STATE v CARDWELL

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No. 14825 I N THE SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA F H F 1979 T E STATE O MONTANA, H F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, VS . CURTIS CARDWELL, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable W. W. L e s s l e y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: A. M i c h a e l S a l v a g n i a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana F o r Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Donald White, County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana Michael J. L i l l y a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana Submitted: '+,-LC,:, 3, Filed: -. O c t o b e r 31, 1979 ~ e c i d e d : A P R2 ? 1980 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. On December 8, 1978, the Honorable W. W. Lessley granted the Gallatin County attorney leave to file an information accusing appellant, Curtis Cardwell, of committing the offenses of aggravated assault, tampering with witnesses, and aggravated kidnapping. Cardwell pleaded not guilty to all three counts, and trial was set for January 26, 1979. On January 17, 1979, the State filed an amended information without leave of court pursuant to section 46-11403(1), MCA. The amended information changed the nature of the aggravated assault charge against Cardwell by adding the allegation that he committed the crime by threatening Jeff Sawyer with serious bodily injury by the use of a knife. The amendments to the original information further altered the information by charging Cardwell with aiding or abetting another in committing the offense of tampering with witnesses rather than actually committing the crime as charged in the original information. The amended information also eliminated the aggravated kidnapping charge. Cardwell moved to dismiss the amended information alleging that the filing of an amended information without leave of court was cnconstitutional, that Count I was duplicitous, and that Count I1 had been filed without the showing of probable cause. The District Court denied the motion, and Cardwell was tried on the information on January 29 and 30, 1979. A jury found Cardwell guilty of both offenses charged in the amended information. This appeal followed. The thrust of appellant's argument on appeal centers around a challenge to section 46-11-403(1), MCA. That statute permits an information to be amended once as to s u b s t a n c e p r i o r t o t r i a l w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t . Appellant c o n t e n d s t h a t a l l o w i n g s u b s t a n t i v e changes i n a n i n f o r m a t i o n without j u d i c i a l examination i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Appellant r a i s e s h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e t o s e c t i o n 46-11-403(1), MCA, under A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . That c o n s t i t u t i o n provision s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "All criminal a c t i o n s i n d i s t r i c t court, except t h o s e on a p p e a l , s h a l l be p r o s e c u t e d e i t h e r by i n f o r m a t i o n , a f t e r e x a m i n a t i o n and commitment by a m a g i s t r a t e o r a f t e r l e a v e g r a n t e d by t h e c o u r t , o r by i n d i c t m e n t w i t h o u t s u c h e x a m i n a t i o n , commitment, o r l e a v e . " Reading t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n b r o a d l y , a l l s t a g e s o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n f i l i n g p r o c e s s i n c l u d i n g amendments r e q u i r e j u d i c i a l e x a m i n a t i o n . t i o n of t h e p r o v i s i o n , Under t h i s i n t e r p r e t a - s e c t i o n 46-11-403(1) conflicts with t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n by a l l o w i n g a n i n f o r m a t i o n t o be amended without leave of court. A s s u c h , t h e s t a t u t e would be v o i d . I f , however, A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, i s c o n s t r u e d more narrowly t o apply only t o t h e i n i t i a t i o n of c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s , l e g i s l a t i v e c o n t r o l of subsequent s t a g e s of t h e information p r o c e s s would b e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . Construing t h e provision i n t h i s f a s h i o n would a l l o w t h e amendment w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t s t a t u t e t o stand. To d e t e r m i n e t h e meaning of A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , w e must employ t h e same r u l e s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n employed t o c o n s t r u e s t a t u t e s . ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. K e l l e r v . Smith 399, 404, 553 P.2d 1002, 1006. The i n t e n t of t h e f r a m e r s o f a c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i s i o n c o n t r o l s i t s meaning. Keller, 170 Mont. a t 405, 553 P.2d a t 1006. The i n t e n t of t h e f r a m e r s s h o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used. I f t h a t i s possible, we a p p l y no o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . a t 405, 553 P . 