STATE v SORENSON

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No. 79-26 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA THE STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vsJEAN SORENSON Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District, In and for the County of Silver BOW, The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: M. F. Hennessey and Leonard J. Haxby, Butte, Montana M. F. Hennessey argued, Butte, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Chris Tweeten and Mike McGrath argued, Assistant Attorney Generals, Helena, Montana John G. Winston, County Attorney, Butte, Montana Michael Wheat argued, Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana Submitted: Filed: MQV 2 4 1980 September 16, 1980 J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. J e a n Sorenson a p p e a l s h e r c o n v i c t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of S i l v e r Bow, t h e Honora b l e Arnold Olsen p r e s i d i n g . W e affirm. On December 6 , 1978, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a n i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t , J e a n Sorenson, w i t h one c o u n t of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and one c o u n t of a g g r a v a t e d assault. On May 4 , 1979, f o r t y - f i v e d a y s p r i o r t o t r i a l , t h e S t a t e moved t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r l e a v e t o amend t h e information. The motion was g r a n t e d . The amended informa- t i o n changed t h e c h a r g e o f m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide and r e t a i n e d t h e c h a r g e of a g g r a v a t e d assault. Defendant was c o n v i c t e d of one c o u n t of d e l i b e r a t e homicide and one c o u n t o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t f o l l o w i n g a jury t r i a l . The c o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o s e r v e twenty- f o u r y e a r s ' imprisonment on t h e homicide c o u n t and t w e l v e y e a r s ' imprisonment on t h e a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t c o u n t , t h e t e r m s t o run concurrently. Defendant Sorenson owns and o p e r a t e s t h e Stockman Bar i n B u t t e , Montana. 11:45 p.m., On November 9, 1978, a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y G e r a l d L o j e s k i , Sam P e r n e l l and S t e v e n Sims e n t e r e d and o r d e r e d a round of b e e r s . Defendant r e f u s e d t o s e r v e them and o r d e r e d them t o l e a v e t h e b a r . b u t L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l d i d n o t . Sims l e f t , An argument e n s u e d , d u r i n g which d e f e n d a n t p r o c u r e d a handgun from behind t h e b a r , p o i n t e d i t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l , and f i r e d three shots. One b u l l e t s t r u c k P e r n e l l i n t h e s h o u l d e r . Another s t r u c k L o j e s k i i n t h e f a c e , k i l l i n g him i n s t a n t l y . ~ e f e n d a n t aintained she f i r e d i n self-defense. m She c l a i m e d s h e had r e f u s e d t o s e r v e L o j e s k i , P e r n e l l and Sims b e c a u s e t h e y were l o u d and b e l l i g e r e n t . According t o de- f e n d a n t , L o j e s k i became a n g r y and a s k e d i f s h e had r e f u s e d them s e r v i c e b e c a u s e P e r n e l l was a b l a c k man. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e t h r e a t e n e d t o c a l l t h e p o l i c e and t h a t L o j e s k i t h e r e u p o n t h r e a t e n e d t o " k i c k t h e s--- o u t of [her]." She t h e n moved down t h e b a r and s e c u r e d a handgun, and, p o i n t i n g i t a t L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l , o r d e r e d them t o l e a v e . A t that t i m e , Sorenson contended, t h e v i c t i m s a t t e m p t e d t o s l a p o r s t r i k e h e r , and P e r n e l l t h r e a t e n e d t o "'whup [ h e r ] a s s . ' " She t e s t i f i e d s h e was a f r a i d t h e v i c t i m s would "come o v e r t h e b a r , " s o she s t a r t e d shooting. Defendant d e n i e d h a v i n g any i n t e n t t o k i l l o r i n j u r e anyone. The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d t e s t i m o n y from t h r e e b a r t e n d e r s and a b a r p a t r o n , a l l of whom had d e a l t w i t h L o j e s k i , P e r n e l l , and Sims p r i o r t o t h e i r a r r i v a l a t t h e Stockman B a r , and a l l o f whom t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e t h r e e men had n o t been l o u d , belligerent, o r aggressive. D e f e n d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y a l s o c o n t r a s t s markedly w i t h t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h r e e e y e w i t n e s s e s . D a r r e l l Halvorson, a t r u c k d r i v e r and h i m s e l f a former b a r t e n d e r , w a s s e a t e d a t t h e b a r w i t h i n a few f e e t o f d e f e n d a n t , L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a l t e r c a t i o n between Sorenson and t h e v i c t i m s was n o t s e r i o u s , t h a t i t w a s a t y p i c a l barroom argument " w i t h a l o t of c u s s i