State v. Obley
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Decisions
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of the Nebraska Court of Appeals
19 nebraska appellate reports
State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
Leron L. Obley, appellant.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed May 17, 2011. No. A-10-657.
1. Postconviction: Constitutional Law: Proof. An evidentiary hearing on a motion
for postconviction relief must be granted when the motion contains factual allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringement of the movant’s rights under the
Nebraska or federal Constitution. However, if the motion alleges only conclusions
of fact or law, or the records and files in the case affirmatively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, no evidentiary hearing is required.
2. Effectiveness of Counsel. A claim that defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact.
3. Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. With regard to the questions of
counsel’s performance or prejudice to the defendant as part of the two-pronged
test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984), an appellate court reviews such legal determinations independently of the lower court’s decision.
4. Postconviction: Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. In order
to establish a right to postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assist
ance of counsel, the defendant has the burden, in accordance with Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), to show
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defense in his or her case.
5. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Right to Counsel. A defendant has the
right under the federal and state Constitutions to be represented by an attorney in
all critical stages of a criminal prosecution.
6. Criminal Law: Words and Phrases. Critical stages of a criminal prosecution are
those stages at which the substantial rights of a defendant may be affected.
7. Criminal Law: Right to Counsel: Words and Phrases. A hearing on a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea is a critical stage in the proceedings, carrying with it the
right to counsel.
8. Constitutional Law: Right to Counsel: Waiver. A defendant may waive the
constitutional right to counsel, so long as the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
9. ____: ____: ____. A waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is valid
only when it reflects an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege; therefore, the key inquiry is whether one who waived the Sixth
Amendment right was sufficiently aware of the right to have counsel and of the
possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel.
10. Right to Counsel: Presumptions. Prejudice is presumed where an accused is
completely denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings.
Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: W.
Russell Bowie III, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed
and remanded for further proceedings.
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Gregory A. Pivovar for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein for
appellee.
Sievers and Cassel, Judges, and Hannon, Judge, Retired.
Cassel, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Leron L. Obley appeals from the denial of his motion
for postconviction relief. Although the district court properly
denied an evidentiary hearing on most of Obley’s claims,
we conclude that the hearing on Obley’s motion to withdraw
his plea was a critical stage at which Obley had the right to
counsel and that the record does not show Obley knowingly
waived such right. Because Obley’s postconviction motion
asserted claims of ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate
counsel concerning his lack of counsel at that hearing, the
court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on those claims.
We therefore affirm in part, and in part reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
The State charged Obley with first degree sexual assault and
first degree false imprisonment. On August 19, 2008, pursuant
to plea negotiations, Obley pled no contest to first degree sexual
assault and the other charge was dismissed. He was represented
by an assistant public defender. The next day, Obley signed a
pro se motion to withdraw his no contest plea, which motion
was filed on August 25. Obley alleged that on the morning of
August 19, he told his attorney that he believed he should go to
trial on the matter, that his attorney set a hearing for that same
day “in an attempt to scare or threaten” Obley, and that Obley
was upset and under duress at the time of his no contest plea.
Obley further alleged that his plea was not knowingly or intelligently made.
At the beginning of the October 29, 2008, hearing on Obley’s
motion, the assistant public defender representing Obley stated
that “Obley is requesting to proceed on this matter on his
own without counsel.” This attorney then asked for leave to
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ithdraw. Without ruling on the request to withdraw, the court
first asked Obley if he had any evidence to present. The following colloquy occurred:
[Obley]: Your Honor, the day on August 19, when
[defense counsel] came to see me that morning, it was
agreed we were going to trial. I never gave him any indication or said anything about pleading guilty or no contest
to any sexual assault or any of the charges. So it was my
understanding we wanted to go to a trial the next day,
August 20. But against my wishes and my knowledge,
I had a hearing later that day, so I didn’t know — when
I got here, I just assumed that the charges were being
dropped, until he told me that they had a deal for me,
and it was a good deal and I should deal. So at the time,
I was really surprised. I didn’t know what was going on.
I was shocked. I didn’t even me [sic] come here to plead
no contest or make a deal, so I said that I wanted to go to
trial the next day.
THE COURT: Well, it says — are you comfortable
going forward on your own, . . . Obley?