2d a t 1006. Keller, 170 Mont. The q u e s t i o n now becomes whether t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i s i o n i s ambiguous. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t S e c t i o n 20 of A r t i c l e I1 i s ambiguous. I t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e key word i n t h e provision i s "prosecuted." The S t a t e asserts t h a t p r o s e c u t e d c a n mean e i t h e r i n s t i t u t e o r i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y forward. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t i n t e r c h a n g i n g t h e s e two meanings of t h e t e r m r e s u l t s i n d i f f e r e n t consequences i n I f p r o s e c u t e d i s t a k e n t o mean i n s t i t u t e , A r t i - t h i s case. c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, a p p l i e s o n l y t o t h e commencing of c r i m i nal actions. S e c t i o n 46-11-403(1), MCA, which a p p l i e s t o amendments made a f t e r a n a c t i o n b e g i n s , would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h i s a n a l y s i s . The second u s a g e of t h e t e r m , i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y f o r w a r d , would make t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n provision applicable t o a l l s t e p s i n the information f i l i n g p r o c e s s i n c l u d i n g t h e f i l i n g o f amendments. S e c t i o n 46-11- 4 0 3 ( 1 ) would be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p r o s e c u t e a s i t a l l o w s amendments w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision. Given t h i s a m b i g u i t y , t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s we must l o o k t o o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t i n g A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, t o d e t e r m i n e i t s meaning. W e do n o t f i n d i t n e c e s s a r y t o do s o b e c a u s e w e a r e n o t p e r s u a d e d by t h e S t a t e ' s argument t h a t t h e t e r m " p r o s e c u t e d " i s ambiguous. The t e r m s " p r o s e c u t e " and " p r o s e c u t i o n " have l o n g been d e f i n e d i n t h e j u d i c i a l setting. A s l o n g ago a s 1821, Chief J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l s a i d , "To commence a s u i t , i s t o demand something by t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of p r o c e s s i n a c o u r t o f j u s t i c e ; and t o p r o s e c u t e t h e s u i t , i s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e common a c c e p t a t i o n of l a n g u a g e , t o c o n t i n u e t h a t demand." U.S. 264, 408, 5 L.Ed. Cohens v . ~ i r g i n i a( 1 8 2 1 ) , 1 9 257, 292, 6 Wheat. 264. S i n c e Cohens, numerous o t h e r c o u r t s have a l s o d e f i n e d p r o s e c u t e o r p r o s e - c u t i o n t o mean i n s t i t u t e and c a r r y f o r w a r d . For example, t h e V i r g i n i a Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d : " I n common and o r d i n a r y a c c e p t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n g i v e n by l e x i c o g r a p h e r s , and a u t h o r i t i e s g e n e r a l l y , t h e word ' p r o s e c u t i o n ' means t h e i n s t i t u t i o n and c a r r y i n g on of a s u i t o r p r o c e e d i n g t o o b t a i n o r e n f o r w some r i g h t o r t h e p r o c e s s of t r y i n g f o r m a l c h a r g e s a g a i n s t an offender before a l e g a l tribunal. " I n c r i m i n a l law, i t i s t h e means a d o p t e d t o b r i n g a supposed c r i m i n a l t o j u s t i c e and punishment by due c o u r s e o f law, and c o n s i s t s of a series o f p r o c e e d i n g s from t h e t i m e f o r m a l acc u s a t i o n i s made by swearing o u t a w a r r a n t , t h e f i n d i n g of a n i n d i c t m e n t o r i n f o r m a t i o n i n a c r i m i n a l c o u r t , t h e t r i a l , and f i n a l judgment. [ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] " Sigmon v. Commonwealth ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 2 0 0 Va. 258, 1 0 5 S.E.2d 1 7 1 , 178. See a l s o : F l o r i d a e x r e l . Shevin v . Exxon Corp. (5th C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) , 526 F.2d 266, 270, f o o t n o t e 1 6 , c e r t . d e n i e d 429 U.S. 829; Commonwealth v. F a t t i z z o ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 223 Pa.Super. 378, 299 A.2d 22, 28, f o o t n o t e s 15-16; S t a t e v . Harvey ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706, 717; Thacker v . M a r s h a l l (Okla. 1 9 5 8 ) , 331 P.2d 488, 492, f o o t n o t e 4 ; S t a t e v . Shushan ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 206 La. 415, 1 9 So.2d 185, 192; S t a t e v. Bowles (1905) , 70 Kan. 821, 79 P. 726, 728. I n Montana w e have n o t y e t been s o e x p l i c i t i n a d o p t i n g a d e f i n i t i o n of " p r o s e c u t i o n " o r " p r o s e c u t e . " However, w e d i d speak t o t h e i s s u e i n Rosebud County v . F l i n n (1940) , 109 Mont. 537, 98 P.2d 330. There, w e h e l d t h a t w h i l e t h e term p r o s e c u t i o n was n o t broad enough t o encompass i n v e s t i g a t i o n before f i l i n g a complaint o r information, t h e t e r m was b r o a d enough t o t a k e i n t h e t r i a l and o t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s previous t o t r i a l . 