STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ANGEL L. SANTIAGO

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4194-02T44194-02T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANGEL L. SANTIAGO,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________

 

Submitted September 21, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Weissbard and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 8-01-02.

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Joan T. Buckley, Designated Counsel, of counsel and on the brief).

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Deborah Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant was indicted for first degree murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1). A pretrial hearing was conducted to determine the admissibility of two statements defendant made to the police. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress these statements and the matter proceeded to trial. The jury found defendant guilty and the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment, thirty years without parole. Fines and fees in the amount of $205 were also imposed.

Defendant raises the following issues in support of his appeal:

POINT I

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ADMITTING THE DEFENDANT'S PRE-MIRANDA AND POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS BECAUSE:

A. PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT - THE POLICE SUBJECTED THE DEFENDANT TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION WITHOUT PROVIDING THE REQUIRED MIRANDA WARNINGS; AND,

B. POST-MIRANDA STATEMENT - DESPITE THE POLICE MIRANDA WARNINGS GIVEN MID-INTERROGATION, THE FACTS OF THIS CASE SHOW THAT THE POLICE QUESTION-FIRST INTERROGATION TACTIC COMPLETELY UNDERMINED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MIRANDA WARNINGS.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO LIFE WITH A THIRTY-YEAR PERIOD OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY CONSIDER THE MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS.

Investigator William Gonzalez, a nine-year veteran of the Camden County Prosecutor's Office, was the only witness the State called to testify during the suppression hearing. Gonzalez was assigned to the Homicide Unit and had specialized training in interrogation techniques. He testified that on the morning of March 10, 2001, while serving as the on-call investigator, he learned of the death of five-month-old A.T. In response, he proceeded to Cooper Hospital in Camden where the infant had been taken. Upon his arrival, he was briefed by a detective from the City of Camden Police Department. He next met with the victim's mother, who relayed to him that her son had spent the night at his aunt's home and was found unresponsive early that morning. From the hospital, Gonzalez traveled to the apartment of the victim's aunt, J.T., who consented to having the apartment searched and photographed. J.T. also agreed to accompany Gonzalez to the police department for an interview.

Gonzalez, along with J.T., arrived at the Camden Police Department sometime between 1:00 p.m. and 1:15 p.m. that day. He observed a number of persons in the lobby of the detective bureau located on the second floor. Gonzalez described the lobby as a public area where people could sit while waiting to speak to detectives. He testified that the area was accessible by elevator or stairs. He explained that there were no security doors restricting access, but that it was necessary to be buzzed in to enter the actual work area of the detectives. During Gonzalez' testimony, a videotape of the detective bureau was presented and he described the areas off of the lobby. He identified public bathrooms; a conference/lunchroom; three interview rooms, one of which was used to interview individuals who were actually being detained; and a holding cell.

In the lobby area, Gonzalez counted about ten persons, consisting of both adults and children. After introducing himself and asking the persons assembled to introduce themselves, he learned they were members of the victim's family. It was at that point he became aware that one of the persons present was J.T.'s boyfriend, the defendant, Angel Santiago.

Gonzalez worked with another officer, Detective Miguel Ruiz, in conducting the interviews that took place over the course of the next three to four hours. Gonzalez could not specifically recall how much of the time was spent interviewing defendant. He estimated, however, that a third of the total time was devoted to questioning defendant. All of the interview rooms, including the conference/lunchroom, were used to conduct the interviews. Four or five interviews were conducted simultaneously. Gonzalez testified that he and Ruiz narrowed their questioning to J.T. and Santiago. J.T. was interviewed in the conference/lunchroom, while Santiago was interviewed in a small room with a one-way mirror. This mirror permitted someone to monitor an interview from the other side, but Gonzalez stated no one monitored the interview of defendant.

Gonzalez testified that he and Ruiz did not remain in the interview room throughout the interviews of defendant and J.T. He stated that both he and Ruiz occasionally left the interview rooms to compare the statements of defendant and J.T., as well as to confer with detectives conducting the other interviews. The door was closed while Santiago was interviewed, but the door remained ajar when they left the room. No one was left to guard Santiago either inside or outside the room. Gonzalez testified that Santiago was not handcuffed at any time during this interview.