n g and s w e a r i n g on b o t h s i d e s . " Halvorson s t a t e d t h a t L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l had been d r i n k i n g b u t d i d n o t a p p e a r t o be o v e r l y a g g r e s s i v e u n t i l Sorenson became a b u s i v e towards them. Sorenson c a l l e d P e r n e l l a " f - According t o Halvorson, ' n i g g e r c--- w a s t h e n t h a t t h e argument h e a t e d up. s ----- .I1 It Halvorson t e s t i f i e d t h a t n e i t h e r of t h e two men a t a n y ' t i m e punched o r s l a p p e d a t d e f e n d a n t ; n o r had e i t h e r e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o "come o v e r A t no t i m e , t h e bar." a c c o r d i n g t o Halvorson, d i d t h e two men p l a c e d e f e n d a n t i n d a n g e r of d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y injury. I n h i s o p i n i o n , it w a s n o t a t a l l n e c e s s a r y t o u s e a gun t o e j e c t t h e men from t h e p r e m i s e s . Two Montana Tech s t u d e n t s , Greg L a C l a i r e and P a t R o l l i n s , were s e a t e d a t t h e o p p o s i t e end of t h e b a r from Halvorson. Their testimony s u b s t a n t i a l l y corroborated h i s . LaClaire t e s t i f i e d t h a t the victims w e r e "loose" b u t n o t l o u d when t h e y e n t e r e d t h e b a r . H e s t a t e d t h a t Sorenson c a l l e d P e r n e l l " a m ----- f ----- and a c--him " t o l i c k h i s b ---- ." S ----- " and t o l d He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e a r g u - ment between Sorenson and t h e v i c t i m s n e v e r became p h y s i c a l and t h a t t h e v i c t i m s n e v e r a t t e m p t e d t o " c l i m b t h e b a r . " R o l l i n s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Sorenson s t a r t e d t h e argument, t h a t s h e used p r o f a n i t y a g a i n s t t h e v i c t i m s t h e whole t i m e t h e y were i n t h e b a r , and t h a t most o f t h e p r o f a n i t y was directed a t Pernell. H e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t n e i t h e r man t h r e a t e n e d Sorenson, and t h a t n e i t h e r "climbed t h e b a r " nor a t t e m p t e d t o s t r i k e Sorenson. R o l l i n s t e s t i f i e d , moreover, t h a t neither w a s i n a position t o s t r i k e her. Neither L o j e s k i n o r P e r n e l l had b r a n d i s h e d a weapon of any k i n d . He i d e n t i f i e d Sorenson a s t h e a g g r e s s o r i n t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n . According t o R o l l i n s , t h e argument h e a t e d up a s t h e r e s u l t of defendant's profanity. Both L a C l a i r e and R o l l i n s t e s t i f i e d t h a t Sorenson walked from t h e n o r t h end of t h e b a r , where t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e v i c t i m s t o o k p l a c e , t o t h e s o u t h end of t h e b a r , where t h e two s t u d e n t s w e r e s e a t e d , t o p r o c u r e t h e gun. Both L a C l a i r e and R o l l i n s had worked a s b a r t e n d e r s and bouncers. R o l l i n s was 6 ' 2 " t a l l and weighed 215 pounds. I n s t e a d of r e m a i n i n g a t t h e s o u t h end of t h e b a r w i t h t h e two s t u d e n t s , where s h e c e r t a i n l y would have been s a f e from any supposed danger posed by L o j e s k i and P e r n e l l , d e f e n d a n t r e t u r n e d w i t h t h e gun t o t h e n o r t h end o f t h e b a r . P e r n e l l t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant then stationed h e r s e l f d i r e c t l y i n f r o n t of him b u t f a r enough away s o t h a t he c o u l d n o t have grabbed o r s t r u c k h e r even i f he had t r i e d . P e r n e l l i n s i s t e d t h a t n e i t h e r he n o r L o j e s k i made t h e s l i g h t e s t e f f o r t t o harm d e f e n d a n t and t h a t when t h e s h o t s w e r e f i r e d , d e f e n d a n t was i n no danger of d e a t h o r s e r i o u s bodily injqry. H i s t e s t i m o n y i s c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e a b s e n c e o f blood on t h e b a r s e p a r a t i n g d e f e n d a n t from t h e v i c t i m s , a s w e l l a s by t h e t e s t i m o n y of f o r e n s i c e x p e r t Donald Reedman. Based on t h e p a t t e r n o f powder b u r n s on P e r n e l l ' s c l o t h i n g , Reedman t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was p r o b a b l y f o u r and one-half t o f i v e f e e t from t h e v i c t i m s when t h e shots w e r e fired. L a C l a i r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t , a f t e r p r o c u r i n g t h e handgun, Sorenson t o l d t h e v i c t i m s t o g e t o u t b u t t h e n " a l m o s t instantaneously" s t a r t e d shooting. Rollins t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t f i r e d no warning s h o t s f i r s t . Based on t h e i r p e r s o n a l b a r t e n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e s , Halvorson and t h e two s t u d e n t witnesses a l l t e s t i f i e d , i n essence, t h a t t h e barroom a l t e r c a t i o n posed no t h r e a t of imminent danger t o Sorenson which would make i t n e c e s s a r y f o r h e r t o d e f e n d herself. Sorenson raises t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l : 1. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o amend t h e i n f o r m a t i o n changing t h e c h a r g e of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide? 2. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n g r a n t i n g t h e S t a t e ' s motion i n l i m i n e t o e x c l u d e r e f e r e n c e t o m a r i j u a n a u s e by t h e v i c t i m s and w i t n e s s e s t w e l v e h o u r s p r i o r t o t h e s h o o t i n g ? 3. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 27 and 28 d e a l i n g w i t h t h e u s e of f o r c e i n s e l f - d e f e n s e by a n a g g r e s s o r and a n a g g r e s s o r ' s d u t y t o withdraw? 4. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t err i n r e f u s i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e f e n s e of a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e ? 5. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t ? I n h e r f i r s t a s s i g n m e n t of e r r o r d e f e n d a n t e s s e n t i a l l y a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w a s v i o l a t i v e of b o t h t h e s t a t u t o r y mandates of s e c t i o n 46-11-403, MCA, and of t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s of 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , A r t . 11, 520, and o f t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e s o f t h e s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o n s t i tutions. H e r argument h a s t h r e e p a r t s , e a c h o f which w i l l be d i s c u s s e d s e p a r a t e l y . A. S t a t u t o r y Argument. I n her o r i g i n a l b r i e f , defendant pursues mainly a s t a t u t o r y argument. She r e l i e s on t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n S t a t e v . Hallam ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 175 Mont. 492, 575 P.2d 55, t h a t amendments s u b s e q u e n t t o p l e a d i n g a r e a l l o w e d o n l y a s t o m a t t e r s of form and o n l y when no s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e defendant a r e prejudiced. She c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g a n amendment of s u b s t a n c e a f t e r s h e p l e a d e d on t h e o r i g i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . ~ e f e n d a n t ' sr e l i a n c e on Hallam i s , however, m i s p l a c e d . T h a t c a s e c o n s t r u e d t h e n u m e r i c a l p r e d e c e s s o r t o s e c t i o n 4611-403, MCA, p r i o r t o i t s amendment i n 1977. p r i o r t o 1977, s u b s e c t i o n (1) of t h e s t a t u t e p e r m i t t e d amendments of substance only p r i o r t o pleading. The 1977 amendment removed t h a t l i m i t a t i o n , a l l o w i n g s u b s t a n t i v e amendments w i t h o u t leave of the court at any time not less than five days before trial. The procedural safeguards governing substan- tive amendments of criminal informations are hereafter declared by this Court's holding in State v. Cardwell (1980), - Mont. , 609 P.2d 1230, 37 St.Rep. 750, and not by Hallam. B. Burden Shifting. In its brief in support of its motion to amend the information, the State listed, as one justification for increasing the degree of the offense charged, the fact that defendant had failed to supply the State with the names of witnesses who would justify retaining the lesser offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. As a result, defendant contends that the State has attempted to shift its burden of proving that defendant committed mitigated deliberate homicide to her. She relies on In Re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375. Defendant's argument that the State unconstitutionally shifted its burden of proving an element of mitigated deliberate homicide to her is unfounded. The burden-shifting rationale was developed by the United States Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, and In Re Winship, supra. Mullaney invali- dated a rule of Maine law that a defendant must, to reduce a homicide charge to manslaughter, bear the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted "in the heat of passion on sudden provocation." The case held that a necessary element of murder, malice, may not be presumed, thereby relieving the State of the burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court applied the same principle in winship to invalidate a New York statute providing that, for a juvenile to be found guilty of an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, the State need prove guilt only by a preponderance of the evidence. Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, does not support defendant's position. In 1977 the United States Supreme Court, distin- guishing Mullaney, held that a New York law requiring that the defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to reduce the offense to manslaughter did not violate the due process clause. Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. The Court held that a State is not required to prove the nonexistence of every fact which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. 