IN THE MATTER OF ARTHUR SCHREPPEL

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2813-04T1

IN THE MATTER OF

ARTHUR SCHREPPEL

 

Argued November 30, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Weissbard and Winkelstein.

On appeal from a final decision of the Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 3-10-51642.

Larry S. Loigman, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Susanne Culliton, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent, Police and Firemen's Retirement System (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General, attorney; Ms. Culliton, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellant, Larry S. Loigman, appeals from a final administrative agency determination of the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System ("Board") dated January 13, 2005 that dismissed his complaint. We reverse.

On February 9, 2004, the Board reviewed and approved an application submitted by Arthur Schreppel for an accidental disability retirement allowance. Following the Board's decision, Loigman requested various documents relating to Schreppel's application. The Board provided some of the requested documents, but not all. Subsequently, Loigman wrote to the Board arguing that Schreppel was not entitled to an accidental disability pension. Following correspondence between Loigman and the Board, the Board determined that Loigman had no standing to challenge the award to Schreppel.

Loigman did not seek relief from that determination in the Appellate Division. Instead, he filed a complaint in the Law Division against the Board and two of its employees. In that complaint, he sought relief,

(A) Ordering, declaring and adjudging that Defendants must discharge their fiduciary responsibilities in a careful, diligent, prudent and proper fashion;

(B) Enjoining and prohibiting Defendants from awarding pension benefits except to those by law entitled to the same;

(C) Ordering Defendants to disclose to the public all information necessary to substantiate the lawfulness of each pension award;

(D) Removing from office, and forfeiting the position of, any Defendant who shall refuse to discharge his responsibilities, as set forth by statute and as determined in this action, in a proper and efficient manner;

. . . .

In an apparent reference to Arthur Schreppel, Loigman also requested an order "declaring and adjudging that the pension rights and benefits of A.S., and of all other persons the beneficiaries of an unlawful granting of such rights and benefits, be forthwith terminated."

Following the State's motion to dismiss the complaint, the Law Division entered an order transferring the complaint back to the Board. The order contained no specific instructions as to how the Board should proceed.

In a letter dated December 27, 2004, the Board notified Loigman that at its January 10, 2005 meeting it would reconsider his request for a hearing concerning the Board's previous determination to grant accidental disability benefits to Schreppel. Loigman did not attend the meeting, nor did he submit additional documentation. The Board voted to leave its grant of Schreppel's retirement allowance undisturbed, and maintained that Loigman had no standing to contest it. The Board determined that the matter was "closed" and voted to take no further action.

An appellate court will not upset the determination of an agency unless the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably. Campbell v. Dep't. of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963). An administrative determination carries with it the presumption of correctness, and, on review of the facts, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of an agency where the agency's findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence. Gerba v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 83 N.J. 174, 189 (1980); Hillman v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 109 N.J. Super. 449, 461 (App. Div. 1970). An agency's determination of a strictly legal issue, not involving either interpretation of its enabling legislation or the exercise of agency expertise, is not entitled to deference, and the appellate court will consider the issue de novo. See e.g., SSI Med. Servs. v. State of N.J., Dept. of Human Servs., 146 N.J. 614, 621 (1996); Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992).

Here, the Board concluded that Loigman had no standing to challenge Schreppel's pension award. But, that was not the issue before the Board following the transfer of the complaint by the Law Division. While that complaint used Schreppel's application as an example of the Board's mismanagement, the demand for relief broadly challenged the Board's administration of the pension system. It does not appear that the Board even considered those allegations in arriving at its determination.

Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -24, "an agency upon the request of any interested person may in its discretion make a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability to any person, property or state of facts of any statute or rule enforced or administered by that agency." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-8. Loigman's complaint essentially asks the Board for a declaratory ruling with regard to the allegations in the complaint of fraud and mismanagement in the administration of the pension fund. The Board did not address these allegations.

An "administrative agency acting quasi-judicially must set forth basic findings of fact, supported by the evidence and supporting the ultimate conclusions and final determination," to inform "the interested parties and any reviewing tribunal of the basis on which the final decision was reached so that it may be readily determined whether the result is sufficiently and soundly grounded or derives from arbitrary, capricious or extra-legal considerations." Application of Howard Sav. Institution of Newark, 32 N.J. 29, 52 (1960); see also Steven L. Lefelt et al., New Jersey Practice: Administrative Law and Practice 7.21 at 392 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that "[a] reviewing court will do more than merely express abiding faith in the agency's expertise"). If an administrative agency's decision is not accompanied by the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law, the usual remedy is to remand to the agency to correct the deficiency. DiMaria v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., 225 N.J. Super. 341, 347 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 638 (1988). Consequently, because the Board failed to address any of the allegations in the complaint that had been transferred to the Board from the Law Division, we vacate the January 13, 2005 determination and remand to the agency for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 
Reversed and remanded.

The Board's January 13, 2005 decision inaccurately states that the Law Division judge granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

(continued)

(continued)

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A-2813-04T1

December 12, 2005