MATTER OF SHAW
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No. 80-18 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN THE MATTER OF THE REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF JAMES T. SHAW, Professional Land Surveyor. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for the County of Flathead, The Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Astle & Astle, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : Alan J. Joscelyn, Helena, Montana Submitted on Briefs: Decided : Filed: &G .J 2 5 l$:gQ July 7, 1980 2 5 19.80 Mr. ~ustice Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . his i s a n a p p e a l from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , F l a t h e a d County, which a f f i r m e d a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c i s i o n by the Board of P r o f e s s i o n a l E n g i n e e r s and Land S u r v e y o r s of t h e Department of P r o f e s s i o n a l and O c c u p a t i o n a l L i c e n s i n g , r e v o k i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n a s a r e g i s t e r e d land surveyor. I n F e b r u a r y 1976 James T . Shaw w a s h i r e d by D r . John L. Fenner t o c o n d u c t a boundary s u r v e y o f some p r o p e r t y owned by D r . Fenner i n S e c t i o n 2 0 , Township 26 N o r t h , Range 20 West, F l a t h e a d County, Montana. Work on t h e boundary s u r v e y was t o b e commenced a s soon a s p o s s i b l e w i t h c o m p l e t i o n e s t i m a t e d i n f o u r t o s i x weeks. During t h e s p r i n g , summer and f a l l of 1976, t h e s u r v e y remained uncompleted, d e s p i t e numerous i n q u i r i e s and prompti n g by D r . Fenner. On December 7, 1976, Shaw f i l e d a c e r t i - f i c a t e of s u r v e y w i t h t h e F l a t h e a d County C l e r k and Recorder which i n d i c a t e d t h a t monumentation on t h e s u r v e y had been completed. On t h e f a c e of t h e s u r v e y p l a t w a s Shaw's c e r t i - f i c a t i o n t h a t a l l e i g h t c o r n e r s shown on t h e p l a t had been monumented by a p i p e 2-1/2" by 30" s e t i n t o t h e ground and topped w i t h a marked aluminum o r b r a s s c a p . Shortly a f t e r t h e p l a t w a s f i l e d , D r . Fenner p a i d Shaw i n f u l l f o r work done on t h e s u r v e y . I n March o r A p r i l 1977 D r . Fenner d i s c o v e r e d , c o n t r a r y t o Shaw's c e r t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t monumentation f o r t h e boundary s u r v e y w a s n o t complete. On May 23, 1977, Fenner i s s u e d a f o r m a l c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e Board of P r o f e s s i o n a l E n g i n e e r s and Land S u r v e y o r s (Board) l i s t i n g t h e problems he had had w i t h Shaw. After receiving t h e complaint, t h e ~ o a r d sa s i g n e d Roy Bulger t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e a l l e g a t i o n s . ~uring h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n , Bulger i n t e r v i e w e d Shaw, a t which t i m e Shaw a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e monuments f o r t h e p r o j e c t were n o t p r o p e r l y i n s t a l l e d and i n some i n s t a n c e s n o t i n s t a l l e d a t all. Shaw a d v i s e d Bulger t h a t t h e work would be completed by J u n e 22, 1977. On J u l y 2 8 , 1977, Shaw a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e Board r e g a r d i n g t h e Fenner c o m p l a i n t . Shaw a d v i s e d t h e Board a t t h a t t i m e t h a t a l l n e c e s s a r y work had been completed on t h e survey. Based on t h e a s s u r a n c e s of Shaw, t h e Board made a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e " m i s s i n g monuments a r e now i n and r e c o r d e d , " and c l o s e d t h e c o m p l a i n t f i l e . Dr. F e n n e r , a f t e r b e i n g informed by t h e Board t h a t h i s c o m p l a i n t f i l e was c l o s e d , i n s p e c t e d h i s p r o p e r t y and d i s c o v e r e d t h e work was s t i l l n o t complete. Dr. Fenner, s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s , informed t h e Board of h i s d i s c o v e r y . Upon l e a r n i n g t h a t t h e work was s t i l l n o t completed, t h e Board notified Dr. Fenner and Shaw and asked them t o a p p e a r on September 29, 1977. A t t h e t i m e set f o r t h e i r appearances, Fenner appeared and reviewed t h e m a t t e r w i t h t h e Board. Shaw d i d n o t a p p e a r . Upon h e a r i n g D r . F e n n e r , t h e Board i n s t r u c t e d i t s a t t o r n e y t o b e g i n p r o c e e d i n g s t o suspend o r r e v o k e Shawls c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n . The Board a l s o a s s i g n e d B u l g e r and C h a r l e s Hegman t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e s i t e o f t h e boundary s u r v e y . When i n s p e c t i n g t h e s i t e on October 4 , 1977, t h e y found t h a t t h e p r o p e r monumentation f o r t h e p r o p e r t y had s t i l l n o t been completed. The Board m e t on F e b r u a r y 1 6 , 1978, and a f t e r r e v i e w i n g t h e r e p o r t by B u l g e r and Hegman, unanimously p a s s e d a motion t o i n s t r u c t i t s a t t o r n e y t o suspend Shaw's c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n and n o t i f y Shaw of t h e a c t i o n . However, s h a w l s c e r t i f i c a t e was n o t suspended, n o r was h e n o t i f i e d t h a t i t had been a t t h a t t i m e . I n September 1978, Shaw was a d v i s e d t h a t t h e Board proposed t o suspend o r r e v o k e h i s c e r t i f i c a t e and of h i s o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a h e a r i n g on t h e matter. Notice s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e grounds f o r t h e proposed a c t i o n was d e l i v e r e d t o A h e a r i n g on t h e matter was h e l d Shaw and t o h i s a t t o r n e y . November 2 , 1978. A h e a r i n g s examiner i s s u e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w on J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1979. On t h e b a s i s of t h e s e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e Board v o t e d t o r e v o k e Shawls c e r t i f i c a t e of r e g i s t r a t i o n . S u b s e q u e n t l y , Shaw f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g and a motion f o r s t a y w i t h t h e Board. motion were d e n i e d . Both t h e p e t i t i o n and t h e Shaw t h e n f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , and a motion f o r a s t a y of t h e Board's decision. The B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n w a s s t a y e d pending t h e j u d i c i a l review. On December 1 0 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court affirmed t h e Board's decision. Shaw a p p e a l s t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . A p p e l l a n t f i r s t r a i s e s t h e i s s u e of w h e t h e r , p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 37-67-331(2), MCA, t h e Board i s p r e c l u d e d from p r o c e e d i n g on t h e c h a r g e s a s b r o u g h t . S e c t i o n 37-67-331(1), MCA, s t a t e s t h a t t h e Board o f P r o f e s s i o n a l E n g i n e e r s and Land S u r v e y o r s c a n revoke o r suspend t h e c e r t i f i c a t e of a r e g i s t r a n t i f found g u i l t y of " g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e , incompetency o r m i s c o n d u c t i n t h e p r a c - t i c e of . .. . . . land s u r v e y i n g as a r e g i s t e r e d p r o f e s s i o n a l land surveyor." S e c t i o n 37-67-331(2), MCA, p r i o r t o i t s amendment i n 1979, i n d i c a t e s t h a t c h a r g e s a g a i n s t a r e g i s t r a n t engaging i n t h e above improper a c t i v i t y may be b r o u g h t by any p e r s o n s o l o n g a s t h e c h a r g e s a r e made by a f f i d a v i t and f i l e d w i t h t h e Board. The s e c t i o n g o e s on t o s t a t e t h a t once c h a r g e s a r e b r o u g h t t h e y w i l l e i t h e r be " d i s m i s s e d by t h e board a s unfounded o r t r i v i a l , o r s h a l l be h e a r d by t h e board w i t h i n t h r e e ( 3 ) months a f t e r t h e d a t e on which t h e y were made." (Emphasis added. ) I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t due t o a n amendment i n 1979, six s e c t i o n 37-67-331 ( 2 ) now p r o v i d e s t h a t w i t h i n - months of c h a r g e s b e i n g b r o u g h t , t h e Board o n l y h a s t o " a c t " on t h e c h a r g e s by d i s m i s s i n g them o r n o t i f y i n g t h e a c c u s e d of i t s i n t e n t t o r e v o k e o r suspend h i s l i c e n s e . The Board under t h e amendment i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o p r o v i d e a h e a r i n g w i t h i n t h e six-month p e r i o d ; however, i n t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y i n v o l v e d i n t h i s a p p e a l o c c u r r e d d u r i n g 1977 and 1978, w e must l o o k t o t h e language of t h e s t a t u t e a s s t a t e d p r i o r t o t h e 1979 amendment. A p p e l l a n t ' s main c o n t e n t i o n of e r r o r c e n t e r s on t h e h e a r i n g h e l d November 2, 1978, which r e s u l t e d i n t h e Board revoking h i s l i c e n s e . