STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF C.R. v.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4679-03T44679-03T4

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STATE OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE INTEREST OF C.R.

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Submitted September 13, 2005 - Decided:

Before Judges Payne and Kimmelman.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, FJ-04-1868-04B.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lon Taylor, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Vincent P. Sarubbi, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Robert Luther, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

C.R., a juvenile, appeals from a final adjudication of juvenile delinquency entered July 2, 2004.

On appeal, C.R. argues that it was improper for the trial court to allow the State to withdraw from a non-Megan's law (N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11) plea agreement entered on the record.

C.R. was charged with two acts of juvenile delinquency committed on the same date in Camden County against two different victims. Both acts involved sexual activity. To avoid the application of Megan's law, counsel for both parties agreed to a plea agreement whereby C.R. would plead to a third-- degree charge of endangering the welfare of a child in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 as well as the disorderly persons charge of lewdness. It was agreed that these charges would constitute a violation of probation.

At the time of the entry of the plea, neither counsel knew of C.R.'s complete juvenile history from Gloucester County. The Gloucester County report was made available to the trial judge who decided to share the report with both counsel because it indicated that C.R. had a history of sexually impulsive behavior. The judge thought counsel might wish to reconsider the plea in view of such additional information.

The State, after reviewing the Gloucester County report in detail, moved to vacate the plea. The court granted the State's motion. The juvenile was then tried and convicted of the original charges and was confined for a violation of probation.

From our review of the record, there is no doubt that both counsel were under a mistaken impression as to the nature and extent of C.R.'s sexual offenses. Rule 3:9-3(e) authorizes a court to vacate a plea agreement where the court determines that "[t]he interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the agreement. . . ." Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the judge was correct and did not abuse his discretion in permitting the State to vacate the original plea agreement.

Affirmed.

 

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A-4679-03T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

September 30, 2005