[Obley]: For the motion?
THE COURT: Right.
[Obley]: Yes.
The court inquired further as to why Obley entered his no
contest plea, and Obley offered his explanations. The prosecutor stated that Obley had not met his burden to show that
he was not properly informed of his rights, that the court
erred in accepting his waiver of those rights, that he was
not competent to stand trial, or that there was not a factual
basis. The court then stated to Obley that “you have done
this without assistance of counsel. And you haven’t presented
any evidence to show that your plea was not made freely,
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and that you were
incompetent to enter the plea, or the factual basis was insufficient.” The court overruled Obley’s motion to withdraw
his plea and proceeded to sentencing. The assistant public
defender was not discharged by the court, and he represented
Obley during sentencing. Obley was sentenced to 15 to 20
years’ imprisonment.
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On direct appeal, represented by the public defender’s
office, Obley asserted only that his sentence was excessive. On
March 13, 2009, we summarily affirmed the sentence in case
No. A-08-1233.
Obley subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief and motion for appointment of counsel. Obley’s
motion for postconviction relief alleged that (1) the district
court engaged in judicial misconduct because at the time of the
hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, the district court
failed to inquire if Obley was waiving his right to counsel;
(2) his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate
and interview the State’s witnesses and in “induc[ing]” Obley
to plead no contest; (3) his appellate counsel was ineffective
in failing to pursue Obley’s claims regarding the hearing on
Obley’s motion to withdraw his plea; (4) the district court did
not obtain jurisdiction because the information was invalid;
and (5) his no contest plea was not intelligently and understandingly made. The district court denied the motion without
an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Obley’s judicial
misconduct claim was procedurally barred. It determined that
Obley’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea was
without merit because Obley elected to represent himself. It
found that Obley’s claim that counsel was ineffective in coercing him to enter his plea was without merit because the court
found the plea to be entered freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. The court found Obley’s claim that counsel failed
to investigate to be without merit because Obley entered a plea
of no contest in which he declined to contest the facts upon
which the charge was based. As to Obley’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the other
claims on direct appeal, the district court stated that “[t]here is
no evidence contained in the bill of exceptions which would
form a basis from which appellate counsel would raise these
arguments.” Finally, the court found Obley’s jurisdictional
claim to be meritless.
Obley timely filed a motion to reconsider. While that motion
was pending, Obley filed a notice of appeal, docketed as our
case No. A-09-904. In due course, on March 24, 2010, we
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dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, determining that
the pending motion for rehearing constituted a motion to alter
or amend the judgment and terminated the running of the time
for appeal.
Thereafter, the district court overruled the motion to reconsider and Obley, through appellate counsel, timely filed a new
notice of appeal, which was docketed as the instant case.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Obley assigns that the district court erred in (1) denying an
evidentiary hearing, (2) denying his motion for postconviction
relief, and (3) finding Obley’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] An evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief must be granted when the motion contains factual
allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringement of the
movant’s rights under the Nebraska or federal Constitution.
However, if the motion alleges only conclusions of fact or
law, or the records and files in the case affirmatively show
that the movant is entitled to no relief, no evidentiary hearing is required. State v. McGhee, 280 Neb. 558, 787 N.W.2d
700 (2010).
[2,3] A claim that defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance presents a mixed question of law and fact. Id. With
regard to the questions of counsel’s performance or prejudice
to the defendant as part of the two-pronged test articulated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 674 (1984), an appellate court reviews such legal determinations independently of the lower court’s decision. State v.
McGhee, supra.
ANALYSIS
Obley’s brief argues his three assignments of error collectively: Because Obley alleged facts in his motion for postconviction relief which would constitute a denial of his constitutional rights, the district court erred in denying his motion
without an evidentiary hearing. Although Obley’s assignments
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of error are broad enough to encompass the district court’s
denial of all the claims raised in his motion for postconviction
relief, we limit our review to those claims that were raised in
his motion and also argued in his brief. See State v. McGhee,
supra (alleged error must be both specifically assigned and
specifically argued in brief of party asserting error to be considered by appellate court). See, also, State v. Gunther, 278
Neb. 173, 768 N.W.2d 453 (2009). Thus, we do not address
the allegations of the motion regarding judicial misconduct,
the purported invalidity of the information, and Obley’s understanding of the no contest plea.