432 U.S. at 207-209, 97 S.Ct. The due process clause does not put the states to a choice between abandoning affirmative defenses "or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction . . ." 432 U.S. at 208, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. The Patterson Court noted that Mullaney was distinguishable because the Maine law which Mullaney invalidated presumed malice, a requisite element of murder, if the defendant did not prove mitigating circumstances. at 215-216, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 286. 432 u.S. In summary, Patterson stands for the proposition that a state may require a criminal defendant to prove mitigating circumstance when this circumstance constitutes a defense rather than e s s e n t i a l elements of t h e offense. t o s e c t i o n 45-3-115, A s t h e A n n o t a t o r ' s Note MCA, p r o v i d e s : " There d o e s n o t seem t o be any f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problem i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a burden g r e a t e r than a 'reasonable doubt' s i n c e the U.S. Supreme C o u r t h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t a s t a t e need n o t a l l o w any a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s a t a l l . P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 197. And, where i t c h o o s e s t o a l l o w such d e f e n s e s , t h e S t a t e may r e g u l a t e t h e burden of p r o d u c i n g e v i d e n c e and t h e burden of p e r s u a s i o n a s l o n g a s it does n o t thereby s h i f t t o t h e defendant i t s own burden of proof a s t o e a c h of t h e e l e ments of t h e o f f e n s e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . Id. - The Supreme C o u r t h a s even h e l d t h a t an Oregon s t a t u t e , which r e q u i r e d t h e d e f e n d a n t t o p r o v e t h e d e f e n s e of i n s a n i t y beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , was n o t v i o l a t i v e of due process. Leland v . Oregon ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 343 U.S. 790." C. Cardwell Argument. A f t e r defendant f i l e d her o r i g i n a l b r i e f , t h i s Court d e c i d e d S t a t e v. Cardwell ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont. 1230, 37 St.Rep. s e c t i o n 46-11-403, 750. MCA, , 609 P.2d I n t h a t c a s e , t h i s Court held t h a t a l l o w i n g s u b s t a n t i v e amendments w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t , i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under 1972 Mont. Const., A r t . 11, 520. Furthermore, t h e Court held t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s j u d i c i a l s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e informat i o n t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u r s e o f p r o s e c u t i o n and t h a t a subs t a n t i v e change i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n may o n l y be made i n compliance w i t h c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s . 609 P.2d a t 1233. Cardwell, I n her r e p l y b r i e f , defendant contends t h a t t h e C a r d w e l l h o l d i n g a p p l i e s t o t h i s case. H e r argu- ment i s twofold. I n i t i a l l y , Sorenson c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell r u l e i s n o t a t i s s u e . She a r g u e s t h a t Cardwell a p p l i e s d i r e c t l y t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e f o r e s s e n t i a l l y t h r e e reasons: b e f o r e t h e Sorenson t r i a l ; (1) C a r d w e l l ' s t r i a l o c c u r r e d ( 2 ) t h e defendant has consis- t e n t l y contended t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s amendment of t h e informa- t i o n was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s a p p l i e d t o h e r ( s h e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e i m p e r m i s s i b l y p u t t h e burden on h e r t o j u s t i f y r e t a i n i n g t h e c h a r g e of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide o r s e e t h e c h a r g e i n c r e a s e d t o d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e ) ; and ( 3 ) d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n , a s announced by S t a t e v . Campbell ( 1 9 7 9 ) , , 597 P.2d 1146, 1149, 37 St.Rep. Mon t . 1264, a p p l i e s o n l y t o new, c o u r t - c r e a t e d r u l e s , n o t t o s t a t u t e s which have been declared unconstitutional. I n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e defendant argues t h a t i f r e t r o a c t i v i t y i s an i s s u e , then, pursuant t o t h e three-pronged t e s t of S t a t e v. Campbell, s u p r a , t h e e q u i t i e s f a v o r t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell h o l d i n g i n t h i s case. C a r d w e l l r e p r e s e n t s t h i s C o u r t ' s view t h a t l e a v e of c o u r t t o amend a n i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l f u l l y p r o t e c t t h e c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t s under 1972 Mont. C o n s t . , Art. 11, 520. Cardwell i d e n t i f i e s two i n t e r e s t s p r o t e c t e d by t h a t c o n s t i t u The f i r s t i s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e t i o n a l provision. i n f o r m a t i o n be s u p p o r t e d by p r o b a b l e c a u s e a t a l l s t a g e s of t h e proceeding. 