STATE v DAHL

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No. 80-117 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1980 STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vsWILLIAM S . DAHL, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e , The H o n o r a b l e William J. Speare, Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: M i c h a e l J . Whalen, B i l l i n g s , Montana F o r Respondent : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana H a r o l d I I a n s e r , County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : Filed: J u l y 11, 1980 Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the D e f e n d a n t W i l l i a m Dahl a p p e a l s from a judgment o f the Court. Y e l l o w s t o n e County D i s t r i c t C o u r t , e n t e r e d f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l , c o n v i c t i n g him o f r o b b e r y . H e a l s o a p p e a l s from t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r d e s i g n a t i n g him a s a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r for purposes conviction but of parole remand eligibility. for W e redetermination of affirm the status for parole eligibility. Defendant r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s . order of relating the trial court He f i r s t challenges the refusing t o p r e t r i a l photographic to suppress line-up evidence procedures. He next c h a l l e n g e s t h e r e f u s a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t "mere p r e s e n c e a t o r a b o u t t h e s c e n e where a c r i m e i s c o m m i t t e d d o e s n o t make o n e a p a r t y t o t h e c r i m e . " L a s t , he c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n c o n c l u d i n g that section 46-18-404, MCA, required defendant t o be c l a s s i f i e d a s a dangerous offender f o r p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . The r o b b e r y c h a r g e stems f r o m a r o b b e r y o f a B i l l i n g s Superamerica gas s t a t i o n and evening of 30, waited August until all the 1979. convenience Two men customers a p p r o a c h e d t h e c l e r k , R o b e r t Heimer from t h e c a s h r e g i s t e r . the defendant, entered were , store gone, on the the store, and then and demanded t h e money One o f t h e men, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s g r a b b e d him by h i s s h i r t c o l l a r , p u l l e d him t o t h e c o u n t e r , and p u t t i n g a k n i f e t o h i s t h r o a t , t o l d him t o h u r r y up. held W h i l e t h e c l e r k g a t h e r e d t h e money, him w i t h a k n i f e to the clerk's throat. t h e man The c l e r k p l a c e d t h e money i n a s a c k and g a v e i t t o one o f t h e men. The men a l s o t o o k a c a s h d r a w e r and t h e n f l e d . The clerk immediately reported the robbery to the p o l i c e and gave them a d e s c r i p t i o n o f d e s c r i p t i o n s f i t t i n g t h a t of saw t h e men flee the t h e men--one the defendant. s t o r e and g e t of the Two w i t n e s s e s into a car, and they r e l a y e d t h e c a r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n t o t h e c l e r k who i n t u r n g a v e the description t o the police. A few m i n u t e s later, the p o l i c e n o t i c e d a v e h i c l e n e a r t h e S u p e r a m e r i c a s t o r e which matched t h e d e s c r i p t i o n g i v e n t o t h e m , and t h e y g a v e c h a s e . They f o l l o w e d t h e v e h i c l e f o r a s h o r t d i s t a n c e b e f o r e the vehicle was driven into o c c u p a n t s f l e e i n g on f o o t . Sometime l a t e r , under an alley and abandoned, the The p o l i c e g a v e c h a s e on f o o t . another o f f i c e r found the defendant hiding a n e a r b y c a r and a r r e s t e d him. The c a s h d r a w e r and money s t o l e n from S u p e r a m e r i c a w e r e f o u n d n e a r t h e a b a n d o n e d c a r , and p o l i c e a l s o f o u n d n e a r b y a p a p e r bag s i m i l a r t o t h e ones used at fingerprint. Superamerica--bearing Later that evening, the while defendant's at the police s t a t i o n , o n e of t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s i d e n t i f i e d d e f e n d a n t a s being the driver of the car to which the officers gave chase. The identification was a r r e s t e d . make a began after the defendant H e was t a k e n t o t h e S u p e r a m e r i c a s t a t i o n i n t h e back s e a t o f then process a police car. positive The s t o r e c l e r k c o u l d n o t identification of the suspect, a p p a r e n t l y d u e t o p o o r l i g h t i n g i n t h e c a r and s t a t i o n a r e a , and b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t was s l o u c h e d o v e r and e x p o s e d o n l y h i s profile. But the store clerk went down to the police s t a t i o n l a t e r on t h e same e v e n i n g and g a v e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e man who t h r e a t e n e d him w i t h t h