Obley’s arguments in his brief are limited to his claims
for relief that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by inducing him to enter a plea, by failing to investigate, and by failing to adequately represent him at the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea. He also argues that
appellate counsel was ineffective in not discussing the appeal
with Obley resulting in the withdrawal of plea issue not being
raised on direct appeal. Because Obley was represented by
the public defender’s office at the trial level and on direct
appeal, this postconviction proceeding is his first opportunity
to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v.
McGhee, supra.
[4] In order to establish a right to postconviction relief based
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
has the burden, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington,
supra, to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense
in his or her case. State v. Vo, 279 Neb. 964, 783 N.W.2d 416
(2010). The two prongs of this test, deficient performance and
prejudice, may be addressed in either order. Id. Because Obley’s
conviction was the result of a plea, the prejudice requirement
is satisfied if he can show a reasonable probability that, but for
the errors of counsel, he would have insisted on going to trial
rather than pleading. See id.
Most of Obley’s arguments relate to his postconviction
claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to defend
and protect Obley’s interests during the hearing on his motion
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to withdraw his no contest plea and that appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to pursue any claims regarding the hearing
on Obley’s motion to withdraw his plea.
We consider Obley’s lack of representation at the time of
the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. Without the
assistance of counsel, Obley filed the motion to withdraw
his no contest plea. At the start of the hearing on Obley’s
motion, the public defender stated that Obley was requesting to proceed on the matter “on his own without counsel”
and the public defender asked for leave to withdraw. After
Obley explained that he had not wanted to plead no contest
but wanted to go to trial, the court asked Obley if he was
“comfortable going forward on [his] own.” Obley answered
that he was.
[5,6] A defendant has the right under the federal and state
Constitutions to be represented by an attorney in all critical
stages of a criminal prosecution. See State v. Miner, 273 Neb.
837, 733 N.W.2d 891 (2007). Critical stages of a criminal
prosecution are those stages at which the substantial rights of
a defendant may be affected. State v. Gray, 8 Neb. App. 973,
606 N.W.2d 478 (2000), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Nelson, 262 Neb. 896, 636 N.W.2d 620 (2001).
Our review of Nebraska case law has not uncovered any
cases explicitly deciding whether a hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea is a “critical stage” of a criminal proceeding.
[7] Other jurisdictions have considered the issue and held
that a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a
critical stage in the proceedings, carrying with it the right to
counsel. See, e.g., U.S. v. Sanchez-Barreto, 93 F.3d 17 (1st
Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Garrett, 90 F.3d 210 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States v. White, 659 F.2d 231 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States
v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1976); Ducker v. State, 986
So. 2d 1224 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Fortson v. State, 272
Ga. 457, 532 S.E.2d 102 (2000); State v. Harell, 80 Wash.
App. 802, 911 P.2d 1034 (1996); Browning v. Com., 19 Va.
App. 295, 452 S.E.2d 360 (1994); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d
314 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d
1291 (Ind. App. 1992); Beals v. State, 106 Nev. 729, 802 P.2d
2 (1990); Lewis v. United States, 446 A.2d 837 (D.C. App.
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1982); People v. Holmes, 12 Ill. App. 3d 1, 297 N.E.2d 204
(1973). Cf. State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 454, 235 P.3d 404
(2010) (postjudgment hearing on motion to withdraw guilty
pleas was not critical stage of proceedings at which right to
counsel attached).
[8] The same constitutional right to counsel also guarantees the right of a defendant to represent himself or herself.
See State v. Dunster, 262 Neb. 329, 631 N.W.2d 879 (2001).
A defendant may waive the constitutional right to counsel, so
long as the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. Figeroa, 278 Neb. 98, 767 N.W.2d 775 (2009).
Formal warnings do not have to be given by the trial court to
establish a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel. Id.