609 P.2d a t 1233. The second i n t e r e s t i s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t , r o o t e d i n t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e , t h a t d e f e n d a n t have n o t i c e of t h e c h a r g e and a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o prepare a defense. 609 P.2d a t 1233. To p r o t e c t t h e s e i n t e r e s t s , Cardwell e s t a b l i s h e s t h r e e procedural safeguards t h a t must be complied w i t h b e f o r e a s u b s t a n t i v e amendment t o an information i s allowed: (1) t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n must b e approved by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ; ( 2 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t must have a d e q u a t e n o t i c e of t h e c h a r g e and a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e p a r e f o r t r i a l ; and ( 3 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t " s h o u l d " be r e a r r a i g n e d on t h e new c h a r g e . 609 P.2d a t 1233. The r e c o r d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e shows t h a t t h e s e t h r e e p r o c e d u r a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s t o s u b s t a n t i v e amendments of i n f o r ma t i o n s have been m e t : (1) Here, a l t h o u g h s e c t i o n 46-11-403 ( I ) , MCA, d i d n o t f a c i a l l y r e q u i r e i t , t h e p r o s e c u t i o n s o u g h t and r e c e i v e d l e a v e of t h e t r i a l c o u r t b e f o r e i t f i l e d t h e amended i n f o r On May 4 , 1979, t h e S t a t e f i l e d a motion t o amend mation. t h e i n f o r m a t i o n accompanied by a b r i e f i n s u p p o r t of t h e motion. A h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h e motion on May 11, 1979, a t which d e f e n d a n t was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . By i t s o r d e r o f May 2 5 , 1979, t h e t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e motion t o amend. ( 2 ) Defendant c l e a r l y had a d e q u a t e n o t i c e and a d e q u a t e t i m e t o prepare her defense. The motion t o amend was f i l e d on May 4 , 1979, some f o r t y - f i v e d a y s p r i o r t o t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t r i a l on J u n e 18, 1979. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e amended i n f o r - m a t i o n d i d n o t change t h e s u b s t a n t i v e e l e m e n t s of t h e The S t a t e h a s t h e burden of p r o v i n g t h e s a m e ele- charge. ments under b o t h m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide and d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The amended i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t i n u e d t o a l l e g e t h a t d e f e n d a n t p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly k i l l e d G e r a l d L o j e s k i . Defendant h a s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d how any of h e r s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s were p r e j u d i c e d ; n o r h a s d e f e n d a n t e x p l a i n e d how s h e was u n f a i r l y s u r p r i s e d o r r e n d e r e d i n c a p a b l e of p r e p a r i n g a d e f e n s e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s l e a v e t o amend t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . S e e S t a t e v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 1050. 501, 505, 507 ~ . 2 d I f d e f e n d a n t f e l t s h e had a n i n a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e p a r e a n a d e q u a t e d e f e n s e , s h e c o u l d have r e q u e s t e d a continuance. ( 3 ) A m i n u t e e n t r y of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d a t e d J u n e 11, 1979, c l e a r l y shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t was r e a r r a i g n e d under t h e amended i n £orma t i o n . Because t h e l e a v e of c o u r t w a s g r a n t e d , t h e p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s of Cardwell w e r e s u b s t a n t i a l l y complied w i t h and d e f e n d a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d by t h e e x i s t e n c e of a p r o c e d u r a l s t a t u t e which was l a t e r r u l e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Since s h e was n o t i n j u r e d by t h e s t a t u t e , d e f e n d a n t h a s no s t a n d i n g t o a r g u e f o r t h e r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Cardwell rule. W e f i n d no m e r i t i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t a s s i g n m e n t of error. I n h e r second i s s u e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n p r o h i b i t i n g t h e d e f e n s e from r e f e r r i n g t o t h e u s e of m a r i j u a n a by P e r n e l l , Sims, and L o j e s k i w h i l e e n r o u t e t o B u t t e by bus a t a r e s t s t o p i n I d a h o , some t w e l v e hours before t h e shooting. D e f e n d a n t ' s arguments a r e l a r g e l y s p e c u l a t i v e and c o n c l u s o r y . Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t t h e e x c l u d e d e v i d e n c e i s "ext r e m e l y r e l e v a n t " t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e fundamental t e s t i monial c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e S t a t e ' s two p r i m a r y w i t n e s s e s , P e r n e l l and Sims. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t much of t h e t e s t i - mony t h a t t h e s e men gave a t t r i a l r e l a t e d t o e v e n t s t a k i n g p l a c e on t h e bus t o B u t t e w h i l e t h e y were " u n d e n i a b l y " under t h e i n f l u e n c e of b o t h a l c o h o l and m a r i j u a n a , which c o u l d have c o l o r e d t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of t h o s e e v e n t s . Defendant i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s i s an "obvious d e f e c t " i n t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y t h a t s h o u l d have been b r o u g h t t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e jury. Defendant a l s o s p e c u l a t e s t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s c o u l d have a g a i n used d r u g s a f t e r t h e i r a r r i v a l i n B u t t e and c o u l d have been i n a "drug-induced s t u p o r " when t h e y e n t e r e d t h e Stockman Bar. Defendant also implies that the excluded evidence was relevant to the "central issue" of her case, presumably her theory of self-defense. This contention seems to be premised on an assumption that the smoking of marijuana would be likely to produce aggressive tendencies. The District Court excluded any mention of the use of marijuana by Pernell, Sims and Lojeski twelve hours before the shooting on the grounds of remoteness. In State v. Gleim (1895), 17 Mont. 17, 31, 41 P. 998, this Court stated that the mere use of narcotics is not admissible to impeach witness credibility "unless it is proposed to show that the witness was under the influence of the drugs at the time the events happened about which she testified." Defendant has laid no foundation tending to show that the witnesses were under the influence of drugs at the time of the events in question. She merely assumes that they were and that their behavior was adversely affected. Defendant has, therefore, failed to make the requisite showing under Gleim. Evidence that a witness was intoxicated is admissible on cross-examination to impeach the witness's ability to accurately perceive the events about which he has testified. )a-efzi3 2ss=mq V. Sandberg (1918), 54 Mont. 538, 540, 172 P. 132, 133; State v. Trueman (1906), 34 Mont. 249, 252, 85 P. 1024, 1025. Evolving a satisfactory rule for cases in which the witness uses drugs is considerably more difficult, however. Although the psychological effects of alcohol usage are far from clear, much less is known about the effect of drugs. The multiplicity of drugs and the varying reactions they cause have compounded the difficulties. Only a minority of state courts has adopted a blanket rule of admissibility. Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 742, 743; see also Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957). Those courts allow evidence of drug usage,without requiring proof that the witness's testimentary capacities were impaired, usually on the theory that a user of drugs is a liar. That is, how- ever, a theory of impeachment which seemingly rests more on the witness's character than on his mental capacity. Such a theory would now be governed by Rule 608, Mont.R.Evid. The majority of state courts has adopted the sounder rule that evidence of drug usage is not permitted "unless it can also be proved that the use of narcotics has impaired the sensory, zetentive, or communicative f eht*% witness." Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 742, 743. The federal courts, operating under the Federal Rules of Evidence upon which Montana's rules are based, have endorsed a variety of approaches. See generally, 3 Wein- stein's Evidence, §607[04] (1978). There does not seem to be a clear consensus in the federal system. State v. Gleim, supra, indicates that Montana has endorsed the majority rule requiring a showing that drug usage has impaired the witness's facilities before evidence of the witness's use of the drug is admissible. Implicit in the formulation of the rule in Gleim (drug use is inadmissible unless it is shown that the witness was under the influence of drugs - - - - the events about which at the time he testifies occurred) is a recognition of the concept of remoteness. Here, the trial judge ruled that the smoking of marijuana was too remote in time to be admitted. The ques- tion of remoteness is directed to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Fitzpatrick (1980) - Mont. , 1 606 P.2d 1343, 1355, 37 St.Rep. 194; State v. Satterfield (1943), 114 Mont. 122, 127, 132 P.2d 372. While remoteness is a matter that generally goes to the credibility of the evidence rather than to its admissibility, Satterfield, supra, evidence can be excluded if it is so remote that it has no evidentiary value. Satterfield, supra; State v. Pemberton (1909), 39 Mont. 530, 535, 104 P. 556. Given defendant's failure to lay a proper foundation