IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2003 MT 25
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
MARK J. STONEMAN,
Petitioner and Respondent,
RUTH L. DROLLINGER,
Respondent and Appellant.
District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Mark L. Guenther, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Michael S. Kakuk, Helena, Montana
Karl Knuchel, Livingston, Montana
Patricia Novotny, Seattle, Washington; Shane P. Coleman, Dorsey &
Missoula Montana (Northwest Women's Law Center)
Heard: October 15, 2002
Submitted: October 29, 2002
Decided: February 18, 2003
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Ruth L. Drollinger appeals the denial of her motion requesting the court decline to exercise
jurisdiction over a custody dispute with her former husband, Mark J. Stoneman. In September 1999,
Drollinger relocated with her four children to the State of Washington. The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) enumerates domestic violence as one of eight factors
that a Montana court must consider when determining whether it is an inconvenient forum to
adjudicate child custody issues. Although Stoneman’s past acts of violence against Drollinger are
well documented, the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, failed to consider
Drollinger’s safety and well-being when evaluating whether transfer of proceedings to Washington
is appropriate. We hold that a finding of domestic violence authorizes a court to yield jurisdiction to
another state if the victim could be better protected in the other forum and if the other statutory
factors do not militate against the transfer. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
The sole issue raised by Drollinger on appeal is whether the District Court erred by denying
her motion to decline to exercise jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum under the UCCJEA.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stoneman and Drollinger married on October 1, 1988, in Livingston, Montana. On August
1, 1990, a few months after the birth of the couple’s first child, Stoneman filed a petition for
dissolution in Gallatin County. Thereafter, the parties reconciled, reunited and broke-up numerous
times before they finally separated in 1996 while Drollinger was pregnant with their fourth child.
The children have resided with Drollinger since their parents’ final separation.
Stoneman repeatedly battered Drollinger during the marriage and Drollinger obtained
several court-issued orders of protection during the parties’ multiple separations. Stoneman pled
guilty to partner and family member assault in 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1996. The record details
Stoneman’s violations of the orders of protection as well as several incidents involving Stoneman’s
violent behavior after the parties’ final separation.
The District Court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) in 1997 to represent the interests
of the children in the dissolution proceedings. The GAL consistently recommended against
Stoneman’s unsupervised visitation with the children. In its October 23, 1998 decree of dissolution,
the court divided the marital estate and awarded custody of the children to Drollinger. Drollinger,
acting pro se and in forma pauperis, appealed the division of marital property, denial of a
maintenance award, determination of child support and the visitation provisions of the parenting
While the appeal was pending, Drollinger filed a notice of intent to move and relocated with
her children to Washington in September 1999. The District Court in Montana directed Drollinger
to bring the four children on alternate weekends from Washington to a designated location in
Bozeman where the children’s transfer to Stoneman for unsupervised visits was facilitated by a third
On November 30, 2000, this Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the issues of
property apportionment, maintenance and child support, but held that the court committed reversible
error by allowing Stoneman unsupervised visitation with the children in light of his history of
violence toward their mother. Stoneman v. Drollinger, 2000 MT 274, 302 Mont. 107, 14 P.3d 12.
We noted that the overwhelming evidence in this case demonstrates an emotional and physical risk
to the children if they are left alone with their father. Stoneman, ¶ 59. We remanded for entry of an
order requiring the children’s visits with Stoneman to be supervised and well-structured. Stoneman,
¶ 61. Stoneman filed a petition for rehearing, which this Court denied.
On February 6, 2001, the Whitman County Superior Court of Washington issued a
Permanent Order of Protection that bars Stoneman from all direct contact with Drollinger and the
four children, except for Stoneman’s supervised visitation, which had not yet been established by the
On March 9, 2001, Drollinger, again acting pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a motion
requesting the Montana court to decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum in order to allow the
Whitman County, Washington court to assume jurisdiction. Stoneman opposed the motion. On
May 3, 2001, the day set for a hearing on the parties’ various motions, Drollinger moved to bifurcate
property and parenting issues and requested the court decline jurisdiction over custody proceedings
only. The court denied both of Drollinger’s motions on September 10, 2001.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a motion to decline jurisdiction is whether the District Court
abused its discretion. In re Paternity and Custody of B.E.S., 1998 MT 90, ¶ 19, 190 Mont. 188, ¶ 19,
963 P.2d 449, ¶ 19 (citing In re Marriage of Cook (1986), 223 Mont. 293, 297, 725 P.2d 562, 56465).
As a case of first impression, this Court is asked to examine the provisions of the UCCJEA
that allow a Montana court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over child custody proceedings when
the court determines that it is an inconvenient forum. For background, a brief discussion of the
statutory schemes designed to address jurisdictional problems raised by interstate child custody
disputes is warranted.