e k n i f e , which d e s c r i p t i o n v e r y c l o s e l y matched d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t u a l a p p e a r a n c e . He a l s o s t a t e d t o the police while giving the description, t h a t he was f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t t h e man b r o u g h t t o t h e S u p e r a m e r i c a s t a t i o n e a r l i e r t h a t n i g h t had b e e n o n e o f t h e r o b b e r s . The n e x t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s t o o k p l a c e some e i g h t days after custody, the robbery, after the d e f e n d a n t had and a f t e r c o u n s e l had b e e n a p p o i n t e d . been in The s t o r e c l e r k came t o t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n t o l o o k a t a p h o t o g r a p h i c line-up f o r p u r p o s e s of identification. The p o l i c e showed him s i x p h o t o g r a p h s o f p e r s o n s r e s e m b l i n g t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e man he had p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n t o t h e p o l i c e , and t h e c l e r k i m m e d i a t e l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t a s t h a t man. i n c u s t o d y a t t h e time b u t was photographic line-up. was Defendant not present for this D e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l was n o t p r e s e n t . D e f e n d a n t moved t o s u p p r e s s t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and t h u s p r e v e n t t h e r o b b e r y v i c t i m f r o m t e s t i f y i n g i n c o u r t that he had identified defendant through a photographic l i n e - u p p r e s e n t e d t o him by t h e p o l i c e . Both the robbery victim arranged the photographic and the line-up, police officer testified that who the p h o t o g r a p h s showed b o t h a f u l l f a c e v i e w and a p r o f i l e v i e w of the however, subjects involved. The p o l i c e o f f i c e r t h a t he a l s o p o s s e s s e d a P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e of d e f e n d a n t showing o n l y a f a c e v i e w . possible picture that the robbery b e f o r e h e made graphic line-up, was s o . testified, victim the H e a g r e e d t h a t i t was had seen the Polaroid t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from t h e photo- b u t s t a t e d h e had no knowledge t h a t t h i s D e f e n s e c o u n s e l a t no t i m e a s k e d t h e r o b b e r y v i c t i m i f he had been shown t h e P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e b e f o r e making t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n from t h e p h o t o g r a p h i c l i n e - u p . Defendant's contentions that motion to suppress t h e robbery v i c t i m ' s was based ability to on the identify him a s t h e man who h e l d t h e k n i f e t o h i s t h r o a t was t a i n t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t h e had s e e n t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e r o b b e r y when h e was i n p o l i c e c u s t o d y , and t h a t t h e r o b b e r y v i c t i m may h a v e s e e n t h e P o l a r o i d p i c t u r e b e f o r e making t h e photographic line-up identification. The trial court denied this motion to suppress, and defendant now urges this as his first appeal contention. At trial the robbery victim positively identified defendant as the man who had held the knife to his throat. Defendant testified in his own behalf and admitted that he was at the Superamerica station in his automobile when the robbery occurred, but denied that he was directly involved. His story is that he was giving two friends a ride in his car, and one of them asked him to stop at the Superamerica store to get some beer. He states he did not know of any plans for a robbery, or of any robbery, until his friends returned to his car. He claims his friends committed the crime without his knowledge. The jury convicted defendant of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison, also designating him, pursuant to section 46-18-404, MCA, as a dangerous offender for purposes of parole eligibility. Defendant contends that the pretrial photographic identification process was so suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification. He also argues that his right to counsel was denied him because counsel was not present at the photographic line-up session. The touchstone of a denial of due process emanating from a photographic identification process is whether the process was likelihood (19801, so suggestive as to present of misidentification." Mont. , State 615 P.2d "substantial v. Pendergrass 201, 37 St.Rep. Manson v. Brathwaite (1977), 432 U.S. L.Ed.2d a 1370; 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 140; Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401. See, for (1978)I . , Mont 587 P.2d example, State v. Lara 930, 35 St.Rep. 1699; State v. Oppelt (1978), 176 Mont. 499, 580 P.2d 110; where we have applied the rules set forth by the United States