JOSEPH M. CARUSO v. SONIA E. FRANCIONI-CARUSO

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0061-05T10061-05T1

JOSEPH M. CARUSO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SONIA E. FRANCIONI-CARUSO,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

 

Argued June 6, 2006 - Decided August 9, 2006

Before Judges Wefing and Fuentes.

On appeal from Superior Court of New

Jersey, Chancery Division - Family Part,

Essex County, No. FM-07-103-04.

Frederick A. D'Arcangelo argued the cause

for appellant (Garrubbo, Capece, D'Arcangelo,

Millman & Smith, attorneys; Mr. D'Arcangelo,

on the brief).

Joseph P. Cadicina argued the cause for

respondent (Laufer, Knapp, Torzewski &

Dalena, attorneys; Mr. Cadicina, of counsel;

Kimberly N. Gronau, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals from post-judgment orders entered by the trial court. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The parties were married in September 2000 and separated in April 2003. In July 2003, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a divorce. The parties appeared before the trial court on April 14, 2004, for a case management conference. During that conference, the attorneys identified the disputed issues in terms of equitable distribution. The trial court instructed the attorneys to meet with their clients in an attempt to settle those issues and to report to it if they were unsuccessful, in which case the attorneys would have the opportunity to present their arguments.

The trial court stated:

It's a quarter to 11. You're now going to go into the same room, not separate, the four of you and you're going to discuss those eight separate issues and you're going to come back with some resolve. And the ones that are not resolved you're going to tell me your respective positions on those issues.

Has everybody understood what I've said?

. . .

I'm then going to decide them and you're going home divorced today 'cause I'm not letting you stay one day longer with this case, not one day longer.

In accordance with the court's instructions, the attorneys and their clients adjourned to a nearby conference room and undertook to attempt to resolve their disputes. They were unsuccessful, however, and returned to the trial court. In accordance with the procedure the court had stated earlier, the attorneys were given the opportunity to put their clients' respective positions on the record, and the court proceeded to decide each issue. No testimony was taken.

One of the disputed questions related to the parties' income tax liability for the year 2002. The parties had filed separate tax returns for the year 2002 that resulted in an overall higher tax liability, and the trial court directed that an amended 2002 joint return be prepared and filed. It stated:

For 2002 this is what I'm going to now require. It appears that the filing of the separate returns in my opinion or at least the Court's opinion caused a higher tax liability to be owed. The Court's going to require an amended return of a joint return to be filed for 2002. This is what's going to happen. The liability owed is going to diminish to $21,000. Then that debt that is owed will be apportioned between each of them under the joint return in an equal amount.

On October 14, 2004, the trial court entered a Dual Judgment of Divorce which incorporated the rulings given in April. This Judgment provided in pertinent part:

Both parties filed individual federal and state tax returns for the tax year 2002. The parties shall file an amended joint federal tax return. The parties shall make arrangements with the IRS in order to be equally responsible for said obligation. However, any payments made by either party in connection with their individual 2002 federal tax return shall be credited to the respective parties who made the payment on the 2002 individual return, toward their obligation on the amended joint return. The parties shall arrange with the IRS to have their obligations separated and establish separate payment schedules. The parties shall be held harmless against the other's obligation and shall indemnify the other if they are called upon to satisfy the other's obligations.

After preparation and filing of that amended joint return, the parties disputed their respective obligations. Plaintiff's original individual 2002 federal tax return showed gross income of $52,086 and a tax liability of $9,095, which plaintiff had paid in full. Defendant's original individual 2002 federal tax return showed gross income of $129,840 and a tax liability of $34,772. Of this, however, defendant had only paid $18,942 and owed an additional $16,289, together with interest. The amended joint 2002 federal tax return showed gross income of $181,926, with a tax of $40,812.

Defendant contended that under the trial court's ruling and judgment, plaintiff was obligated to contribute one-half of the net tax liability. Plaintiff, however, contended that under the court's ruling and judgment, he was entitled to one-half the net savings achieved as a result of the joint filing and was not obligated to pay additional sums.

After listening to the parties' contentions, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff. Defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration that the trial court denied. In connection with that motion, the trial court granted plaintiff's application for counsel fees in the sum of $1,650. Defendant has appealed from those orders.

We affirm the decision of the trial court with regard to the consequences of the filing of the amended joint 2002 tax return. Although we recognize that the trial court's use of the phrase "debt will be apportioned" in April 2004 could be understood to mean that the parties would share equally in the overall 2002 tax liability, the record before us clearly indicates that such a result would not be fair to plaintiff, who had significantly less income than defendant during that period and, accordingly, a lesser tax liability. There is nothing in the record before us which would indicate that any other aspect of the equitable distribution ordered by the trial court would justify imposing such a disproportionate burden upon plaintiff.

The trial court, in handling the motion for reconsideration, awarded plaintiff a counsel fee of $1,650. In doing so, the trial court specifically noted that it did not consider defendant's motion for reconsideration to have been filed in bad faith or be frivolous. It gave no reasons, however, for the award of counsel fees, and the award cannot stand. See Clarke v. Clarke ex rel. Costine, 359 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div. 2003).

We would be remiss if we did not comment upon the procedures employed by the trial court in this matter. Although its goal was well-intentioned, to provide a quick, fair resolution without the parties incurring substantial lawyer fees, it resulted in disagreements between the parties and subsequent motion practice. Neither party objected at the time, however, and we decline to interfere at this juncture. We caution the trial court to be cognizant of the potential dangers in proceeding in such a summary fashion in the future.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

 

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A-0061-05T1

August 9, 2006