In 1977, Montana adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) for the
purpose of avoiding competition between states for jurisdiction over child custody proceedings and
promoting cooperation of the courts by establishing uniform criteria for the state with the closest
connections with the child to exercise jurisdiction. Sec. 1, Ch. 537, L. 1977. Although all 50 states,
the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands adopted the UCCJA, problems of interstate forum
shopping and other jurisdictional disputes continued to vex the nation’s courts. See 9 Uniform Laws
Annotated (U.L.A.) 650 (1999).
In 1980, the federal government enacted the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C. § 1738A, which mandates that state authorities give full faith and credit to another state’s
custody determinations, so long as those determinations were made in conformity with the notice
and procedural provisions of the PKPA. The PKPA also authorizes continuing exclusive jurisdiction
in the state that issued the original child custody decree so long as one parent or the child remains
there and the state has continuing jurisdiction under its own law. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
To harmonize state child custody jurisdictional provisions with the PKPA and to eliminate
inconsistent state court interpretations of jurisdictional issues, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved the UCCJEA in 1997 and
recommended its enactment by all states. 1 The Montana Legislature adopted the UCCJEA in 1999
(codified under Title 40, Chapter 7, Montana Code Annotated), which repealed and replaced the
As of January 2003, thirty-one states, including Washington and Montana, have
enacted the UCCJEA, and nine states have introduced UCCJEA legislation.
provisions of the UCCJA in Montana law. See Sec. 1-14, Ch. 91, L. 1999.
Under the UCCJEA, a Montana court has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination
if Montana is the “home state” of the child. Section 40-7-201(1), MCA. The “home state” is
defined as the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for a least six
months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. Section 40-7-103(7),
MCA. As the “home state” of a child, Montana will continue to have exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction unless a Montana court declines to exercise its jurisdiction. Section 40-7-202(2), MCA.
A court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if the court determines that it is an
inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a court of another state is a more appropriate
forum to make the child custody determination. Section 40-7-108(1), MCA.
To that end, the UCCJEA specifically mandates that a Montana court, at a minimum,
consider the following factors when evaluating a motion to decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient
(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(b) the length of time that the child has resided outside this state;
(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation,
including testimony of the child;
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending
Section 40-7-108(2), MCA.
In the case before us on appeal, Stoneman contends that the criteria for evaluating
inconvenient forum under the UCCJA are encompassed by the UCCJEA’s requirement that courts
consider “all relevant factors.” He cites In re Paternity and Custody of B.E.S., 1998 MT 190, 290
Mont. 188, 963 P.2d 449, as support for his position that it is not appropriate that Washington
assume jurisdiction and determine pending visitation issues because his children have a closer
connection with Montana, which is where the children have resided for most of their lives.
Stoneman also argues that the Montana court should retain jurisdiction because the court has
overseen the protracted litigation between the parties and Drollinger’s effort to transfer jurisdiction
is only an attempt to frustrate Stoneman’s visitation with his children.
In B.E.S., this Court interpreted the statutory criteria for determining inconvenient forum as it
existed in 1998, prior to the Montana Legislature’s enactment of the UCCJEA in 1999. However,
the UCCJEA significantly altered the earlier provisions of § 40-7-108, MCA. For example, as
noted in B.E.S, the UCCJA required a court to decide the jurisdiction question by resort to a
determination “if it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction.” Section 407-108(3), MCA (1997); B.E.S., ¶ 19. The UCCJEA includes no similar provision and eliminates
“interest of the child” from the jurisdictional standard. See 9 U.L.A. 654. The UCCJA also did not
include domestic violence as a factor that a court must consider in evaluating jurisdictional issues in
child custody disputes. The UCCJEA, for the first time, focuses a court’s attention on the safety
and well-being of the victims of domestic violence when determining appropriate jurisdiction.
