trial court found:
It is unlikely that given the type of conduct that is claimed by Ms. Ciarocco that . . . she believes [] emanated [from] Mr. Scolpino's desire in some form to retaliate, that reasonable minds could find that this was, in fact, retaliation.

. . . .

The court finds as well that . . . the type and nature of conduct complained of [at the DPW] would not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of an adverse employment decision or conduct. It, clearly . . . does not do it. Ms. Ciarocco worked for just a matter of days in her capacity at the Department of Public Works before she made the decision to terminate her employment.
 
Moreover, the trial court expressly rejected any connection between Scolpino and the alleged misconduct in the Sheriff's Department, finding no proof to sustain a causal connection between the two
except for some amorphous reference to the fact that Mr. Scolpino may at some time, or did at some time, work with other co-defendants while he was in the capacity of under-sheriff in Bergen County. But there is no nexus or connection or causal connection, factually, that would indicate that any of the steps taken by Mr. Scolpino in dealing with the plaintiff were related to her whistle-blowing activities while she was under the employ of the Bergen County Sheriff's Department.
 
Given these findings, which are fully supported by the record, plaintiff cannot rely on Scolpino's conduct "to create a continuing violation of CEPA."
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Sheriff's Department is a constitutional office and not a department or division within Bergen County. The court reasoned that the county "did not at any time exercise control over her employment or otherwise direct the activities she was obliged to perform." We agree with the trial judge's conclusion that the Sheriff's Department was a separate entity for the purpose of hiring, firing and disciplining employees.
The New Jersey Constitution provides for the manner of the Sheriff's election and term of office. N.J. Const. art. VII, 2, 2. "That hardly lends support to the contention that the Sheriff cannot, for purposes of [N.J.S.A. 40A:5-22 See footnote 3 ], be considered a part of the county structure, or that he must be looked upon as a state employee exclusively." In re Application of Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 99 N.J. 90, 97-98 (1985). The county and sheriff have been held to be joint employers for the purpose of collective bargaining, but their joint role in negotiation does not compromise the Sheriff's independent power to hire, fire or discipline employees. Prunetti v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 350 N.J. Super. 72, 137-38 (Law Div. 2001).
If we extend plaintiff's argument to the state level, it becomes obvious that employment by successive agencies cannot be considered continuing employment merely because the State pays the salary for all of its employees. For example, if a person is employed by the Attorney General's Office and resigns to accept a position in the Department of Environmental Protection, she cannot claim that continuing employment by the State for the purpose of bringing a timely action against the Attorney General, unless there is proof of a continuing course of conduct. Plaintiff's January 20, 2000 letter of resignation from the Sheriff's Department constituted the final adverse employment action and the accrual of her cause of action under CEPA.
Plaintiff further argues that, assuming her CEPA claim was not time-barred, she can establish a prima facie case under the statute. We affirm the trial court's decision on the statute of limitations and decline to discuss the merits of the claim.

III
 
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for wrongful termination under the Pierce doctrine because, contrary to the trial court's finding, she reported defendants' actions to a governmental authority and another outside agency, her union.
In Pierce the Court held that "an employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy." 84 N.J. at 72. Under Pierce, a plaintiff may bring an action in contract or tort based on an implied contractual provision or breach of a duty not to discharge an employee for refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy. Ibid.
Here, the trial court found that plaintiff did not satisfy the Pierce standard because during her employment, although she made complaints to Beverly Schmidt and a member of the county executive staff, she did not complain about illegal fundraising. Indeed, plaintiff never complained or threatened to complain about the fundraising to any outside authority. "[T]he mere voicing of opposition to corporate policy within a corporation provides an insufficient foundation for assertion of a Pierce claim." House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 42, 49 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 154 (1989). See also Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 291 N.J. Super. 98, 124 n.12 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that "internal expressions of disagreement with corporate policy" are insufficient to establish a claim under Pierce in contrast with a claim under CEPA), aff d, 153 N.J. 163 (1998).
[N]o New Jersey case has recognized a claim for wrongful discharge based solely upon an employee's internal complaints about a corporate decision, where the employee has failed to bring the alleged violation of public policy to any governmental or other outside authority or to take other effective action in opposition to the policy.

[House, supra, 232 N.J. Super. at 48-49].
 
Plaintiff does not dispute the applicability of these principles. Rather, she asserts that she took effective action to stop the alleged illegal political fundraising by refusing to continue to organize and provide administrative support for it and by reporting it to DiNapoli, her union shop steward, and Novelli in the County Executive's Office. She argues that given the trial court's finding that the Sheriff's Department, rather than Bergen County, was her employer, the Bergen County Executive qualified as both an outside authority and a governmental authority. We do not disagree that the County Executive is an outside, governmental authority. The record indicates, however, that plaintiff's "complaints" to the Executive's Office and the union shop steward were no more than expressions of disagreement with her employer's policy, rather than the required complaints to an outside party or "other action reasonably calculated to prevent the objectionable conduct." Id. at 49.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to support plaintiff's contention that her individual refusal to continue participating in fundraising activities was meant to stop activity she perceived was illegal. She conceded that although she believed the first command staff meeting was illegal, she told no one. She told Crowley and Benedetto that she thought the envelope stuffing during the work day was improper, but made no complaints during her employment that were designed to stop the activities she now alleges were illegal.
By her own account, plaintiff did not want to continue fundraising because she "didn't like the way it was being handled or performed." Although she testified in deposition that she told Benedetto she thought it was improper for her to stuff envelopes during the work day, she conceded that she made the complaint because her responsibility for handling campaign funds had been taken away.
Plaintiff further testified that she told Benedetto
I had been loyal to the Sheriff and to the previous Sheriff. They had promised me raises and promotions in exchange for these fundraising parties that I was throwing. I had not gotten what they had promised me. I thought I had been taken advantage of. I told him that I felt I had been taken for granted and I didn't want to help the Sheriff if it was not going to help me in return. I didn't want to give up my position with the Sheriff's Department. I simply just wanted to not be involved in the political aspects of it. (Emphasis added.)
 