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e Board f a i l e d t o h o l d t h e h e a r i n g w i t h i n t h r e e months of t h e d a t e o n which t h e c h a r g e s w e r e made, a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 3767-331, MCA. A p p e l l a n t , i n s u p p o r t of t h i s argument, p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e c h a r g e s a l l e g e d i n t h e B o a r d ' s n o t i c e of proposed a c t i o n and o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a h e a r i n g , d a t e d September 1 5 , 1978, and t h e n d e a l t w i t h a t t h e h e a r i n g on November 2 , 1978, a r e t h e same c h a r g e s b r o u g h t by D r . Fenner on May 23, 1977, some s i x t e e n months e a r l i e r . The Board, i n r e s p o n s e , a r g u e s t h a t t h e c h a r g e s w e r e i n i t i a t e d on t h e B o a r d ' s own motion and s i n c e t h e r e i s no s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o a p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n as t o when a h e a r i n g must be h e l d on s u c h c h a r g e s , t h e p r o c e e d i n g on November 2 , 1978, w a s n o t b a r r e d and t h u s p r o p e r under t h e statute. T h i s C o u r t a r g e e s t h a t t h e Board h a s a u t h o r i t y t o i n i t i a t e i t s own c h a r g e s and c o m p l a i n t a s t o a l l e g e d improper a c t i v i t y , b u t w e disagree t h a t it a l s o has unlimited discret i o n a s t o when i t w i l l p r o v i d e a h e a r i n g on t h o s e c h a r g e s . W e can f i n d no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t r e a t i n g t h e Board d i f f e r e n t from t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c a s t o t h e p r o c e d u r e t o be followed when c h a r g e s a g a i n s t a r e g i s t r a n t have been made. A r e g i s t r a n t who h a s been c h a r g e d w i t h improper c o n d u c t s h o u l d n o t be f o r c e d t o w a i t a n i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d of t i m e b e f o r e b e i n g g r a n t e d a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o be h e a r d a t a p r o p e r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g merely because t h e c o m p l a i n t w a s i n i t i a t e d by t h e Board. The p r o c e d u r e f o r d e a l i n g w i t h c h a r g e s a g a i n s t a r e g i s t r a n t are s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 37-673 3 1 ( 2 ) , MCA, and t h a t s e c t i o n , p r i o r t o i t s amendment i n 1979, s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t c h a r g e s w i l l b e h e a r d by t h e Board w i t h i n t h r e e months of t h e i r b e i n g made. W e find t h i s l i m i t a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e t o b o t h c h a r g e s b r o u g h t by a member of t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c and t h o s e b r o u g h t by t h e Board. The c h a r g e s b r o u g h t by t h e Board on September 1 5 , 1978, a r e a s follows: (1) F i l i n g t h e Fenner p l a t w i t h t h e c e r t i f i c a t i o n t h a t monuments shown on t h e p l a t were s e t , when, i n f a c t , o n l y f o u r monuments w e r e s e t a t most, and none were marked; I' " ( 2 ) F a i l i n g t o s e t and mark t h e m i s s i n g monuments i n t h e Fenner m a t t e r f o r more t h a n a y e a r a f t e r t h e p l a t was f i l e d ; " ( 3 ) S t a t i n g t o D r . Fenner and t o t h e Board of E n g i n e e r s and Land S u r v e y o r s t h a t t h e monuments were s e t and marked when i n f a c t t h e y were n o t . " T h e f i r s t two c h a r g e s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r t o a c t i v i t y t h a t D r . Fenner f o r m a l l y complained of i n May 1977. A t the t i m e t h a t c o m p l a i n t w a s f i l e d , t h e Board was f u l l y aware t h a t i t would have t o e i t h e r d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t o r w i t h i n t h r e e months p r o v i d e a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a r i n g on t h e m a t t e r . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e Board c h o s e t o d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t . I f t h e c o u r t w e r e t o now a l l o w t h e Board t o r e f i l e t h o s e same c h a r g e s s i x t e e n months l a t e r , under t h e g u i s e t h a t t h e c h a r g e s a r e b e i n g i n i t i a t e d on i t s own motion and, t h u s , somehow renewed, t h e three-month l i m i t a t i o n would become vacuous of p u r p o s e and meaning. W cannot t o l e r a t e such an e outcome. The Board, i n r e s p o n s e t o a n a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e t h r e e month l i m i t a t i o n , a r g u e s t h a t even though t h e c h a r g e s a r e based on a c t i v i t y complained of s i x t e e n months e a r l i e r , t h e p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n s a s t o when a h e a r i n g must be h e l d s h o u l d n o t have r u n i n t h i s i n s t a n c e . I n support of t h i s argument, t h e Board c o n t e n d s t h a t had i t n o t been f o r t h e f a l s e a s s u r a n c e s by Shaw when he a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e Board on J u l y 28, 1978, t h e c h a r g e s would n o t have been d i s m i s s e d and t h e p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n s would n o t have been a l l o w e d t o run. The Board c o n c l u d e s t h a t due t o a p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n s , h e i s now e s t o p p e d from a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d has expired. The d o c t r i n e of e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l i s founded i n e q u i t y and good c o n s c i e n c e . I t s o b j e c t i s t o p r e v e n t a p a r t y from t a k i n g a n u n c o n s c i o n a b l e a d v a n t a g e of h i s own wrong w h i l e asserting his s t r i c t legal right. Levo v . General-Shea- Morrison ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 128 Mont. 570, 280 P.2d 1086. The e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s of e s t o p p e l a r e : (1) t h e r e must b e c o n d u c t , a c t s , l a n g u a g e o r s i l e n c e amounting t o a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o r concealment of f a c t s ; ( 2 ) f a c t s must be known t o t h e p a r t y e s t o p p e d a t t i m e of h i s c o n d u c t ; (3) truth c o n c e r n i n g t h e f a c t s must be unknown t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y ; c o n d u c t must be done w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t w i l l be (4) a c t e d upon by t h e o t h e r p a r t y , o r under c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t i s b o t h n a t u r a l and p r o b a b l e t h a t i t w i l l be s o a c t e d upon; ( 5 ) c o n d u c t must be r e l i e d upon by t h e o t h e r p a r t y ; and ( 6 ) t h e p a r t y must i n f a c t have a c t e d upon i t t o h i s d e t r i m e n t . Smith v . K r u t a r ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459; Kenco v . C a n t r e l l ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 130, 568 P.2d 1225. T h i s C o u r t b e l i e v e s t h e Board h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h e above elements. A p p e l l a n t a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e Board on J u l y 28, 1977, and informed i t t h a t a l l monuments on t h e Fenner p r o j e c t w e r e properly i n s t a l l e d . A t t h e November 2, 1978 h e a r i n g , D r . F e n n e r , owner of t h e p r o p e r t y , C h a r l e s Hegman, a l i c e n s e d s u r v e y o r and i n v e s t i g a t o r on t h e c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t , and Roy B u l g e r , a n a d d i t i o n a l i n v e s t i g a t o r , a l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t upon examining t h e Fenner p r o p e r t y a f t e r t h e a p p e a r a n c e by a p p e l l a n t on J u l y 28, 1977, t h e y d i s c o v e r e d monuments t h a t had n o t been p r o p e r l y s e t , c o n t r a t o a p p e l l a n t ' s assurances. Had t h e Board been aware t h a t t h e monuments were n o t i n p l a c e on J u l y 28, 1977, i t c o u l d have i n s t i t u t e d t h e p r o c e s s f o r r e v o c a t i o n o r s u s p e n s i o n of a p p e l l a n t ' s l i c e n s e based upon F e n n e r ' s c h a r g e s w e l l w i t h i n t h e three-month t i m e l i m i t . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i n s p i t e of t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Fenner, Hegman and B u l g e r , t h e r e c o r d i s d e v o i d of e v i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y t o s u s t a i n a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e monuments had n o t been s e t p r i o r t o h i s a s s u r a n c e s t o t h e Board on J u l y 28, 1977. W e a g r e e t h a t t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e on t h i s q u e s t i o n b u t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y of Fenner, Hegman and Bulger p r o v i d e s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g by t h e h e a r i n g s examiner t h a t t h e a s s u r a n c e s by a p p e l l a n t on J u l y 28, 1977, were f a l s e . Appellant misled the Board as to the work done on the Fenner project, thereby lulling it into not acting on the Fenner