According to Gonzalez, defendant admitted being present in the house with the victim, but denied causing the injuries. Santiago initially implicated J.T. He later changed his story and blamed J.T.'s eight-year-old niece. J.T. also denied involvement. However, when Gonzalez informed her that Santiago had implicated her niece, she blamed Santiago.

J.T. told Gonzalez that Santiago first struck her nephew the previous night because the baby would not stop crying. At about 2:00 a.m., A.T. started to cry again, and while she prepared a bottle, Santiago struck the baby once more. A.T. began to cry a third time at about 4:00 a.m., so J.T. went to prepare another bottle. When she returned with the bottle, she heard a smacking sound coming from the bedroom. Unbeknownst to Santiago, through a crack in the door, J.T. saw him repeatedly punch A.T. in the stomach and face. Afterwards, J.T. saw blood on A.T.'s lips, so she held A.T. the rest of the night. In the morning, A.T. was cold and motionless. J.T. and Santiago took A.T. to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. J.T. explained to Gonzalez she did not initially tell the police what happened because defendant had previously subjected her to domestic violence and she was afraid it would happen again if she said anything. The officers then turned their focus to Santiago.

Gonzalez testified he and Ruiz became very sympathetic to Santiago. They told him that they too had grown up in Puerto Rican households and had been subjected to "fuete" (spanking). Gonzalez then told Santiago that he would spank his own child if the child would not let him (Gonzalez) sleep. Santiago then admitted hitting A.T. Gonzalez stated that he stopped the interview at that point. He briefed an assistant prosecutor and secured approval to take a taped statement from Santiago. Santiago was given his Miranda rights and thereafter agreed to give a statement. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

Gonzalez testified, because Spanish was Santiago's first language, the rights were read to Santiago in Spanish and also given to him to read in Spanish. Gonzalez, who also spoke Spanish, testified that he "placed the rights form down in front of the defendant . . . in a position in which both [Santiago] and I could read the form together." To ensure that Santiago understood what he heard and read, Gonzalez asked Santiago to initial each line after each right was read. When finished, Santiago signed the bottom of the rights form. He also signed a waiver of his rights and provided an audio taped confession. In his statement, Santiago indicated he appeared voluntarily, had been treated very well, and that no promises had been made to him. The audiotape of the defendant's statement was also played in court.

Miranda warnings are a prerequisite to custodial interrogation, but not to the general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process. Id. at 444, 477. Thus, the inquiry must be whether the totality of circumstances would lead a reasonable person to objectively perceive the circumstances of the questioning to be the equivalent of a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2148, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 950 (2004) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1275, 1279 (1983)). The analysis is fact sensitive and requires the court to consider such factors as the time, location, and duration of the questioning, the particular physical surroundings of the questioning, the manner in which the questioning takes place, and any other relevant factors that objectively demonstrate that the person being questioned is a suspect. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1530, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 300 (1994); State v. Stott, 171 N.J. 343, 365 (2002); State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 1988).

In allowing the pre-Miranda statement, the judge found Detective Gonzalez' testimony to be highly credible. The judge indicated that Gonzalez did not appear to withhold anything and pointed to Gonzalez' acknowledgement that "they (police) use techniques to secure confessions." Although the judge found some inconsistencies in Gonzalez' testimony, he concluded the inconsistencies were insignificant. In ruling that Santiago's initial statement was not the product of a custodial interrogation, he found that Santiago, as well as the other members of the victim's family, voluntarily went to the police station. He determined there was free access in and out of the station and that no one was forced to remain. He found that the officers conducted simultaneous interviews of other persons and that those interviews took place over the course of three or four hours. Although Santiago was interviewed in one of the smaller rooms, the judge determined that it was not the room reserved for suspects. The judge also found there were times when Detectives Gonzalez and Ruiz left Santiago in the room alone with the door ajar. Santiago was not told to remain in the room and no guard was posted within the room or outside the room. Further, the judge noted that despite being told that photographs taken of him would be compared to the bruises on A.T.'s body, Santiago voluntarily agreed to have his face, upper body, fists and hands photographed. He also ruled that there was nothing inappropriate in the officers' use of their personal experiences as a technique in questioning Santiago and that Santiago did not have to agree with the "empathetic comment." He concluded that Santiago's reaction to the empathetic comment was to offer his own experience with A.T. on the previous evening. The judge determined that nothing in the conduct of the officers leading up to defendant's admission was objectively coercive or the product of custodial questioning.