Supreme Court. An in-cour t identification of the defendant is if permitted it is determined that the pretrial identification process did not violate these rules. Here the robbery victim was in an excellent position to view the robber. They were very close to each other in a well-lit location for at least thirty seconds. His first description of the man who held the knife to his throat was a fair description of the defendant. Eight days later, when he chose the defendant from the photo-array line-up, he did so immediately and with assurance. This eight-day lapse between the robbery and the photo-identification was not, under the circumstances here, sufficient to purge from the victim's mind a reasonably precise picture of the attacker's identity. Nor, of course, can we ignore the testimony which clearly placed the defendant in the car which sped away from the Superamerica station after the robbery. The fact that his car was identified as belonging to the defendant, and that defendant had abandoned his car in an alley a few blocks away from the Superamerica station and was found by the police hiding under another car, is more than a little indicative of his involvement in the robbery. Nor can we ignore the fact that the cash drawer and money stolen from the Superamerica were found abandoned near the car from which defendant had fled, and that defendant's fingerprint was found on a paper sack near the car which was similar to paper sacks used at Superamerica. These factors must be considered along with the identification process, and when so considered, they do not point to a substantial chance of misidentification. defendant's guilt. Rather, they point straight at W do n o t e find error in the f a i l u r e t o have d e f e n s e counsel p r e s e n t a t t h e photo-array i d e n t i f i c a t i o n process. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n U.S. U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, is not confrontation clause identification 37 L.Ed.2d process, and refused presently constitution. to violated by therefore, v. a photo-array that the right followed Ash, adopt a s t r i c t e r See S t a t e Ash ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 413 619, h a s held t h a t t h e W have e counsel does not a t t a c h . v. Strain and h a v e r u l e under and Young, to o u r own C a u s e No. 14863, Decided October 22, 1980. Defendant next contends that because his defense involve d an a d m i s s i o n o f b e i n g a t t h e s c e n e o f t h e c r i m e b u t of not being involved except a f t e r the fact, t h a t h e was e n t i t l e d t o an i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t "mere p r e s e n c e a t o r a b o u t t h e s c e n e where a c r i m e is c o m m i t t e d d o e s n o t make o n e a party to a instruction, court's crime." and He neither refusal to offers was give he this no authority prejudiced by instruction. i n s t r u c t i o n f a i r l y covered t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d . for the this trial Here, the The c h a r g e o f robbery, p l u s t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , required t h a t t h e j u r y f i n d n o t o n l y t h a t d e f e n d a n t was p r e s e n t a t t h e s c e n e b u t that he was the person clerk's throat. Thus, who held the knife to the store t h e j u r y was f u l l y a w a r e t h a t mere p r e s e n c e a t t h e s c e n e of a c r i m e is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v e criminal involvement. committed clerk's the throat, crime The by jury holding and t h e e v i d e n c e believed the that knife to defendant the store is c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t to sustain this belief. W e that agree, the however, trial s e c t i o n 46-18-404, court MCA, with defendant's erroneously final determined contention that under h e was r e q u i r e d a s a m a t t e r o f l a w t o d e s i g n a t e defendant a s a dangerous offender f o r purposes of parole e l i g i b i l i t y . convicted of a D e f e n d a n t had b e e n p r e v i o u s l y b e e n felony. in Wyoming less than five years p r e c e d i n g t h e commission of t h e c r i m e i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e . At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor urged c o u r t t o s e n t e n c e d e f e n d a n t t o impose a t w e n t y - y e a r the prison s e n t e n c e and t o d e s i g n a t e d e f e n d a n t a s a d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r . Defense counsel urged ten-year prison nondangerous the court t o sentence and t o designate defendant offender. recommendations, the impose no more t h a n a In sentencing response court as a to stated that these "I am g o i n g t o d e s i g n a t e him ( t h e d e f e n d a n t ) d a n g e r o u s , b e c a u s e I feel I have no option under sentenced defendant to designated him dangerous as a the fifteen statute." years offender The in court prison for and purposes of parole