NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES v. J.J. AND M.M.

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1871-04T4A-1871-04T4

A-2196-04T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.J. and M.M.,

Defendants-Appellants,

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF

J.L.J., S.J. and S.M.,

Minors.

___________________________

 

Submitted September 13, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Coburn, Collester

and S.L. Reisner.

On appeal from the Superior Court of

New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family

Part, Union County, FG-20-62-03.

Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General,

attorney for the respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General,

of counsel; Veronica A. Beke, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellants (Christine B.

Mowry, Designated Counsel and William J. Sweeney, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender,

Law Guardian, attorney for the minor children J.L.J., S.J. and S.M. (Olivia Belfatto Crisp, Designated Counsel,

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

M.M. and J.J. appeal from a final order of the trial court terminating their parental rights to their biological child S.M. J.J. also appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her children J.L.J. and S.J.

On this appeal, M.M. raises the following issues:

POINT I: SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE DID NOT EXIST SUPPORTING THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE "BEST INTERESTS" TEST WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

A) THERE DID NOT EXIST CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT S.M. WAS ENDANGERED BY HER RELATIONSHIP WITH M.M. OR THAT APPELLANT M.M. WAS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO ELIMINATE THE HARM ALLEGEDLY FACING HIS CHILD.

B) THERE DID NOT EXIST CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE DIVISION MADE "REASONABLE EFFORTS" TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO M.M.

C) THE COURT'S FINDINGS THAT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WILL NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

J.J. raises these issues:

POINT I: THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT TERMINATION WILL NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

POINT II: THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT J.J. CANNOT CEASE CAUSING HARM TO THE CHILDREN.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial judge's findings are amply supported by the evidence, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A), and that defendants' contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Although we affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the thorough and sensitive oral opinions of Judge Chrystal, issued on July 29, 2004 and November 10, 2004, we add the following comments.

We must defer to the findings of the trial court so long as they are supported by sufficient, credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We give particular deference to decisions of the family court, because of its "special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." Id. Those principles mandate affirmance here, where the judge presided over a lengthy trial, made scrupulously detailed findings of fact, including credibility determinations, and properly applied the law to her findings of fact.

The record in this case amply supports the decision of the trial judge. The mother, J.J., has longstanding problems of drug addiction and alcoholism, as well as severe psychological problems. M.M. is living with her and has "enabled" her continuing addiction. The children have special needs. They have been in foster care for years while defendants, despite the provision of ample services from the Division of Youth and Family Services, have been unable to resolve their persistent personal problems. While defendants visit with the children, they are unable to parent them. Further, contrary to defendants' contentions on this appeal, there was undisputed testimony at the November 10, 2004 hearing that DYFS had identified potential adoptive homes for each of the three children.

The trial judge properly applied the appropriate legal standard, and correctly concluded that termination of defendants' parental rights was in the children's best interests. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a; In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 352 (1999). Further, the record supports the trial judge's conclusion, reached only after holding a second hearing at which a court-appointed expert testified on the issue, that termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a(4). We agree with the trial judge's conclusion that the children are entitled to the opportunity to be adopted, even if there is no guarantee that that option will work out for them. This is their only hope for a permanent, stable family life, a life defendants cannot provide for them.

Affirmed.

 

(continued)

(continued)

5

A-1871-04T4

RECORD IMPOUNDED

September 23, 2005