INNA GOLDFIELD v. SERGEY GOLDFIELD

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2672-04T52672-04T5

INNA GOLDFIELD,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SERGEY GOLDFIELD,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

 

Submitted September 13, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Lefelt and Hoens.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,

Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-605-02H.

Appellant, Sergey Goldfield, submitted

a pro se brief.

Respondent, Inna Goldfield, submitted

a pro se brief.

PER CURIAM

This is a post-divorce dispute, regarding enforcement of child support between defendant Sergey Goldfield, who is currently living in New York, and plaintiff Inna Goldfield, who continues to live in New Jersey. The parties were divorced on January 15, 2002, and have two children, Anna, who was born in 1983, and Samuel, born in 1992. Samuel remains a minor, and Anna was a college student at the time of this dispute.

Defendant appeals from an order of the motion judge, which established $53,200 in support arrears; refused to modify the amount of defendant's support obligation; denied emancipation of Anna; directed wage garnishment; and provided that an arrest warrant would issue, if necessary, to enforce the support obligations. Defendant complains that the motion judge erred in establishing the arrears and refusing to modify support because the judge failed to consider "wages" defendant paid directly to Anna, support payments defendant paid directly to plaintiff just before plaintiff filed her enforcement motion, and that defendant has suffered "more than 40% reduction in income." In addition, defendant argues that the judge failed to make any findings or legal conclusions, failed to request any financial information from plaintiff, improperly accepted as true plaintiff's late reply certification, and failed to permit oral argument.

Unfortunately, we are unable to address defendant's appeal arguments and must remand this matter to the Family Part because the motion judge failed to comply with R. 1:7-4(a) and render findings of fact and conclusions of law. We are well aware of the pressures on trial judges, particularly those serving in the stressful, overburdened, and often volatile Family Part. However, we have said numerous times that a judge who fails to make findings of fact or legal conclusions disserves "the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court." E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 259 N.J. Super. 402, 407 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980)). It is not acceptable to render naked conclusions in an executed order without providing supportive findings or reasons.

Furthermore, as we believe the motion judge understood, judges should "ordinarily grant requests for oral argument on substantive and non-routine discovery motions." R. 5:5-4(a). Although the executed order, which is the subject of this appeal, recites that the judge had heard oral argument, defendant claims that none occurred. The record contains no transcript of any argument that was conducted or waived and does not reflect any reason why the judge may have rejected oral argument.

Finally, we note that plaintiff's opposition indicates that "[t]he sole purpose of the initial suit was to persuade the Defendant to dedicate and spend more time with his children, specifically his son, Samuel Goldfield." Plaintiff hoped "that the suit would arouse the defendant's attention and motivate him to spend more time with his son." According to plaintiff, her motion "was never about the money," and she "does not want to continue battling over money . . ." She also reveals that "Defendant paid the appropriate payments established by the court promptly and continues to do so currently."

In view of this unusual, conciliatory position, we suggest to the motion judge that upon remand some form of appropriate mediation or other settlement efforts might best serve the interests of these parties. Therefore, we vacate the Amended Order of December 17, 2004, and remand for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 
Remanded.

According to plaintiff, Anna was to graduate in May 2005.

(continued)

(continued)

4

A-2672-04T5

September 21, 2005