DENISE GHANEM v. JOSEPH GHANEM

 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1330-04T11330-04T1

DENISE GHANEM,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH GHANEM,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Submitted September 14, 2005 - Decided

Before Judges Winkelstein and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, FD-18-229-04.

Schwartz & Betzner, attorneys for appellant (Kyle G. Schwartz, of counsel and on the brief).

Legal Services of Northwest Jersey, attorney for respondent (Diane K. Smith, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this Family Part case, defendant appeals from multiple orders of the trial court that affect his obligation to pay child support and alimony. He raises the following issues:

[I.] THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSES OF THE DEFENDANT AND REVIEW THE NON-CONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, AS REQUIRED UNDER N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.110.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED UNDER R. 4:50- 1 BECAUSE THE MAY 28, 2004 FLORIDA COURT ORDER AND PROOF OF DIRECT PAYMENTS BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF GREATER THAN THE CLAIMED ARREARS IS NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND JUDGE RUBIN DID NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT AND KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THERE WAS NO ARREARS ORDER OR JUDGMENT AND THE BASIS OF PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVITS WERE INACCURATE WHEN NEW JERSEY ACCEPTED THE INTERSTATE REGISTRATION TO ENFORCE THE ALLEGED ARREARS.

[III.] JUDGE KUMPF HAD MORE THAN SUFFICIENT PROOFS TO MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT MODIFICATION OF THE CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WAS BOTH APPROPRIATE AND FAIR FROM THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY MR. GHANEM DEMONSTRATING CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES FROM THE ENTRY OF THE ORDER THIRTEEN YEARS PRIOR, WHERE THE INCOME OF THE PARTIES WERE VASTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE DATE OF ENTRY OF THE ORIGINAL ORDER OF SUPPORT AT THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE, AND NO COURT HAD EVER REVIEWED THIS ORDER OF SUPPORT.

[IV.] IT WAS IMPROPER FOR JUDGE KUMPF TO DISALLOW A MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT TO THE DATE OF FILING BY MR. GHANEM OF HIS ORIGINAL APPLICATION.

[V.] IT WAS ERROR BY THE TRIAL JUDGE TO INCREASE ARREARS PAYMENTS WHEN DEFENDANT HAD PAID AN AMOUNT GREATER THAN REQUIRED SINCE THE ORDER WAS ENTERED IN NEW JERSEY.

We have carefully considered the parties' arguments in light of the facts and the applicable law. With the exception of issue number five, which we will address, we conclude that defendant's contentions are clearly without merit and do not warrant discussion in a full written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the Family Part judge in his orders dated September 22, 2004, and November 17, 2004, and his comprehensive statements of reasons accompanying those orders. We will therefore limit our discussion to the fifth issue raised by defendant, whether the trial judge abused his discretion by increasing the arrearage payment from $25 to $50 per week.

Briefly, the facts are as follows. The parties were married in 1987 and had two children: Joshua, born December 4, 1986; and Jessica, born December 8, 1989. A final judgment of divorce was entered by default in Florida on May 17, 1991. Defendant failed to appear. Plaintiff was awarded primary custody of the children, with defendant having visitation rights. Defendant was ordered to pay $350 per week in child support, and $50 per week in alimony, "until such time as the Wife shall become employed full time."

From 1991 until 2001, the parties made several attempts at reconciliation, and on occasion lived together after the divorce. The parties permanently separated in November 2001. Defendant moved to New Jersey and remarried in July 2002, and plaintiff moved with the children to Pennsylvania in September 2003.

On June 9, 2003, defendant filed a petition in Florida for modification of child support, visitation, and termination of alimony. The following month, plaintiff filed an emergent motion for civil contempt/enforcement in Florida, asking the court to address support arrears. She filed support arrearage affidavits showing that as of July 11, 2003, defendant was in arrears for child support in the amount of $31,450, and in arrears for alimony in the amount of $9,800; the total arrearages alleged were $41,250. Florida ultimately declined jurisdiction of both applications.

On October 15, 2003, a hearing officer of the New Jersey Chancery Division, Family Part, entertained plaintiff's request to have an order for arrearages entered in New Jersey. By way of interstate petition, plaintiff requested that the court enter an order for arrearages in the amount of $41,250. When defendant contested the amount, he was given four weeks to provide proof of direct payments to plaintiff. He failed to do so, and the hearing officer found $41,250 to be due to plaintiff in arrearages. The hearing officer also ordered defendant to pay $25 per week additional to satisfy those arrearages. Defendant filed an appeal from that determination, which was heard and denied by Judge Rubin on December 9, 2003, who entered an order for arrearages on that date. Defendant was later given a credit against his arrearages in the amount of $7700 for payments he made in Florida.

On appeal to this court, defendant challenges two orders. The first is the trial court's September 22, 2004 order, in which the court denied defendant's motion to reconsider prior orders establishing arrearages. The second is the order dated November 17, 2004, where the court again declined to modify the amount of arrearages and, in addition, ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $50 per week on the remaining arrearages, up from the previously-ordered $25 per week. The court did not, however, either in the latter order or the statement of reasons accompanying that order, make any findings to support its decision to raise defendant's weekly payment on arrearages to $50.

Rule 1:7-4 requires a court, sitting without a jury, to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law on "every motion decided by written order that is appealable as of right." The trial judge has an obligation to "support its decision with adequate findings of fact." Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 157 N.J. 504, 509 (1999); R. 1:7-4. The judge must "state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 565, 570 (1980).

Here, because the trial judge rendered no findings to support his conclusion that defendant's payment on arrearages should be raised from $25 per week to $50 per week, we vacate that portion of the November 17, 2004 order and remand for findings of fact on those issues. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

 

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A-1330-04T1

September 20, 2005