that the witnesses were under the influence of drugs at the time of the material events in this case, exclusion of the evidence was justified both under the Gleim rule and under the remoteness doctrine. The District Court did not err in granting the State's motion in limine. Defendant next urges that the trial court erred in giving the following instructions dealing with an aggressor's use of force in self-defense and an aggressor's duty to withdraw. Instruction No. 27, to which defendant objects, reads: "You are instructed that the use of force in defense of a person is not available to a person who purposely or knowingly provokes the use of force against himself unless such force is so great that he reasonably believes that he has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use of force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to the assailant." Defendant also objects to Instruction No. 28: "You are instructed that the use of force in defense of person is not available to a person who purposely or knowingly provokes the use of force against himself unless in good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force." Defendant p r e s e n t s e s s e n t i a l l y a two-pronged argument. F i r s t , t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o j u s t i f y giving I n s t r u c t i o n Nos, 27 and 28. Defendant p o i n t s s e l e c t i v e l y t o e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d which, s t a n d i n g a l o n e , s u p p o r t s h e r c o n t e n t i o n t h a t s h e was n o t t h e a g g r e s s o r . t h e f a c t t h a t s h e i s a 71-year-old woman. She emphasizes She c o n t e n d s t h a t s h e was s u d d e n l y c o n f r o n t e d by t h r e e drunk men i n h e r b u s i ness. When s h e r e f u s e d t o s e r v e them a l c o h o l , a s s h e w a s l e g a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o do under s e c t i o n 1 6 - 3 - 3 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA, s h e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e men s u b j e c t e d h e r t o t h r e a t s of p h y s i c a l violence. Second, d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e a b s t r a c t and i n c o m p l e t e s t a t e m e n t s of t h e law. Defen- d a n t a r g u e s t h a t a p e r s o n must have t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t of becoming a n a g g r e s s o r b e f o r e he o r s h e may be d e p r i v e d of t h e r i g h t of s e l f - d e f e n s e on t h e ground of p r o v o c a t i o n . S e c t i o n 45-3-105(2), MCA, p r o v i d e s t h a t s e l f - d e f e n s e is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a p e r s o n who: " ( 2 ) p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly provokes t h e u s e of force against himself, unless: " ( a ) s u c h f o r c e i s s o g r e a t t h a t he r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t h e i s i n imminent d a n g e r of d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm and t h a t he h a s e x h a u s t e d e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e means t o e s c a p e such danger o t h e r t h a n t h e u s e of f o r c e which i s l i k e l y t o c a u s e d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm t o t h e a s sailant; or " ( b ) i n good f a i t h , he withdraws from p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t w i t h t h e a s s a i l a n t and i n d i c a t e s c l e a r l y t o t h e a s s a i l a n t t h a t he d e s i r e s t o withdraw and t e r m i n a t e t h e u s e o f f o r c e b u t t h e a s s a i l a n t c o n t i n u e s o r resumes t h e u s e of f o r c e . " I n S t a t e v. Buckley ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 238, 2 4 2 , 557 P.2d 283, t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t " t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s must c o v e r e v e r y i s s u e o r t h e o r y h a v i n g s u p p o r t i n t h e e v i d e n c e , and t h e i n q u i r y of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t must o n l y be any whether o r n o t - e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d t o w a r r a n t an i n s t r u c t i o n . . ." S u f f i c i e n t evidence i s c l e a r l y p r e s e n t i n t h e record t o support t h e S t a t e ' s theory t h a t defendant was t h e a g g r e s s o r i n h e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e v i c t i m s . The e v i d e n c e j u s t i f i e s g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 27 and 28. A p e r s o n c a n become a n a g g r e s s o r i f h e o r s h e p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly provokes t h e v i c t i m v e r b a l l y . The j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l s t a t e i n b o t h I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 27 and 28. A s h e r f o u r t h i s s u e , Sorenson u r g e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g h e r p r o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s concerni n g t h e defense of an occupied s t r u c t u r e . S e c t i o n 45-3-103, MCA, d e f i n e s t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e i