STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. DERRICK ROSSI

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0133-04T40133-04T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DERRICK ROSSI,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________

 

Submitted April 24, 2006 - Decided May 12, 2006

Before Judges Fall and Yannotti.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 01-09-1199.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Susan Brody, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Joseph L. Bocchini, Jr., Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Dorothy Hersh, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Derrick Rossi was charged under a Mercer County indictment with murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) (count one); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(3) (count two); robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count three); possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (count four); and unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (count five). Defendant was tried to a jury, which found him not guilty of murder, felony murder and robbery but guilty of the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter and the two weapons offenses. Defendant was sentenced to a 30-year term of incarceration on count one, with a period of parole ineligibility as prescribed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Count four was merged with count five and defendant was sentenced to a four-year term to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on count one. Appropriate fines and penalties also were imposed. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentences. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for re-sentencing on count one.

I.

We begin with a summary of the evidence presented at trial.

Daniel Pedroza (Pedroza) testified that on February 4, 2001, he was living on Hudson Street in Trenton, New Jersey. He came home from work at about 1:00 in the morning and was looking out the window in a room on the second floor of his residence, smoking a cigarette. After about five minutes, Pedroza observed two men coming down Pearl Street onto Hudson. They looked as if they were talking. Pedroza said that, when the men turned the corner, they started pushing each other. The two men moved down the block and were across the street from Pedroza's home. Pedroza identified defendant as one of the two men that he saw from his window.

Pedroza said that he saw defendant holding the other man by his coat. The other man tried to pull away from defendant and defendant swung at the other man, hitting him in the face. Defendant pulled out a gun. He was about three or four feet from the other man. A shot rang out. The victim fell and kicked his legs, trying to get away. Pedroza ran downstairs to get the phone so he could call 9-1-1. Pedroza was on the steps inside his home when he heard a second shot.

Pedroza went back upstairs and looked out the window. He did not see the victim but he saw defendant running down towards Hamilton Avenue. He said that defendant was wearing black pants and a blue "puffy" coat. The victim was wearing black pants and a pull-over jacket of a "greenish/bluish" color. The police arrived shortly thereafter and Pedroza told the police what he had seen.

Officer Jason Astbury (Astbury) of the Trenton Police Department was on patrol duty at the time and he was dispatched to the area of Pearl and Hudson Streets. Astbury testified that he was driving down Hamilton Avenue towards Hudson Street when he observed a man walking across the street. Astbury identified defendant as the man he saw crossing the street. Astbury said that defendant was coming from a "little walkway between the houses." Astbury said that he was looking for an individual wearing a dark colored, dark green jacket and blue jeans. Defendant matched the description. Astbury stopped the police vehicle and told defendant to stop. Astbury got out of the car and defendant began to run.

Defendant ran south on Hudson Street and turned into Ditmar Alley. Defendant had his right hand in the inside of his jacket. Astbury said that he believed that defendant was reaching for a gun. Astbury chased after defendant. Defendant continued running and Astbury continued in pursuit. Astbury briefly lost sight of defendant near on parking lot on Bayard Street but continued to chase after defendant. Astbury observed defendant enter a house on Walklett Alley. Astbury tried to enter but the door was blocked with a couch. Astbury ran to the rear of the house. He looked up and saw defendant in the window.

Defendant was residing at the time in the house on Walklett Alley with his girlfriend, Maria Pineda (Pineda). She testified that she was in bed on the second floor of the house when defendant entered. She heard the officer outside calling to defendant and telling him to come out. Pineda came down the stairs and saw defendant run into the kitchen. Pineda testified that defendant repeatedly said that he was sorry. Defendant ran into the living room and pushed a sofa in front of the door. He continued to tell Pineda that he was sorry. Defendant went upstairs to the bedroom in the back of the house. He put his leg out the window but pulled it back in when he saw the police.

Defendant ran to the front bedroom and looked out the window. Defendant went downstairs to the kitchen, opened one of the drawers and pulled out a steak knife. He told Pineda he was sorry. Defendant said that "he thought he might have shot someone." Defendant again went upstairs to the front bedroom. He sat on the bed and, according to Pineda, repeatedly stated that he was sorry. The police forced their way into the house. The officers went upstairs where they found defendant under a bed in the front bedroom.

