STEVEN BRONNER v. JERSEY CITY DELIVERANCE TEMPLE

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-7131-03T41482-04T2

STEVEN BRONNER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JERSEY CITY DELIVERANCE TEMPLE,

Defendant-Respondent.

__________________________________

 

Submitted May 10, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Coburn and Wecker.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Hudson County, No. L-3421-03.

Allen Zavodnick, attorney for appellant.

Douglas R. Juengling, attorney for respondent

(Adam T. Warcholak, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Stephen Bronner, fell and was seriously injured while attempting to enter the restroom of defendant Jersey City Deliverance Temple. Bronner was at the church as a wedding guest. Neither plaintiff nor the bride or groom were members of the church, which was rented to them for a fee of $200. The motion judge awarded summary judgment to defendant based on the Charitable Immunity Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7. Plaintiff appeals.

On appeal, plaintiff contends: "The defendant has not proven the affirmative defense of charitable immunity because the plaintiff is not a beneficiary of the defendant and there is nothing in the record that proves that the wedding he attended was for the advancement of the defendant's religious purposes." After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we disagree and therefore affirm.

The Charitable Immunity Act states:

a. No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes or its trustees, directors, officers, employees, agents, servants or volunteers shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or association; provided, however, that such immunity from liability shall not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of such corporation, society, or association or of its agents or servants where such person is one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corporation, society or association.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7a].

As Judge Santiago stated in her oral opinion, there is a three-prong test to determine whether a defendant entity qualifies for immunity:

[A]n entity qualifies for charitable immunity when it "(1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works."

[O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 489 (2002) (quoting Hamel v. State, 321 N.J. Super. 67, 72 (App. Div. 1999))].

It is undisputed in this case that the church is a non-profit organization and that it was organized exclusively for religious purposes. This appeal turns on the third prong: whether defendant was promoting its religious "objectives and purposes" when it rented the church to non-members for their wedding, thereby making plaintiff a beneficiary of its objectives and purposes.

The test of whether an injured plaintiff is a beneficiary of the religious entity in these circumstances is two-pronged: (1) whether the defendant organization that claims immunity "'was engaged in the performance of the [religious] objectives it was organized to advance'" and (2) "that the injured party must have been a direct recipient of those good works." Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 350 (2003) (quoting Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.J. Super. 532, 536 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 38 N.J. 305 (1962)).

The judge relied substantially on Anasiewicz, supra, 74 N.J. Super. 532, to find that plaintiff was a beneficiary of defendant's religious purposes. As we explained in Anasiewicz, a guest at a wedding is a beneficiary of the religious entity hosting that wedding whether or not the guest is a member of the congregation or an adherent of the same religion. See id. at 537-38. Plaintiff therefore meets the second prong of the beneficiary test.

The more difficult question involves the first prong: whether the church was "engaging in the performance of charitable objectives." That test is met when either the religious entity has taken an active role in the event in question or has facilitated its own religious objectives and purposes in providing space on its property to a non-member.

In contending that it met the second alternative, the facilitation of its religious objectives and purposes, defendant also relies on Loder v. St. Thomas Greek Orthodox Church, 295 N.J. Super. 297, 302 (App. Div. 1996). In that case, a Greek Orthodox church held a Greek festival on its premises. The festival was open to the public and although no admission fee was charged, the church did charge fees for dinners. Id. at 300. The purpose of the event was both to raise funds and to expose the community to Greek culture. Ibid. We held that the church was immune to a claim for injuries that occurred during that event because "[t]he church . . . was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to advance inasmuch as it was attempting to demonstrate to the community the rich traditions of the Greek Orthodox Church and 'the importance of the Hellenic culture in [the] orthodox religion' as expressed through Greek food and dance." Id. at 302.

Where a religious entity has allowed the use of its property at no charge or for a nominal fee to another non-profit entity, whose operation or event was consistent with the church's mission, immunity has been upheld. See, e.g., Ryan, supra, 175 N.J. at 336; Bixenman v. Christ Episcopal Church Parish House, 166 N.J. Super. 148, 150-51 (App. Div. 1979). In Ryan, the church permitted various non-profit organizations to use a room in its facility for a fee of $15 (apparently to cover the costs of electricity, heating and air conditioning) or even without fee in some cases. Ryan, supra, 175 N.J. at 339. When a non-member attended one such meeting and was injured, both the user groups and the church were held immune. Id. at 336, 349.

In Bixenman, an Episcopal church lent its premises to a Greek Orthodox church until that congregation could move into its own facilities. Bixenman, supra, at 150. We held that by lending its property to an entity that also promoted worship, the Episcopal church retained its immunity when a person attending the Greek Orthodox services was injured. Id. at 151.

As we said in Anasiewicz, the charitable immunity statute is to be applied broadly, providing immunity to religious entities for more than just "'sectarian teaching and worship.'" 74 N.J. Super. at 537 (quoting Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N.J.L. 325, 332 (E. & A. 1939)). Of course, religious entities "do not enjoy absolute immunity from worldly burdens. . . . [A] delicate balancing of secular and sacred interests is required." Brown v. St. Venantius School, 111 N.J. 325, 333 (1988) (quoting Market St. Mission v. Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards, 110 N.J. 335, 340 (1988)). Thus immunity was denied in Book v. Aguth Achim Anchai, 101 N.J. Super. 559, 561 (App. Div. 1968), where the injured plaintiff was not a member of the temple when she participated in a bingo game run by the temple. Regardless of the fact that the religious entity itself ran the bingo game and used the fees generated for religious and charitable purposes, we found that the "operation of bingo games for profit" was obviously "not one of the purposes for which the defendant synagogue was organized." Id. at 563.

This case differs from Anasiewicz in that the wedding ceremony apparently was performed in that church by a parish cleric. "Plaintiffs . . . were invited guests at a wedding ceremony held at the church." Anasiewicz, supra, 74 N.J. Super. at 533. We reasoned that in performing the ceremony, "[t]he defendant was engaged in the performance of a ritual of deep significance to it." Id. at 537. But we further noted that "the controlling fact is that in providing the situs of the ceremony the church contributed the preservation of moral or sociological concepts held by the community generally." Id. at 538. We continued to explain that "[t]he 'works' of the institution were, therefore, a 'benevolence' shared in common by plaintiffs and all members of the community, present or absent, and without regard to their religious beliefs or persuasions." Ibid.

Here defendant allowed its religious site to be used for a wedding, and although we are not informed of the nature of the ceremony, on its face it appears to have been an event consistent with the church's objectives and purposes. In our view, this case is closer to Ryan, Loder, and Anasiewicz than to Book.

 
Affirmed.

The record does not reveal whether the ceremony, reception or both took place at the church. The record is also silent as to who performed the ceremony or otherwise participated either in the ceremony or reception.

(continued)

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A-1482-04T2

November 30, 2005