The trial judge also found that defendant was properly Mirandized and knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to providing the taped confession. In listening to the audiotape, the judge acknowledged that he did not understand Spanish but was instead listening for clearness of tone and understanding. He found that Santiago's answers were crisp, concise, and to the point. He noted from the transcribed copy of defendant's statement that the responses were not "yes" and "no" answers but included details in a cogent manner. The judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant gave the statement "freely, knowingly and voluntarily."

Our review of a trial court's findings in a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the findings made by the trial court could have reasonably been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the record and whether the legal conclusions are valid. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 472 (1999); State v. Alvarez, 238 N.J. Super. 560, 564 (App. Div. 1990). We are not permitted to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence. Ibid. Consequently, if the record reveals the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and determine the issue of credibility, we are bound by the findings of the trial court as long as those findings are supported by adequate and credible evidence, especially where the evidence is largely testimonial rather than documentary. Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607 (1989). We conclude that Judge Snyder's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. See Ibid. We are not, however, similarly constrained with respect to his legal determinations. Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Nonetheless, on this record, we also agree with the judge's conclusions of law.

Since we agree that defendant's initial statement was voluntary and provided in a non-custodial setting, we see no merit to defendant's contention that the subsequent Miranda warnings were ineffective. Once defendant told the officers that he struck the victim, the interview was immediately stopped. Defendant was administered Miranda warnings, which he fully understood, and thereafter signed a waiver of those rights. Thus, Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004), and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985), are not implicated. Further, the fact that Gonzalez reviewed what Santiago would say before starting the tape is of no consequence. The Miranda form was signed at 5:00 p.m., the taping commenced at 5:03 p.m., and it was concluded at 5:28 p.m. We discern no basis from this record to conclude that during those three minutes, Gonzalez engaged in the prohibited conduct described by Justice Stevens in Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2615, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 660.

Finally, defendant's contention that the judge erred in imposing sentence is equally without merit. In determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on an individual convicted of a crime, the sentencing court must specifically consider the enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors identified at N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b), balance them, and explain how the sentence was determined so that a reviewing court will have an adequate record to review on appeal. State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 358-59 (1987). If a sentencing court properly identifies and balances the factors, and their existence is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, an appellate court should affirm the sentence. State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 6 (1990).

The trial judge found four aggravating factors and one mitigating factor. He emphasized the "nature and circumstances" of the offense of which defendant had been found guilty. He described defendant's actions in striking A.T. on three different occasions that evening, causing significant injury each time. He also noted, in particular, that the victim was five months old, could not speak, could not defend himself, and could not run or crawl away.

 
Defendant objects to the trial judge's consideration of unproved allegations of criminal conduct, namely "countless crimes that have gone unpunished with respect to [J.T.]." He urges that had this factor not been considered, the court would have given more weight to the absence of any prior record. While there was no evidence in the record that defendant had committed countless crimes against J.T., defendant admitted to striking J.T. two or three times because, "I have a lot of anger and I lose my thoughts." In light of the other facts the judge considered in finding the aggravating factors, we are not persuaded that erroneous consideration of countless assaults upon J.T., rather than the two or three assaults defendant admitted committing, would have resulted in a different sentence. In any event, the life sentence with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility is neither an illegal sentence nor one which shocks the conscience. State v. T.C., 347 N.J. Super. 219, 245 (App. Div. 2002), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 222 (2003).

(continued)

(continued)

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A-4194-02T4

October 27, 2005