Defendant was arrested and informed of his Miranda rights. Defendant was placed into a police car and taken to the crime scene, where Pedroza identified defendant as the person he saw shoot the victim. At about the same time, detectives arrived at the house on Walklett Alley. Pineda gave the detectives consent to search the premises. The detectives found a bag of nine-millimeter rounds in a drawer in defendant's bedroom. They found a blue jacket. They also found a box for a gun-cleaning kit in the kitchen.

At police headquarters, a detective questioned defendant. He was again informed of his Miranda rights. Defendant initially denied any knowledge of the shooting, but when he was told that there was an eyewitness to the incident, defendant admitted that he was at the scene. He said that he gave a man money and the man ran away. Defendant asserted that he heard two gunshots as he was running away. Defendant denied that he was in possession of a weapon. The detective told defendant that the eyewitness saw him with a weapon.

The detective asserted that he knew the truth, at which point defendant said, "I didn't mean to shoot him." Defendant stated that the victim tried to rob him and pulled on a gold chain that he was wearing. He said that he grabbed the victim's gun and shot the victim twice when the victim charged him. Defendant stated that he walked away but ran when he saw the police.

At the scene of the shooting, other police officers found a blue knit hat. Pineda identified the hat as her own. She said that defendant would, at times, borrow her hats. The officers found a trail of blood that led to Hudson Street. The officers also found two spent shell casings on Hudson Street. They were informed that a man was down on Tyler Street. There, an officer found Daniel Rojas, who matched Pedroza's description of the victim. His clothes were soaked in blood. Rojas was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead.

The officers did not immediately find a weapon. However, later that morning, a person living on Bayard Street informed the police that a handgun had been found. The gun was recovered near the parking lot where Astbury briefly lost sight of defendant while chasing him. Defendant identified the handgun as the one he used to shoot Rojas. It was a nine-millimeter Ruger semi-automatic pistol containing ammunition. Ballistic tests indicated that the shell casings recovered on Hudson Street had been fired from the gun found in the parking lot near Bayard Street.

Defendant testified in his own defense. He stated that on February 4, 2001, he left his home at about 11:00 p.m. and spent about two hours drinking at Charlie Fisher's bar. He was walking home when he ran into Rojas. Defendant had never seen Rojas before. Rojas spoke to him in Spanish but defendant did not speak that language. Rojas told defendant that he wanted "rock or whatever." Defendant told Rojas that he did not have drugs. According to defendant, Rojas pulled up his shirt and showed defendant the handle of a gun.

Defendant testified that Rojas demanded money. Defendant said that he gave Rojas the money that he had and a struggle ensued. Rojas reached for the white gold chain that defendant was wearing on his neck. Defendant saw the opportunity to grab the gun from Rojas' waistband. Rojas resisted and they struggled. Defendant got possession of the gun. Defendant testified that he shot a warning shot at a tree. Defendant asserted that Rojas charged him again. Defendant met Rojas' chest area with his left hand and defendant ran into Rojas. He pushed him off and Rojas grabbed his wrist. The second shot was fired and Rojas ran off.

Defendant admitted that when the police brought him back to the crime scene after his arrest, he asserted, "That bitch tried to rob me." Defendant was referring to Rojas. He testified that the bullets found in his dresser drawer had been left there by a guest. Defendant asserted that he hid the ammunition to keep it from Pineda's son. Defendant also stated that he was unaware that there was ammunition in the entertainment center on the first floor of the house. Defendant stated that he did not own the Ruger handgun. He denied that he tried to rob Rojas. Defendant said that initially he denied any knowledge of the incident because he was afraid that he would be seen as the aggressor.

The Public Defender has filed a brief on behalf of defendant asserting the following:

POINT I: DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY THE PROSECUTOR'S HIGHLY IMPROPER SUMMATION, IN WHICH HE VOUCHED FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF HIS OWN WITNESS AND CONTRASTED HIM WITH DEFENDANT WHO HAD A "MOTIVE TO LIE" (Not raised below).

POINT II: THE COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTION ON CREDIBILITY WAS SO FLAWED AND SO PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT THAT IT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (Not raised below).

POINT III: THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON DEFENDANT WAS SO MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE UNDER ALL OF THE APPLICABLE CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO SHOCK THE CONSCIENCE AND REQUIRE REVERSAL.