complaint within the required three months. We now find, therefore, that appellant is estopped from asserting the limitation period had run and, as a consequence, the Board was proper in proceeding with the charges as brought. To allow appellant to assert that the period had expired in this instance would be to allow him to take advantage of his own wrong. Such a holding would be both unconscionable and inequitable. A second issue raised by appellant is whether the decision of the Board, as affirmed by the District Court, was clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the record. In reviewing administrative decisions, this Court need only determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the administrative body if such evidence is found to exist. Public Utilities Commission v. Northwest Water Corp. (1969), 168 Colo. 154, 451 P.2d 266; Western Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of Springfield (1976), 274 Or. 37, 545 P.2d 592; Standard Chemical Mfg. Co. v. Employment Security Div. (1980), - Mont. , 605 P.2d 610, 37 St.Rep. 105. As to the first two grounds upon which the Board decided to revoke appellant's license, appellant makes no argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant merely states that these grounds are based upon Dr. ~enner's complaint and thus barred by the three-month limitation. This issue has already been decided and warrants no further discussion. As to the third ground upon which the decision to revoke was made, appellant argues the record is "devoid" of evidence needed to support the finding that appellant misled the Board as to work done on the Fenner project. has also been discussed. This issue As stated earlier, even though there was conflicting testimony, there still remains reliable and substantial evidence which supports the findings made. Appellant being unable to persuade this Court that there is a lack of substantial evidence on the record as to the findings made, we are unable to rule that the decision by the Board was clearly erroneous. Appellant's final argument on appeal is that the hearings examiner failed to make findings of fact as requested on issues essential to the decision. See section 2-4- 704 (2) (g), MCA. The first issue appellant claims is essential to a decision in this matter but not dealt with in the findings of fact as requested is that Dr. Fenner removed certain monumentations purposefully. The testimony of Dr. Fenner indicated that he removed certain monuments. However, he also testified that removal was done to show that the monuments had been set improperly. Dr. Fenner's testimony further indicated that monuments other than the ones removed were also set improperly or not set at all. The material issue in this case is whether or not all the monuments were set by appellant as certified. The fact that Dr. Fenner may have removed certain monumentations has a bearing on this issue. However, based on Fenner's reasons for disturbing certain monuments and his further testimony as to the discovery of other unset monuments, the finding requested by appellant is not so essential in this matter that to omit it alters the outcome of the decision or prejudices appellant's rights. A second issue claimed by appellant to be essential and ignored by the hearings examiner is that the Board was of the opinion this action was not warranted because appellant was only technically wrong in filing a certificate indicating there were monumentations when in fact there were none. Without ruling on whether this issue is essential or even supported by the evidence, we need only note that appellant failed to include such a finding in his proposed findings of fact. The finding not having been requested, this Court cannot now rely on it to overturn the Board's decision. See section 2-4-704 (2)(g), MCA. The third issue claimed to be essential but not dealt with in the findings of fact as requested is that the investigations conducted pursuant to the hearing were done improperly and that with surveying equipment the investigators would have been able to find all the monuments. We disagree with appellant's contention. Even without the use of surveying equipment, the investigators were able to testify that they discovered monumentation that was incomplete. Thus, even if all the monuments had been found, it would not have changed the outcome of the decision rendered. This.Court is unable to find that appellant's rights were prejudiced at the administrative level or by the District Court's affirmation of the Board's decision. There- fore, the judgment of the District Courcris affirmed. J Justice /p$% We concur: Chief Justice -)&&- 42. Justices
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