109 Mont. a t 541-42, 98 P.2d a t 333-34. Although Rosebud County d o e s n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e which p a r t s o f t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f a c r i m i n a l a c t i o n are i n c l u d e d i n t h e " p r o s e c u t i o n " of t h e a c t i o n , t h e broad l a n g u a g e used t o d e f i n e p r o s e c u t i o n i n d i c a t e s Montana i n t e n d e d t o a d o p t t h e g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n o f p r o s e c u t i o n t h a t would i n c l u d e amendments t o a c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n . The above a n a l y s i s i l l u s t r a t e s t h e c l e a r and unambiguo u s meaning of A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 20, 1972 Montana C o n s t i tution. A l l criminal actions prosecuted--initiated c a r r i e d forward--by and i n f o r m a t i o n must be examined and com- m i t t e d by a m a g i s t r a t e o r must be c a r r i e d forward a f t e r l e a v e g r a n t e d by t h e c o u r t . Thus, a l l s t a g e s of p r o c e e d i n g by i n f o r m a t i o n i n c l u d i n g amendments t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n must b e reviewed by t h e c o u r t . Any s t a t u t e t h a t a l l o w s f o r amendments w i t h o u t l e a v e o f c o u r t c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h i s cons t i t u t i o n p r o v i s i o n and must f a l l . S e c t i o n 46-11-403(1) a l l o w s f o r amendment of c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n s w i t h o u t j u d i c i a l supervision. The s t a t u t e , t h e r e f o r e , c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and must be d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d . W e now s o hold. I n d e c l a r i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i v e amendment w i t h o u t l e a v e of c o u r t s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , w e do n o t i n t e n d t o t o t a l l y p r e c l u d e s u b s t a n t i v e amendments t o c r i m i n a l i n f o r m a t i o n s . I t h a s l o n g been h e l d t h a t a n i n f o r m a t i o n c a n be amended b o t h a s t o form and s u b s t a n c e . Pa. 1 9 5 2 ) , 107 F.Supp. 839. U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Smith (D.C. On amendment of a n i n f o r m a t i o n , however, c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s must b e imposed. The above d i s c u s s i o n i n d i c a t e s amendments of s u b s t a n c e c a n o n l y be f i l e d w i t h l e a v e of c o u r t . This safeguard i s necessary n o t o n l y t o comply w i t h Montana' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e ments, b u t a l s o t o e n s u r e a d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e s a n e u t r a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r d e t e n t i o n under t h e amended c h a r g e s . 95 S.Ct. See G e r s t e i n v . Pugh ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 420 U.S. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54. 103, Another p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d involves n o t i c e t o t h e defendant. One f u n c t i o n of a n i n f o r - mation is to notify a defendant of the offense charged, thereby giving the defendant an opportunity to defend. State v. ~ r o p f(1975), 166 Mont. 79, 88, 530 P.2d 1158, 1163; State v. Heiser (1965), 146 Mont. 413, 416, 407 P.2d 370, 371. This function of the information cannot be dis- pensed with when the information is amended as to substance. The defendant must be notified of the change and afforded a reasonable time after the amendment to prepare a defense. Further, when an amended information is filed substantively changing the charges against a defendant, the defendant should be arraigned under the new charges. State v. Butler (19691, 9 Ariz.App. 162, 450 P.2d 128, 131; Hanley v. Zenoff (19651, 81 Nev. 9, 398 P.2d 241, 242. See also, State v. DeWolfe (1904), 29 Mont. 415, 417-19, 74 P. 1084, 1085. We see no bar to substantively amending criminal informations if these procedures are followed. Having found the amendment without leave of court statute unconstitutional, we are constrained to dismiss the amended information filed here. Section 46-11-403(1) being uncon- stitutional, the amended information should have been dismissed by the District Court on the original motion by Cardwell, and he should not have proceeded to trial on the charges in the amended information. Since the District Court failed to dismiss the amended information, we must do so now. However, in ordering the dismissal of the amended information, we do not mean to preclude the State from refiling charges against Cardwell with proper judicial supervision. We see no merit to Cardwell's argument that the State did not have probable cause to file any charges against him and are reversing this conviction based solely on the ~istrict Court's improper ruling on the constitutional claim. The cause is reversed and the amended information against defendant ordered dismissed. We concur: afid &&t#q 4 Chief ~ u s t i c e , ? e. w. 0 Justices

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