Section 40-4-108(2)(a), MCA.
At oral argument before this Court, Stoneman conceded that the UCCJEA rather than the
UCCJA governs this case. Also, the parties do not dispute that Montana is the “home state” for the
four children. The children were born in Montana; child custody proceedings commenced in the
Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County; the Montana court made the initial child custody
determination; and Stoneman continues to reside in Montana. Consequently, the Montana court has
exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to establish Stoneman’s supervised visitation with his children
unless, under the circumstances, it would be appropriate for the Montana court to allow the
Washington court to assume jurisdiction.
When evaluating whether to decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum, a court must
allow the parties to submit information for the court’s consideration. Section 40-7-108(2), MCA.
The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion, or
request of another court. Section 40-7-108(1), MCA. The law does not allocate a burden of proof to
either party, but directs the court to conduct an evaluation based upon the relevant information
available to determine whether it is appropriate for another state to exercise jurisdiction. The
District Court addressed each statutory factor in its decision denying the motion to decline
jurisdiction, which we discuss in turn.
The first factor inquires “whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in
the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child.” Section 40-7-108(2)(a),
MCA. The District Court found that “[d]omestic violence towards Respondent is well documented in
this case, but Respondent fails to show this [c]ourt how declining jurisdiction will better protect her
and the children.”
The UCCJEA places domestic violence at the top of the list of factors that courts are required
to evaluate when determining whether to decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum for child
custody proceedings. Since domestic violence was not raised by the now-repealed UCCJA as a
factor for court consideration, the NCCUSL, which drafted the UCCJEA, offered the following
guidance to assist courts in applying this factor:
For this purpose, the court should determine whether the parties are located in
different States because one party is a victim of domestic violence or child abuse. If
domestic violence or child abuse has occurred, this factor authorizes the court to
consider which State can best protect the victim from further violence or abuse.
9 U.L.A. 683. The NCCUSL explicitly recognized that past abuse or a continuing threat of violence
might compel a battered spouse or parent of an abused child to relocate to another state. The
NCCUSL further directed courts to proceed with an evaluation of which forum can provide the
greater safety whenever domestic violence or child abuse has occurred.
The priority the NCCUSL assigned to the protection of victims from further domestic
violence is supported by the research findings of the United States Department of Justice. Those
findings suggest that termination of an abusive relationship actually poses an increased risk of
escalation in domestic violence. Interviews with men who killed their wives indicated that either
threats of separation or actual separation most often precipitated events leading to the murder. See
Patricia Tjanden and Nancy Thoennes, United States Department of Justice, Extent, Nature, and
Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence 37 (July 2000). “Domestic violence often escalates over
time in frequency, intensity and duration. . . . Although divorced women and separated women
comprise only 10 percent of all women in America, they account for three-quarters of all battered
women and report being battered 14 times as often as women still living with their partners.
Divorced or separated men, as opposed to husbands living with their wives, commit 79% of all
spousal violence.” Joan Zorza, Recognizing and Protecting the Privacy and Confidentiality Needs
of Battered Women, 29 Fam. L. Q. 273, 274.
An alarming report from the State Justice Institute lists risk factors for intimate partner
homicide recognized by a majority of domestic violence experts. Identified indicators of homicidal
potential are the batterer’s access to or ownership of guns; use of weapons in prior abusive incidents;
threats with weapons; serious injury in prior abusive incidents; threats of suicide; drug or alcohol
abuse; forced sex with the female partner; obsessiveness; extreme jealousy; and extreme dominance.
See Jan Roehl and Kristin Guertin, State Justice Institute, Current Use of Dangerous Assessments in
Sentencing Domestic Violence Offenders 3-7 (Sept. 1998) (hereafter, Roehl).
Orders of protection have proven inadequate to guard women and children from further
abuse. A recent two-year study of male batterers against whom an order of protection had been filed
found that almost half of abusers assaulted their victims again within the study period. The re-abuse
rate did not differ for those who maintained the orders and those who dropped them. Andrew R.