POINT IV: IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE ABOVE THE PRESUMPTIVE BASED ON NON-JURY FINDINGS, THE COURT VIOLATED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN BLAKELY v. WASHINGTON, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).

Defendant has filed a supplemental pro se brief in which he makes the following argument:

POINT I: DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO CHARGE PASSION/PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MURDER.

II.

We turn first to defendant's contention that he was deprived his right to a fair trial because of certain allegedly improper comments made by the assistant prosecutor in his summation. Defendant focuses on the following statements. The assistant prosecutor asserted that Pedroza had no interest in the outcome of the case "other than the interest of perhaps seeing a guilty man go to jail." He added:

Let's look at the defendant. He's charged with murder, he's charged with felony murder, he's charged with robbery, he's charged with weapons offenses. In the State's mind, that certainly creates a motive to lie to get from underneath those charges.

We have Mr. Pedroza. No motive to lie, the defendant with a large motive to lie because of the seriousness of the charges. In the State's mind, the testimony of Mr. Pedroza is very, very credible. If it weren't for Mr. Pedroza, the defendant wouldn't be in custody.

Defendant argues that the assistant prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of Pedroza, the eyewitness to the shooting who testified for the State. Defendant maintains that the assistant prosecutor improperly advised the jury that defendant's testimony should be viewed with skepticism because he had a "motive to lie." We disagree.

"[T]he primary duty of a prosecutor is not to obtain convictions, but to see that justice is done." State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 320 (1987), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 947, 113 S. Ct 2433, 124 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1993). Although a prosecutor has a duty to use every legitimate means to bring about a just conviction, the prosecutor must refrain from improper methods which are calculated to produce a wrongful conviction. State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 105 (1972)(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935)).

A prosecutor may comment on the evidence and the inferences that reasonably may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Abdullah, 372 N.J. Super. 252, 268 (App. Div. 2004), reversed in part on other grounds, 184 N.J. 497 (2005). In doing so, "[a] prosecutor may argue that a witness is credible but may not personally vouch for the credibility of a State witness or suggest that the witness's testimony has been 'checked out,' thereby referring to matters outside the record." State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363, 445 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 466 (1997) (citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 156 (1991)).

Here, defendant's attorney did not object to the prosecutor's statements. Thus, it can be legitimately inferred that "counsel did not consider the remarks inappropriate or prejudicial." Abdullah, supra, 372 N.J. Super. at 268 (citing State v. Vasquez, 265 N.J. Super. 528, 560 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 480 (1993)). Since the alleged prosecutorial misconduct is raised for the first time on appeal, we consider whether "the remarks, if improper, substantially prejudiced the defendant['s] fundamental right to have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of [his] defense, and thus had a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result." Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 510 (1960)). Reversal of a conviction is warranted only if the prosecutor's conduct "was so egregious that it deprived the accused of a fair trial." Ibid. (citing Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322).

We are not convinced that the assistant prosecutor's comments were improper. The record shows that Pedroza was the only eyewitness to the incident. In his summation, defense counsel attacked Pedroza's credibility, suggesting that Pedroza had provided inconsistent statements concerning what he had seen. In responding to that argument, it was not inappropriate for the assistant prosecutor to state that Pedroza had no motive to lie. Indeed, the judge later stated in his charge that, when weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the jury could consider whether a witness had an interest in the outcome of the case.

The assistant prosecutor also asserted, "In the State's mind, the testimony of Mr. Pedroza is very, very credible." In our view, this statement is more a comment on the witness's credibility based on the trial testimony than a personal statement by the assistant prosecutor vouching for Pedroza's credibility. Certainly, there is no suggestion that the assistant prosecutor's assessment of Pedroza's credibility was based on facts outside the record. Even if the assistant prosecutor's assertion could be interpreted as a personal opinion of Pedroza's credibility, the assertion is not the sort of egregious conduct that would warrant reversal of defendant's conviction.

The same conclusion applies to the assistant prosecutor's assertions concerning defendant's credibility, specifically the statement that defendant had a motive to lie because he had an interest in the outcome of the case. The statements were fair comment on the evidence. A prosecutor may point out a witness's interest "in presenting a particular version of events." State v. Johnson, 287 N.J. Super. 247, 267 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 587 (1996) (citing State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 538 (1992)). Facing charges of murder, felony murder and robbery, defendant surely had an interest in the outcome of the trial and it was not improper for the assistant prosecutor to point that out in his summation.