eligibility. D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t was not statutorily offender, and designated hand, required thus, him had t o d e s i g n a t e him as a he so, chosen a s nondangerous. to do The S t a t e , dangerous could have on t h e o t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e l e a v e s no d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t , and t h a t u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e t h e d u t y of the court to designate defendant as a dangerous analysis, we first set forth S e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA, provides: o f f e n d e r was m a n d a t o r y . For purposes of s t a t u t e i n its e n t i r e t y . " D e s i g n a t i o n a s n o n d a n q------------- r f o r erous o f f e n d e p u r p o s --- o f p a -l e- l i g i -----y . es r o- e bilit ( 1 ) The s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t s h a l l d e s i g n a t e an o f f e n d e r a nondangerous offender f o r purposes of e l i g i b i l i t y f o r p a r o l e under p a r t 2 of c h a p t e r 23 i f : "(a) during the 5 years preceding the commission of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which t h e o f f e n d e r i s b e i n g s e n t e n c e d , t h e o f f e n d e r was n e i t h e r c o n v i c t e d of nor i n c a r c e r a t e d f o r an o f f e n s e c o m m i t t e d i n t h i s s t a t e o r any o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r which a s e n t e n c e t o a t e r m of imprisonment i n e x c e s s of 1 y e a r could the h a v e been imposed; and " ( b ) t h e c o u r t h a s d e t e r m i n e d , b a s e d on a n y p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l and t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h a t t h e offender does not r e p r e s e n t a s u b s t a n t i a l danger t o o t h e r persons or s o c i e t y . A c o n v i c t i o n o r i n c a r c e r a t i o n may n o t "(2) ( be c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r s u b s e c t i o n (1) a ) i f : " ( a ) t h e o f f e n d e r was l e s s t h a n 1 8 y e a r s o f age a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission of t h e present offense; or " ( b ) t h e o f f e n d e r h a s been p a r d o n e d f o r t h e p r e v i o u s o f f e n s e on t h e g r o u n d s o f i n n o c e n c e o r t h e c o n v i c t i o n f o r s u c h o f f e n s e h a s been s e t aside i n a postconviction hearing. " ( 3 I f t h e c o u r t determines t h a t an o f f e n d e r i s n o t e l i g i b l e t o be d e s i g n a t e d a s a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r , i t s h a l l make t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p a r t o f t h e s e n t e n c e imposed and s h a l l s t a t e t h e d e t e r m i n a t o n i n t h e judgment. Whenever t h e s e n t e n c e and judgment do n o t c o n t a i n s u c h a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e offender is considered to have been d e s i g n a t e d a s a nondangerous of f e n d e r f o r parole. " Although t h i s statute is n o t a model of clarity, we c o n c l u d e t h a t it i s m a n d a t o r y o n l y where t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s require the sentencing court to sentence one as a nondangerous o f f e n d e r . The s t a t u t e i m p o s e s l i m i t a t i o n s on a s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e in three situations: d e f e n d a n t was immediately not First, if convicted preceding the t h e judge of felony offense in finds that the within question, 5 years and also f i n d s " t h a t t h e offender does n o t r e p r e s e n t a s u b s t a n t i a l danger t o o t h e r persons o r s o c i e t y , " designated as 46-18-404(1)(a) a and nondangerous ( b ) , supra. d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e judge rather, it sets forth the t h e d e f e n d a n t m u s t be offender. Section T h i s p a r t of the statute t o d e s i g n a t e one a s dangerous; circumstances under which the d e f e n d a n t must be d e s i g n a t e d a s n o n d a n g e r o u s . S e c o n d , s u b s e c t i o n s ( 2 ) ( a ) and ( b ) , s e t f o r t h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which a c o n v i c t i o n c a n n o t b e c o n s i d e r e d f o r p u r p o s e s of t r i g g e r i n g a p o s s i b l e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t one is 'a dangerous offender . If the offender was less than e i g h t e e n y e a r s of a g e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e " p r e s e n t o f f e n s e " , t h e p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n c a n n o t be u s e d a s a b a s i s t o t r i g g e r a finding that the defendant offender had either innocence for the been dangerous. is pardoned previous on offense, or Or, the if the grounds had the of previous o f f e n s e set a s i d e i n a postconviction hearing, t h e previous o f f e n s e c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d a s a b a s i s