MELANIE WOOLRIDGE v. KEITH WOOLRIDGE

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4518-04T14518-04T1

MELANIE WOOLRIDGE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KEITH WOOLRIDGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

 

Submitted October 25, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Lefelt and Seltzer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,

Essex County, FV-07-2592-05.

Keith Woolridge, appellant pro se.

Melanie Woolridge, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

After a bench trial, Judge Convery entered a Final Restraining Order pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. The Order was based on a finding that defendant had harassed plaintiff, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 and stalked her, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

The parties were divorced on January 23, 2003, and have had a continuing dispute respecting custody and visitation of their son, Shaun Woolridge, who was born on June 22, 1997. Plaintiff and defendant were the only witnesses at the domestic violence trial and the proceedings demonstrated their mutual hostility. That hostility, and defendant's attempt to litigate issues of visitation and custody, made the trial somewhat disjointed. Nevertheless, we recite the portions of the evidence relevant to the entry of the Final Order.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant was stalking or harassing her and identified an incident occurring on March 1, 2005, that she claimed justified the entry of a Final Restraining Order. Her testimony regarding that incident was prefaced by a recitation of prior acts of domestic violence as permitted by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). Specifically, she related that on February 4, 2005, defendant had called her in an attempt to exercise visitation. Because visitation was not permitted on February 4, 2005 by the then-existing order, plaintiff terminated the call. Shortly afterward, defendant appeared in front of plaintiff's home where he accosted her, threatened a visitor who plaintiff was entertaining, and refused to leave.

Some weeks later, on February 26, 2005, plaintiff received both a phone call and text messages from defendant indicating that defendant knew that plaintiff had not spent Friday night at her home. Specifically, plaintiff testified that she "got text messages on my phone asking me was it good, was it good? slick, slick, slick." She also testified that later that day defendant called and said "I see you got some last night." Defendant also appeared at plaintiff's door attempting to exercise visitation although he was not then entitled to visitation.

On March 1, 2005, defendant again called plaintiff complaining, in coarse language, that she did not take his phone calls. He began yelling, both at her and at Shaun, to whom she had given the phone. During the course of that conversation, he advised plaintiff that he was standing in front of her home.

Although defendant admitted the communications of February 26, 2005, he denied that he was stalking or following plaintiff or had commented on where she had been the prior night. Defendant claimed that he was merely talking about a denial of what he believed were his rights to visitation. Judge Convery resolved the credibility dispute in favor of plaintiff.

He explained that he "... believes Ms. Woolridge as to what happened."

Defendant's telephone call of March 1, 2005, in which he used extremely coarse language, justifies a finding of harassment by itself. It was a communication made "in offensively coarse language" and could have had no other purpose than to harass plaintiff. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). That March 1, 2005, call; the February 26, 2005, communication that defendant knew where plaintiff had spent the night of February 25, 2005; and his repeated non-consensual appearances at her home, all justify a finding of a "course of alarming conduct" that would also support a finding of harassment. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c).

Similarly, defendant's repeated appearances at plaintiff's home and his knowledge that she had not slept in her home on the night of February 25, 2005, more than support an inference that, on more than two occasions, he was maintaining "a visual or physical proximity" to plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff had testified that defendant "needs anger management classes." That testimony would allow a finding that a reasonable person would fear bodily injury as a result of defendant's behavior. In its entirety, plaintiff's testimony more than supported a conclusion that defendant had stalked her. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.

The decision of a judge, after a bench trial, will not be disturbed if his factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and he draws appropriate legal conclusions from those factual findings. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). Here, although the judge did not describe the findings as explicitly as he might have, his announcement that he believed Ms. Woolridge "as to what happened" is sufficient within the context of this contentious case. The conclusion that the events described by plaintiff constituted both stalking and harassment is fully warranted.

Defendant complains that during the trial he was not permitted to cross-examine plaintiff. As we have noted, this trial was extremely difficult to control and the hostility between the parties was evident. Under these circumstances, the judge, who conducted a careful and thorough examination of both parties, acted well within the scope of his discretionary ability to control the presentation of evidence when he foreclosed other questioning. See N.J.R.E. 611.

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

2

A-4518-04T1

RECORD IMPOUNDED

December 6, 2005