[9] However, in the case before us, the district court did
not resolve the uncertainty. The court did not ask Obley
whether he intended to waive his right to counsel or whether
he wanted the assistance of appointed counsel. Rather, the
court merely asked Obley if he was comfortable proceeding
on his own without giving Obley any options. The court in
Fortson v. State, supra, considered a similar situation in which
the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea and
appeared pro se at the hearing on the motion. The Fortson
court determined that the trial court was obligated to inform
the defendant of his right to counsel or to obtain a constitutionally valid waiver of counsel and that the absence of counsel
was prejudicial. It therefore reversed, and remanded the cause
for another hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw
his plea. Similarly, the district court in this case should have
advised Obley that he had a right to counsel. Because Obley
was not advised of a right to counsel, we question how he
could have effectively waived that right. A waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is valid only when it reflects an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege; therefore, the key inquiry is whether one who
waived the Sixth Amendment right was sufficiently aware of
the right to have counsel and of the possible consequences
of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel. State v. Wilson, 252
Neb. 637, 564 N.W.2d 241 (1997).
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[10] We agree with the jurisdictions cited above that the
hearing on Obley’s motion to withdraw his plea was a critical stage of the proceeding at which the right to counsel
attached. The lack of representation by counsel at this hearing is the linchpin of Obley’s appeal. Prejudice is presumed
where the accused is completely denied counsel at a critical
stage of the proceedings. State v. Davlin, 265 Neb. 386, 658
N.W.2d 1 (2003). Because Obley’s counsel asked to withdraw
at the beginning of the hearing, Obley proceeded to represent
himself at the hearing, and the record does not clearly show
a knowing waiver of the right to counsel. We conclude that
the district court erred in not granting an evidentiary hearing on this issue, which was couched in terms of Obley’s
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
Accordingly, we reverse, and remand for further proceedings
on those claims.
Obley also alleged in his motion for postconviction relief
that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate
and interview the State’s witnesses. Obley alleges that counsel
failed to interview specific witnesses who were endorsed on
the information and who were involved in treating the victim,
but Obley does not indicate what information these witnesses
would have provided. Recently, in State v. McGhee, 280 Neb.
558, 787 N.W.2d 700 (2010), the Nebraska Supreme Court
reiterated that in assessing postconviction claims that trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to call a particular witness, it
had upheld dismissal without an evidentiary hearing where the
motion did not include specific allegations regarding the testimony which the witness would have given if called. Because
Obley’s motion lacked specific allegations regarding the nature
of these individuals’ testimonies, the district court did not err in
denying an evidentiary hearing on this claim.
Obley claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
“investigate and gather” the sexual assault examination report
“to determine if the victim was actually sexually assaulted
and whether there was exculpatory evidence on the report”
because a hospital laboratory result summary indicated the
absence of “spermatozoom” and had no mention of redness, swelling, or irritation around the victim’s vagina. Obley
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implies that the sexual assault examination report would similarly show the absence of sperm and no evidence of trauma
to the victim’s vaginal area. According to the factual basis
provided by the State, the evidence would show that Obley
subjected the victim to penile-vaginal penetration without the
victim’s consent.
Because the district court’s ruling on this claim relied upon
Obley’s plea and we have already determined that he is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing regarding his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel as to the alleged denial of counsel at the
hearing to withdraw the plea, the course of proceedings on this
claim may turn upon the outcome of the evidentiary hearing.
The district court found this claim to be without merit because
Obley “entered a plea of ‘no contest’ to the charge of first
degree sexual assault in which he declined to contest the facts
upon which the charge was based.” If the evidentiary hearing
shows that Obley was not aware of his right to counsel at the
hearing to withdraw his plea, he would be entitled to a hearing
on the motion with the assistance of counsel. If he then prevailed at such a hearing, the plea would be withdrawn and this
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the sexual
assault report would become moot.
On the other hand, if the evidentiary hearing were to show
that Obley was aware of his right to counsel at the hearing to
withdraw his plea and that he voluntarily waived the right by
going forward “on [his] own,” then on the claim regarding the
sexual assault report he would have the usual burden of showing both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he
was prejudiced—that is, that but for the ineffective assistance
of counsel he would have insisted on going to trial. The court
erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the district court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on Obley’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel relating to the hearing on his motion
to withdraw his plea, we reverse, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on those claims. We further reverse, and remand
for an evidentiary hearing on Obley’s claim of ineffective
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a
ssistance of counsel regarding counsel’s alleged failure to
obtain the sexual assault examination report. We affirm the
denial of postconviction relief on all other claims.
Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and
remanded for further proceedings.
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