t o t r i g g e r a f i n d i n g that the defendant is makes claim defendant no dangerous. to We come note under here, any of that these p r o v i s i o n s of t h e s t a t u t e . is d e t e r m i n a t i v e of The t h i r d s i t u a t i o n , h o w e v e r , i s s u e here. S e c t i o n 46-18-404 ( 3 ) , s u p r a , sets forth the the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e judgment i n o r d e r t h a t a d e s i g n a t i o n o f dangerousness t a k e e f f e c t . if The f i r s t s e n t e n c e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c o u r t d e s i g n a t e s one a s a dangerous offender, the c o u r t m u s t "make t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n a p a r t o f t h e s e n t e n c e imposed and s h a l l s t a t e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h e j u d g m e n t . " But t h e second s e n t e n c e of different result attach t h i s subsection requires t h a t a if the sentencing court either r e f u s e s o r f a i l s t o make t h a t d e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e j u d g m e n t . It states: "Whenever t h e s e n t e n c e and judgment do n o t c o n t a i n such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e o f f e n d e r is c o n s i d e r e d t o have been d e s i g n a t e d a s a nondangerous offender for purposes of e l i g i b i l i t y for parole." S e c t i o n 46-184 0 4 ( 3 ) , MCA. W cannot ignore t h i s sentence. e ineligible for parole e l i g i b i l i t y , To d e c l a r e a d e f e n d a n t t h e sentencing court is s t a t u t o r i l y required t o d e s i g n a t e him a s dangerous f o r t h a t purpose. of C l e a r l y , by f a i l i n g t o make s u c h d e s i g n a t i o n p a r t t h e judgment, sentencing e i t h e r by o v e r s i g h t o r by a n e x e r c i s e o f discretion, the statute declares that the defendant involved is t o be "designated a s a nondangerous o f f e n d e r f o r p u r p o s e s of p a r o l e e l i g i b i l i t y . " A l t h o u g h t h e r e is a d e s i g n a t i o n the "defendant be punished imprisonment a t hard l a b o r ( 1 5 ) YEARS," c o u r t when required the as . . . underlying s u c h judgment a i n t h e judgment dangerous for t h e term of assumption was e n t e r e d offender, of is the that that by FIFTEEN sentencing the statute the sentencing court t o designate defendant a s a dangerous offender. But, as we have reasoned, the s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t was n o t r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e t o make t h i s designation. By m e r e l y f a i l i n g t o make a n y d e s i g n a t i o n i n t h e judgment as to the defendant's status, would be s t a t u t o r i l y d e c l a r e d n o n d a n g e r o u s . court did not consider t h i s o p t i o n when the defendant The s e n t e n c i n g it sentenced the defendant. The judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n i s a f f i r m e d . W remand t h i s e cause t o the D i s t r i c t Court for resentencing. W Concur: e ........................... Chief J u s t i c e p-":-*--Justices M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and dissenting i n part: I w o u l d a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t and s e n t e n c e i n i t s e n t i r e t y . I concur i n a f f i r m i n g t h e judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e reasons s t a t e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y opinion. I dissent from the m a j o r i t y c o n s t r u c t i o n o f s e c t i o n 46-18-404, MCA and r e m a n d i n g t h e cause t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r resentencing t h e defendant. Although the statute i s i n a r t f u l l y drafted, it implies, at l e a s t , t h a t a c o n v i c t e d o f f e n d e r i s i n e l e g i b l e f o r d e s i g n a t i o n as a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r i f he was c o n v i c t e d o r i n c a r c e r a t e d i n any j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r a f e l o n y d u r i n g t h e preceding f i v e years. Section 46-18-404(1)(a), MCA. I n t h i s c a s e d e f e n d a n t was c o n - v i c t e d o f b u r g l a r y on A u g u s t 2 5 , 1976, i n t h e S t a t e o f Wyoming. Subsection (3) o f the statute simply provides a catchall f o r the b e n e f i t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i n cases where t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t neglects t o incorporate defendant's none1 i g i b i l i t y f o r non- dangerous o f f e n d e r s t a t u s i n t h e judgment. I do not construe s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) as a d i s c r e t i o n a r y g r a n t o f a u t h o r i t y t o t h e sent e n c i n g c o u r t t o c o n f e r nondangerous o f f e n d e r s t a t u s t o a conv i c t e d f e l o n who h a s a p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s . Chief Justice

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