III.

Defendant next contends that the judge erred in instructing the jury on the manner in which they should weigh the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony.

In this case, the judge gave a lengthy instruction to the jury on credibility. He told the jurors that they could consider among other things: the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, the manner in which the witnesses testified, whether the witness had an interest in the outcome of the case, the reasonableness of the testimony and "any and all other matters in the evidence which serve to support or discredit his or her testimony." The judge instructed the jury that the fact that defendant previously had been convicted of a crime could be considered in weighing defendant's credibility but for no other purpose. The judge instructed the jury concerning the manner in which it could consider the testimony of two experts who testified for the State.

The judge also instructed the jury concerning the manner in which it could consider prior inconsistent statements of a witness. The judge referred to Pedroza's statements as well as those of other witnesses. The judge went on to state:

The extent to which any inconsistencies in the witness' statement, and I'm specifically talking about Mr. Pedroza, but any witness' inconsistent prior statement reflect the truth is for you to determine. Consider the materiality and the relationship to the witness' entire testimony, all the testimony, and all the evidence in the case, everything you know about the case from other witnesses and other exhibits and when and where and the circumstances under which these things were said, whether the reasons that the witness gave you for the inconsistencies appear to be believable and logical, and, in short, consider everything I told you about prior inconsistent statements.

You will, of course, consider other evidence. You have a lot of testimony to consider, including the testimony that was offered by the defendant in this case. He testified that he was present at the scene and what his version is.

But you consider all of the evidence and inferences from all the other evidence, including statements of other witnesses. And you've heard there was a statement by the defendant also given on the night in question; the acts of the other witnesses, including the acts of the defendant which may disclose other motives other than what a witness may have said when he testified as to what his motive is for what he did or said.

So there may be reasons other than those reasons which were stated to you, and you have to evaluate them and determine what's true and what's not true. You have to sift through everything because everything you heard can't be true. You can't - you have to reconcile and resolve the facts. That's the difficulty that you face.

Defendant asserts that the judge erred when referring to "motives other than what a witness may have said." Defendant contends that the judge was obviously referring to the defendant because, according to defendant, he was the only witness whose motivation was in issue. Defendant argues that the judge was improperly conveying to the jury his view that defendant's testimony was lacking in credibility. We disagree.

We do not read the judge's statements concerning motive as referring specifically to defendant. Indeed, read in context, the judge was referring to all of the witnesses who testified, emphasizing the jury's obligation to consider all of the evidence in the case before deciding what evidence to believe and what evidence not to believe. We reject defendant's assertion that the judge had to be referring to him because only his motives were relevant to assessing credibility. The State presented testimony from Pedroza, Pineda and certain law enforcement officers. Surely, the motives of all of these witnesses could be considered by the jury in weighing their credibility.

We therefore are satisfied that the trial judge did not depart from his obligation to instruct the jury in "terms that are fair and impartial." State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 290 (1981). We note that defense counsel did not object to the judge's statement and therefore it can be presumed that he saw nothing improper or prejudicial in this particular portion of the charge. Abdullah, supra, 372 N.J. Super. at 267-68. We are satisfied that there was no error in the judge's instruction on credibility, let alone an error that is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.

IV.

We next consider the contention raised in defendant's supplemental pro se brief that the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. We note that at trial defendant's attorney did not ask for this instruction. In fact, when discussing the charge, defense counsel noted that he did not ask for the charge and did not "see how it's going to fit." The judge replied, "It doesn't fit."

When a defendant requests a charge on an included offense, the charge is not required unless a rational basis exists in the evidence for the jury to acquit defendant of the greater offense and convict on the lesser offense. State v. Brent, 137 N.J. 107, 113-14 (1994); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e). However, when a defendant does not request the charge on an included offense, the charge should be given only when the facts "clearly indicate" that such a charge is warranted. State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 397 (2002) (citing State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 298 (1985), and State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319 (1980)). If the charge is not requested, the trial judge need not "scour the statutes" to determine if there is some uncharged offense of which defendant may be guilty. Brent, supra, 137 N.J. at 118.

The elements of passion/provocation manslaughter under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2) are: 1) adequate provocation, 2) absence of a cool-off period between the provocation and the slaying; 3) the provocation must have actually impassioned the defendant; and 4) the defendant must have not cooled off before the slaying. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411 (1990).