Klein, United States Department of Justice, “Re-abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male
Batterers: Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work,” Legal Interventions in Family Violence: Research
Findings and Policy Implications 52 (July 1998).
Given the high propensity for recidivism in domestic violence, we hold that when a court
finds intimate partner violence or abuse of a child has occurred or that a party has fled Montana to
avoid further violence or abuse, the court is authorized to consider whether the party and the child
might be better protected if further custody proceedings were held in another state. While this factor
alone is not dispositive under § 40-7-108, MCA, we urge district courts to give priority to the safety
of victims of domestic violence when considering jurisdictional issues under the UCCJEA.
Turning to the specific facts before us on appeal, the marriage of Stoneman and Drollinger
was marked by repeated incidents of domestic violence. Local law enforcement officers arrested
Stoneman on charges of partner and family member assault on numerous occasions between 1989
and 1996. Stoneman received four convictions and served a three-month sentence in the Park
County Jail for the fourth conviction. When issues arising from the dissolution of the marriage
between these parties were before this Court two years ago, we recounted the District Court’s
findings regarding two incidents that illustrate Stoneman’s propensity for violence:
A disagreement escalated between Mark and Ruth to the point of violence. To
protect the children, Ruth, who was pregnant at the time, was forced to put them in
the Suburban and drive away from Mark. It is uncontroverted that Mark, in his
pickup truck, rammed into the Suburban, endangering the lives of his children and
Ruth. Mark testified that he was trying to catch up to Ruth because in her hurry to
protect her life and the lives of her children, he thought Ruth had not used seat belts
for the children. The Court finds Mark's seat belt explanation incredible versus his
threat to the safety of his children and Ruth.
The second incident involved Mark painting his face with camouflage in the
presence of the children, drinking, and driving out into the night, after hearing a story
about Ruth. Mark's behavior was so bizarre that it frightened his friend Lisa
Wolstad. Ms. Wolstad called 911 more than six times out of fear of what Mark
would do. . . . Gallatin and Park County deputies pursued Mark and caught him near
the I-90 interchange, dressed in camouflage and in possession of a gun.
Stoneman, ¶ 56.
Stoneman asserts on appeal that his last act of reported domestic violence occurred in 1996
and claims that there has been “no apparent problem” during the past three years. He contends that
Drollinger only wants to obtain a more “sympathetic judge” by seeking the transfer of the remanded
child custody proceedings to a court in Washington.
Drollinger testified at the May 2001 hearing on her motion to decline jurisdiction that she
relocated to Washington with the children in 1999 in order to be near her extended family. She
stated that she preserved the confidentiality of her new address to escape a continuing threat of
violence by Stoneman. Drollinger’s mother and father, sister and brother and their families, as well
as the children’s paternal grandparents, live in Washington and Drollinger testified that they have
provided emotional and material support to her and the children.
Drollinger entered into evidence the Permanent Order of Protection issued by the Whitman
County, Washington court in February 2001. Noting that Stoneman stipulated to having committed
domestic violence, the Washington court made no findings on the matter and noted that Stoneman
disputed Drollinger’s allegations of violence subsequent to 1997. Drollinger explained to the
I’ve needed to leave the state with my children because I have family in
[Washington] state that can help me . . . . The only reason there’s not more domestic
violence that’s been occurring is because I no longer live here and I have a--I’ve
been able to--I have a permanent restraining order there.
There’s been a number of things that has made me fearful for any way that he could
find out where we live or, you know, where--what I’m doing or anything like that. I
feel that my safety is still in question, Your Honor. I’m still afraid of him. I am
being treated for post-traumatic stress disorder, Your Honor, from the years of
domestic violence that I went through.
Drollinger’s brief in support of her motion to decline jurisdiction referred the District Court
to the supplemental information she submitted to this Court in September 2000, which documents
Stoneman’s “acts of violence and abuse towards [her] and the children since fleeing Montana” in
September 1999. Although Drollinger did submit such documentation to this Court during her first
appeal, we refused to consider the evidence. Stoneman, ¶ 12. This Court does not engage in factfinding and may not consider evidence that has not been submitted to the court below for a proper
hearing. Consequently, the documentation provided this Court regarding Stoneman’s more recent
acts of violence is not of record.