Plaintiff testified that Benedetto responded by saying, "you have to support the Sheriff, he's depending on you" but she could not recall "exactly what else he might have said at that time." In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she told Benedetto she did not want to participate in further fundraising for Ciccone "due to the harassing behavior of defendant Crowley, as well as others, and the ongoing political bullying," not because she believed the fundraising was illegal.
Plaintiff contends that her complaint to DiNapoli was a complaint to her union, an outside authority. But, the union had no regulatory or other authority over plaintiff or her employer and was not, therefore, a "governmental or other outside authority." Even if plaintiff's complaints to DiNapoli did qualify as complaints to outside authority, they would not satisfy the Pierce standard. Plaintiff testified that she complained to DiNapoli about "[t]he fact that they were taking away my job responsibilities, what Lieutenant Crowley had done to me, the way Benedetto was treating me, speaking to me, the way that other people in the building were not speaking to me at that point." In short, she complained to DiNapoli about her treatment in the office, not about alleged illegal activity.
The evidence supports the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's Pierce claim. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A).

IV
 
Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her constructive discharge claim because reasonable jurors could have concluded that her working conditions were intolerable. "A constructive discharge occurs when the employer has imposed upon an employee working conditions 'so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.'" Daniels, supra, 340 N.J. Super. at 17 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Muench v. Twp. of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 302 (App. Div. 1992)). The determination of constructive discharge is fact-driven and the allegation must not be dismissed if "reasonable minds could differ on whether a woman of reasonable sensitivity [in a sex discrimination case] would have resigned under the circumstances." Muench, supra, 255 N.J. Super. at 302. The standard for constructive discharge envisions a "sense of outrageous, coercive and unconscionable requirements." Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. Super. 412, 428 (App. Div. 2001).
In Shepherd v. Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 7 (2002), plaintiffs alleged that they were targeted for strict enforcement of workplace rules in retaliation for their support of an unrelated lawsuit against the defendants. The Court found that no reasonable jury could find constructive discharge based upon allegations of ultra-critical supervision and pointed unfriendliness, especially where one plaintiff did not do all that was reasonably necessary to remain employed because he failed to attend a critical counseling session called to discuss the issues related to his internal complaint. Id. at 29.
Here, plaintiff points to numerous allegations of mistreatment during her employment by the DPW. Plaintiff's DPW employment is not relevant to this appeal, however, because, as we discussed above, she has not challenged the dismissal of the claims against Scolpino. We focus instead on plaintiff's allegations of retaliatory conduct during her employment by the Sheriff's Department:
Plaintiff believed she was being demoted to the midnight shift in jail records. Plaintiff was yelled at in a threatening and intimidating nature by both defendant Crowley and defendant Benedetto. Plaintiff was denied the promotion to the title which corresponded with the work she was already performing. When plaintiff asked for a transfer, she was escorted out of the Sheriff's Department like a security or safety threat.

The trial court found that plaintiff's allegations established only that she did not like her work environment, which became unfriendly after she advised Crowley that she would no longer participate in fundraising. Viewing her complaints in the most favorable light, "[p]eople ignored her, people treated her poorly, people yelled at her." She further alleged that "her union shop steward advised her that she might have been transferred" to another job within the Sheriff's Department but she presented no evidence that a transfer was imminent or that any of the defendants participated in any decision to transfer her.
The court found further that plaintiff's claim of constructive discharge was undermined by her seeking reemployment in the Sheriff's Department within the year. We agree. Viewing plaintiff's allegations in the best possible light, they do not constitute egregious conduct "so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign rather than continue to endure it." Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. at 28. Plaintiff's belief that she was being demoted is not supported by any evidence beyond her own hearsay report of DiNapoli's comment. She claims that she was denied a promised promotion but, again, she presents no evidence beyond her own hearsay report of Ciccone's promise to reward her for past political work. Her claim that she was wrongly escorted out of the Sheriff's Department was after she resigned, not during her employment in that department. Moreover, plaintiff's attempt to be rehired by Ciccone six months after her resignation belies her claim of constructive discharge.
We have carefully considered the very extensive record See footnote 4 in light of plaintiff's arguments and the applicable law. We are satisfied that Judge Manahan properly granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint against all of the defendants, and we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the judge in his oral opinion on July 28, 2004. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A).
Affirmed.
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Footnote: 1 Summary judgment was also granted in favor of defendant Anthony Scolpino, but plaintiff has not appealed from that order.
Footnote: 2 In summer or spring 2000, plaintiff's mother had contributed $1,000 to Ciccone's campaign, but plaintiff claims she did not know about the contribution until after the check was returned.
 
Footnote: 3 N.J.S.A. 40A:5-22 provides that "[a] judge of the Superior Court may, in his [or her] discretion, make a summary investigation into the affairs of any local unit and appoint an expert or experts to prosecute such investigation whenever" a petition of 25 taxpaying landowners within the county or "a resolution of the governing body requesting such investigation shall be presented to him [or her]."
Footnote: 4 Plaintiff has presented in excess of 1,600 pages of material in her appendix.

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