MELANIE EGAN (now HUTTER) v. DAVID EGAN

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2124-03T12124-03T1

MELANIE EGAN (now HUTTER),

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DAVID EGAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________________

 

Submitted: October 3, 2005 - Decided:

Before Judges Kestin and Lefelt.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County, FM-21-260-00.

David C. Egan, appellant pro se.

Iandoli & Edens, attorneys for respondent (Ann M. Edens, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, David Egan, appeals from those provisions of a dual judgment of divorce entered on July 8, 2003 that awarded plaintiff, Melanie Egan, permanent alimony of $190 per week and required defendant to maintain a $150,000 life insurance policy to cover the alimony obligation. Defendant also appeals from an order entered on October 30, 2003, awarding plaintiff $34,925 in counsel fees.

Judge Amy O'Connor expressed her reasons for decision on the merits in an extensive letter opinion dated June 9, 2003. The judge articulated the bases of the counsel fee award in a comprehensive letter opinion dated October 30, 2003. We affirm as to both the judgment and the order.

The contested issues were tried on thirteen non-consecutive days between July 29, 2002 and February 3, 2003. The parties had been married since September 21, 1985. The complaint for divorce was filed on March 8, 2000, and, as found by the trial judge, the parties separated in early 2001 when plaintiff "moved out of the marital home and into the home of her paramour." Defendant continued to reside in the marital home with the parties' three children who were seventeen, fourteen, and eleven years of age at the time of decision; and plaintiff returned "on a daily basis to help care for the children."

Beside the dissolution clause and the provisions from which defendant appeals, the judgment of divorce granted the parties joint legal custody of the children, with plaintiff as the primary caretaker and defendant as the secondary caretaker, and established schedules for each of the parties with the children; it provided for the payment of child support from defendant to plaintiff, with maintenance of health insurance for the children; it allocated the parties' responsibilities for healthcare expenses uncovered by insurance; it required defendant to maintain life insurance to cover his child support obligations; and it equitably distributed the parties' property interests.

Findings of a trial court that are supported by adequate substantial credible evidence are binding on appeal, and the discretionary determinations and conclusions that flow logically from those findings are entitled to great deference. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998); Rolnick v. Rolnick, 262 N.J. Super. 343, 358-59 (App. Div. 1993). We have applied this standard of review specifically to alimony determinations:

To vacate a trial court's finding concerning alimony, we must conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion, failed to consider all of the controlling legal principles, or must otherwise be well satisfied that the findings were mistaken or that the determination could not reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record after considering the proofs as a whole.

[Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 345 (App. Div. 1996).]

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff permanent alimony because such an award was "barred by [her] pendente lite and post-divorce cohabitation in a relationship that was 'just like a marriage.'" In the absence of any record that the asserted marital fault "negatively affected the economic status of the parties," Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 90 (2005), we reject the argument defendant propounds. "Where marital fault has no residual economic consequences, it may not be considered in an alimony award." Id. at 91. Judge O'Connor's findings of fact and conclusions in determining plaintiff's entitlement to alimony and in setting the amount of the award are well supported by the evidence and embody appropriate discretionary applications.

The findings undergirding the counsel fee award are similarly well-supported by the record and reflect proper application of the standards of Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233-34 (1971). Judge O'Connor's evaluative determinations, based upon the record that had been developed before her, were well within her discretion to make.

Accordingly, we affirm both the judgment of divorce and the order awarding counsel fees.

 

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A-2124-03T1

November 3, 2005