The evidence in this case did not support a charge for this offense. Defendant testified that he shot Rojas with Rojas's gun in a struggle after Rojas robbed him and grabbed his white gold chain. Defendant did not state that he shot Rojas in a "rage" or as a result of some "passion." See Ibid. (noting that passion/provocation manslaughter is a homicide committed "in the heat of passion"). We therefore are convinced that the trial judge correctly determined that a charge for passion/provocation manslaughter was not warranted in this case.

V.

We turn to defendant's challenge to his sentence. He argues that the sentence of 30 years for aggravated manslaughter and a 4-year consecutive term for unlawful possession of a weapon is excessive. Defendant argues that the judge should have considered the defendant's youth and the fact that Rojas contributed to the crime as mitigating factors. Defendant further contends that the judge erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for the weapons offense. Again, we disagree.

Here, the judge found that there was a risk that defendant would commit another offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3). The judge also found that defendant had extensive involvement with the criminal justice system. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(6). This finding was based upon defendant's criminal record which included eight juvenile adjudications and adult convictions for possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute and burglary. The judge additionally found that it was necessary to deter defendant and others from committing similar offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(9). We are satisfied that there is ample support in the record for these findings.

We reject defendant's assertion that the judge should have found as a mitigating factor that the victim induced or facilitated the commission of the crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1b(5). Defendant was not only convicted of aggravated manslaughter, he was convicted of unlawful weapons possession. The jury thus rejected defendant's assertion that the gun belonged to Rojas. The record does not support defendant's assertion that the jury may have believed that Rojas attempted to rob defendant. Nor does the record establish that Rojas induced defendant to kill him.

We also reject defendant's assertion that the judge erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for the weapons offense. As the judge pointed out, defendant left his home around 11:00 p.m. with a handgun. He was not licensed to carry that weapon. In doing so, he committed a crime. Later that evening, in what was apparently a chance encounter, defendant used the gun to kill Rojas.

Based on this evidence, we are convinced that the judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. We are satisfied that the manslaughter and the weapons possession were separate and distinct crimes, with objectives that were predominantly independent of each other, and were not committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single piece of aberrant behavior. State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985).

We therefore are satisfied that the sentences imposed are not manifestly excessive or unduly punitive, are not an abuse of the judge's sentencing discretion, and do not shock the judicial conscience. State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215-16 (1989); State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-65 (1984).

VI.

Defendant additionally contends that the sentence imposed for aggravated manslaughter violates his right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment. In State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458 (2005), the Court held that New Jersey's system of presumptive-term sentencing violates the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury. Id. at 484. The Court invalidated the presumptive terms under the Code, thereby making the top of the statutory range for the crime charged the "statutory maximum" authorized by the jury verdict or the facts admitted by defendant at his guilty plea. Id. at 487. The Court in Natale ordered new sentencing hearings "in each affected case," at which the trial court must determine whether "the absence of the presumptive term in the weighing process requires the imposition of a different sentence." Id. at 495-96.

The State argues that because the sentencing judge relied upon aggravating factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(3), (6) and (9), re-sentencing under Natale is not warranted. See State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 506 n.2 (2005). The State contends that the findings that resulted in the imposition of a sentence on count one that is longer than the presumptive term were based solely upon defendant's prior criminal record.

However, a review of the transcript of the sentencing proceeding indicates that the judge's finding that there was a risk that defendant would commit another offense was based in part upon evidence that defendant had other guns and other individuals came to the house with their guns. The judge referred to these individuals as, "People who [do not] have any business...with those guns there." Thus, the judge's findings were not informed solely by defendant's prior criminal convictions. In the circumstances, we are convinced that re-sentencing on count one is required.

We add that the judge erred in merging the charge of possession of the weapon for an unlawful purpose with the charge of unlawful possession of that weapon. The unlawful purpose charge should have been merged with the aggravated manslaughter charge. State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 636 (1996). On remand, the judgment of conviction should be corrected.

In summary, we affirm defendant's convictions. We also affirm the consecutive sentence imposed for unlawful possession of a weapon. We remand for correction of the judgment to reflect merger of count four with count one. The judge shall re-sentence defendant for his conviction of aggravated manslaughter in accordance with Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 495-96.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for re-sentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

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A-0133-04T4

May 12, 2006