GEORGE T. BROWN v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND ATLANTIC COAST FIBERS

(NOTE: The status of this decision is published.)
 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2781-05T13661-05T1

GEORGE T. BROWN,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR, AND ATLANTIC COAST FIBERS,

Respondents.

______________________________________

 

Submitted January 10, 2007 - Decided

Before Judges Lefelt and Sapp-Peterson.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No. 98,724.

George T. Brown, appellant, pro se.

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; John C. Turi, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Claimant George T. Brown appeals from a decision dated March 3, 2006 by the Board of Review (Board) finding him ineligible for unemployment benefits. We affirm.

The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. Claimant was employed as a billing clerk for Atlantic Coast Fibers (Atlantic Coast) from July 1, 2003 until October 14, 2005. Atlantic Coast was the successor corporation to claimant's prior employer, for whom claimant had worked for more than forty years. It had been claimant's intention to retire from Atlantic Coast in 2006. However, his daughter, who lived in Texas with her husband and children, became seriously ill. Claimant and his wife believed they had no alternative other than to relocate to Texas to assist their daughter and her family. Claimant applied for unemployment benefits effective November 6, 2005. A deputy to the Director, Division of Unemployment Insurance, denied the claim, determining that claimant was ineligible to collect unemployment benefits because he left his employment without good cause attributable to his employment.

Claimant appealed the deputy's determination to the Appeal Tribunal. A hearing was conducted resulting in the determination that claimant was disqualified for benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he voluntarily left work for personal reasons unrelated to his employment. Claimant appealed to the Board, and the Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision.

In this appeal, claimant argues that he "really deserved unemployment benefits due to the hardship in the family." Claimant also argues that he had worked "since 1964 and never collected any unemployment pay for all those years (41 years)."

Our scope of review of administrative decisions is narrowly circumscribed. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999). Our role is to determine "'whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record' considering 'the proofs as a whole,' with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility." Ibid. (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965)). We may not engage in an independent assessment of the evidence, id., and we will accord a strong presumption of reasonableness to the decision of an administrative agency. Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 525 (1982). We give great deference to administrative decisions, State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 159 (1964), but we do not act simply as a rubber stamp of the agency's decision. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). An administrative decision will be reversed when it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole." Ibid.

The Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -65 provides that a claimant is disqualified for benefits "[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works four weeks in employment . . . and has earned . . . at least six times the individual's weekly benefit rate . . . . N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The language of the statute makes clear that the "good cause" for a voluntary resignation from employment must relate to the employment itself rather than a factor personal to the employee. White v. Bd. of Review, 146 N.J. Super. 268, 270 (App. Div. 1977); Morgan v. Bd. of Review, 77 N.J. Super. 209, 214 (App. Div. 1962).

Applying these principles to the record before us, we are satisfied that the Board's decision was neither arbitrary, capricious nor unreasonable. There is no dispute that claimant's departure was attributed solely to the unfortunate personal circumstances surrounding his daughter's illness. The Board's decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).

 
Affirmed.

(continued)

(continued)

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February 1, 2007