n d e f e n s e of a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e : "A p e r s o n i s j u s t i f i e d i n t h e u s e of f o r c e o r t h r e a t t o u s e f o r c e a g a i n s t a n o t h e r when and t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he reasonably b e l i e v e s t h a t s u c h c o n d u c t i s n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t o r term i n a t e such o t h e r ' s u n l a w f u l e n t r y i n t o o r a t t a c k upon a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e . However, h e i s j u s t i f i e d i n t h e u s e of f o r c e l i k e l y t o c a u s e d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm o n l y i f : " (1) t h e e n t r y i s made o r a t t e m p t e d i n v i o l e n t , r i o t o u s , o r tumultuous manner and h e r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t such f o r c e i s necessary t o p r e v e n t an a s s a u l t upon o r o f f e r of p e r s o n a l v i o l e n c e t o him o r a n o t h e r t h e n i n t h e occupied structure; o r " ( 2 ) h e r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t such f o r c e i s n e c e s s a r y t o p r e v e n t t h e c o m i s s i o n of a f o r c i b l e felony i n t h e occupied s t r u c t u r e . " T h i s s e c t i o n i s d e r i v e d from I l l i n o i s which h a s s u b s t a n - t i a l l y t h e same s t a t u t e . I l l . C.C. 1961, T i t l e 38, S7-2. B e f o r e t h e s t a t u t e i s a p p l i c a b l e , I l l i n o i s c a s e law r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e e n t r y must be u n l a w f u l ; hence, t h e d e f e n d a n t may n o t a s s e r t j u s t i f i c a t i o n where t h e v i c t i m s e n t e r upon t h e p r e m i s e s l a w f u l l y b u t s u b s e q u e n t l y engages i n u n l a w f u l c o n d u c t f o r which t h e o c c u p a n t of t h e d w e l l i n g seeks t o expel the victim. P e o p l e v . Chapman ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 4 9 Ill.App.3d 553, 364 N.E.2d I l l . ~ p p , 3 d 757, 312 N.E.2d 577; P e o p l e v . Brown ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 9 789; s e e g e n e r a l l y , A n n o t a t o r ' s Note, Montana C r i m i n a l Code Annotated 131-132 (rev. 1980). S o r e n s o n ' s c l a i m i s t h a t once s h e had o r d e r e d t h e s e c u s t o m e r s o u t o f h e r b a r , and t h e y r e f u s e d t o go, t h e n t h e i r c o n t i n u e d p r e s e n c e i n t h e b a r became a n u n l a w f u l e n t r y i n t o an occupied s t r u c t u r e . Based on t h a t s y l l o g i s m , s h e main- t a i n s s h e was e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s b a s e d on s e c t i o n 453-103, MCA. By i t s t e r m s , t h i s s e c t i o n o n l y a p p l i e s t o e f f o r t s of a d e f e n d a n t t o p r e v e n t o r t e r m i n a t e an u n l a w f u l e n t r y i n t o occupied premises. i n t o premises. I t h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n t o a l a w f u l e n t r y On t h e e v i d e n c e h e r e , w i t h o u t d o u b t , t h e s h o o t i n g d i d n o t o c c u r w h i l e Sorenson was a t t e m p t i n g t o prevent o r terminate an e n t r y i n t o her premises. N error o o c c u r r e d when t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e f u s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s based upon t h i s s e c t i o n . N a u t h o r i t y h a s been found and none was c i t e d by o d e f e n d a n t t h a t a " t u m u l t u o u s e n t r y " i n t o a t a v e r n makes t h e e n t r y unlawful. The t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d d e f e n - d a n t ' s p r o f e r r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s on d e f e n s e of a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e s i n c e t h e r e w a s no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e e n t r y was u n l a w f u l o r a n a t t a c k upon t h e s t r u c t u r e , F i n a l l y , Sorenson c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e . lous. The c o n t e n t i o n i s f r i v o - Defendant merely a s s e r t s i n a c o n c l u s o r y f a s h i o n t h a t t h e c a u s e of t h e s h o o t i n g w a s t h e v i c t i m s ' i n s i s t e n c e on b e i n g s e r v e d l i q u o r , t h a t t h e s h o o t i n g of t h e v i c t i m s was e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d even when t h e e v i d e n c e i s viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e S t a t e , and t h a t s h e was under e x t r e m e s t r e s s which m i t i g a t e d t h e crime. The jury is not bound to blindly accept defendant's version of the facts. It is free to pick and choose the evidence it wishes to believe. Mont. , State v. Seitzinger (1979), 589 P.2d 655, 658, 36 St.Rep. 122, 125; State v. Fitzpatrick (1973), 163 Mont. 220, 226, 516 P.2d 605. The jury chose to believe the State's witnesses, not Sorenson. The verdict is supported by sufficient evidence. Af f irmed . 1 We concur: 4 A A d @&&&$7 Chief Justice Justices ~igtrict Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Justice Daniel Shea.

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