While the record in this case is voluminous and the District Court acknowledged the well-
documented history of domestic violence perpetrated by Stoneman against Drollinger throughout
their ten-year marriage, the court made no new findings regarding violent acts or threats of violence
since the October 1998 dissolution proceedings. The court also made no findings regarding threats
or the likelihood of future violence before determining that Drollinger failed to demonstrate how she
and the children would be safer if proceedings were transferred to Washington.
In her testimony before the District Court, Drollinger spoke of her fear of future violence by
Stoneman and her efforts to prevent Stoneman from knowing her home address or her daily
activities. Stoneman’s criminal record of domestic violence reveals a pattern of recurrent wifebattering of escalating intensity, which includes severely beating Drollinger during pregnancy. The
record also establishes that Stoneman used weapons in the context of spousal abuse, perpetrated
serious injury upon his ex-spouse, and exhibited obsessive and domineering behavior, all of which
correspond with indicators of homicidal potential identified by the State Justice Institute. See Roehl,
3-7. Stoneman testified at the May 2001 hearing that he had not received any type of psychological
counseling since his last incarceration in 1996 for domestic violence. Moreover, he made no
showing before the District Court that his potential for future violence has abated.
We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion when it acknowledged the well
documented history of domestic violence presented by this case, yet neglected to consider which
forum could best protect Drollinger and the children from further abuse. Drollinger maintains that
she feels safer in Washington where she is surrounded by extended family and where Stoneman does
not know her address or daily pattern of activities. Therefore, we hold that Washington is an
appropriate forum for further child custody proceedings in order to better protect Drollinger and the
children from the threat of violence from Stoneman.
Although a finding of past domestic violence can be the basis for a Montana court to yield
jurisdiction to another state, the seven other jurisdictional factors enumerated by § 40-7-108(2),
MCA, must also be taken into consideration. The second factor asks how long the children have
resided outside Montana. Section 40-7-108(2)(b), MCA. The District Court found that the majority
of the children’s lives have been spent in Montana and “the [c]ourt does not believe that two (2)
years in Washington weigh against retaining jurisdiction given the extensive history of the parties in
the Montana [c]ourts.” The four children, ranging in age from four to eleven at the time of the
hearing, have lived in Washington since September 1999. Drollinger testified that the children
“have significant connections to family, school and community” in Washington and have developed
relationships that have enhanced their sense of security and well-being, which is “a contrast from the
isolation they experienced while living in Montana.” As the children’s home for the most recent
two years, we conclude that Washington would be an appropriate forum for child custody
The third factor evaluates the distance between the courts, which is approximately 600 miles
in this case.
Section 40-7-108(2)(c), MCA.
The District Court stated, “[w]hile the court
sympathizes with Respondent’s need to relocate, she did choose to relocate a great distance from
Petitioner.” Drollinger testified that the drive between her home and the court in Bozeman takes
about eight hours each way. As the primary custodial parent, Drollinger must either bring the
children with her to proceedings or arrange for their care in her absence. Since the distance between
the Montana and Washington courts creates a transportation inconvenience that must be borne by
one of the parties, we conclude that the facts suggest that Stoneman, as the noncustodial parent, may
be in the better position to undertake the necessary travel.
The fourth factor concerns the relative financial circumstances of the parties, which the
District Court found to be disparate. Section 40-7-108(2)(d), MCA. The court determined that
Stoneman enjoys an income of $31,797, based in part on imputed wages, while Drollinger has an
imputed income of $6,500. Under the fifth factor, the parties have no agreement regarding
appropriate jurisdiction. Section 40-7-108(2)(e), MCA.
The sixth factor examines the traditional bases for determining venue and inquires about the
nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including the
testimony of the children. Section 40-7-108(2)(f), MCA. The District Court stated that “Respondent
contends all current evidence regarding the children’s mental health, medical, financial, and school
records are in Washington. The [c]ourt believes that Montana is just as convenient a forum as
Washington for review of pertinent child records. . .”
Although records may be easily transportable, the District Court failed to address the
convenience of the witnesses, the majority of whom reside in Washington, including the four
children. Three of the children are enrolled in school and receive therapeutic counseling in
Washington. Drollinger maintains that Washington is now the location of all witnesses and evidence
regarding the children, with the single exception of the GAL who resides in Montana. The GAL
testified at the May 2001 hearing that she actually has not seen the children for over one year, but
has maintained contact by telephone. Stoneman did not refute Drollinger’s assertions regarding the
location of evidence and witnesses.
The seventh factor inquires about the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue
expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence. Section 40-7-108(2)(g), MCA.
Although the District Court did not address this factor directly, we trust that courts in either
Montana or Washington are competent to decide evidentiary and substantive issues expeditiously.
The record does not indicate that the Montana court communicated with the Washington court to
discuss the possible transfer of this case, pursuant to § 40-7-139, MCA. Consequently, no
information is available regarding potential docketing problems or other concerns that might affect
the Washington court’s timely adjudication. Drollinger testified she has secured the services of a
pro bono attorney to represent her through custody proceedings in Washington but has been unable
to arrange for legal assistance in Montana.
The final factor is the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the
pending litigation. Section 40-7-108(2)(g), MCA. The District Court concluded that it is in the
better position to address the issue of supervised visitation because the property and parenting issues
arising from the dissolution of the marriage of Stoneman and Drollinger have been the subject of
extensive litigation in Montana. The court noted that the case file is now in its thirteenth volume.
While we acknowledge the extraordinary efforts of the Eleventh Judicial District Court to resolve
the issues presented by this case--three district court judges have presided over the matter, and this is
the second time that these parties have come before this Court on appeal--the value the court
attaches to retaining jurisdiction is misplaced. For more than five years, the court system has served
as a forum in which Stoneman and Drollinger have waged a contentious and protracted battle. While
the Montana court may be well versed in the conflict, Drollinger argues that the Washington court
also has had an opportunity to become familiar with the facts and issues involved in the case when
she applied for and received a Permanent Order of Protection in 2001 from the Superior Court of
Whitman County. Therefore, under this factor, we again conclude that the Washington court would
be an appropriate forum.
It is the judgment of this Court that the protection of the parties, the years the children have
resided in Washington, the significant distance between courts, the parties’ disparate financial
circumstances, the location of evidence and convenience of witnesses, and the familiarity factors, all
support the Montana court declining jurisdiction to allow the Washington court to exercise
jurisdiction. None of the jurisdictional factors enumerated by § 40-7-108(2), MCA, militate against
declination and no factor outweighs the concern for the safety and well-being of Drollinger and the
children raised by the history of Stoneman’s domestic violence.
Therefore, we conclude that
Washington is the more appropriate forum in which a supervised, well-structured visitation plan for
Stoneman may be established.
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s order as it pertains to custody matters and
remand with directions that the court stay further proceedings and communicate with the appropriate
court in Washington to discuss transfer of this case, pursuant to § 40-7-139, MCA. If transfer can
be arranged, we direct the Montana court to decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum and hold
that further proceedings should occur in Drollinger’s home court.
Reversed and remanded.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in much of the Court's opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from the result the
Court reaches. I would remand.
The District Court denied Drollinger's motion to decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient
forum. As the Court correctly states, our review of the District Court's decision is whether that court
abused its discretion. Having properly begun to apply the correct standard, however, the Court takes
it upon itself to make the ultimate decision about whether Montana is an inconvenient forum and,
indeed, concludes that Washington is the "more appropriate" forum for this case. I cannot agree
with the Court's approach.
I do agree with the first sentence in ¶ 34 of the opinion, where the Court determines that the
District Court abused its discretion by neglecting to consider which forum could best protect
Drollinger and the children. I also agree with ¶ 32 of the opinion, which lists other findings not
made by the District Court. The Court then implicitly makes these missing findings of fact–an
undertaking totally outside this Court’s authority–in order to reach the conclusion it desires to make.
On this record, I conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to make
sufficient findings on the domestic violence matters. I would remand, however, for the entry of
those findings and, thereafter, for reconsideration of the entire issue of a convenient forum under §
40-7-108, MCA. I simply cannot agree with this Court's choice to make the ultimate decision which
properly belongs with the District Court.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY