GILES v FLINT VALLEY FOREST PRODUC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
No. 13732 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 JEFFREY A. GILES, - Plaintiff and Appellant and Cross-Respondent, -vs- FLINT VALLEY FOREST PRODUCTS, MONTANA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, a Body Politic and Members thereof and H. J. ANDERSON, Montana State Director of Highways, Defendants and Respondents and Cross-Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, Honorable Robert Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Daniels and Mizner, Deer Lodge, Montana Ted L. Mizner argued, Deer Lodge, Montana For Respondents: Poore, McKenzie, Roth, Robischon & Robinson, Butte, Montana Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Gary Graham argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: J&p - - - ? I October 16, 1978 : ;379 - J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Mr. P l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Powell County, t o r e c o v e r damages f o r i n j u r i e s h e s u f f e r e d i n a motor v e h i c l e a c c i d e n t o n J u n e 11, 1974. The a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y one m i l e w e s t of G a r r i s o n J u n c t i o n a t t h e W a r m S p r i n g s i n t e r s e c t i o n where I n t e r s t a t e 90, a d i v i d e d f o u r - l a n e highway, m e e t s a n u n d i v i d e d two-lane r o a d . A t t h e t i m e of t h e c o l l i - s i o n p l a i n t i f f was t u r n i n g l e f t o f f 1-90 i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n a r e a o n t o t h e f r o n t a g e r o a d a t t h e Warm S p r i n g s i n t e r s e c H i s a u t o m o b i l e was s t r u c k by a l o a d e d l o g g i n g t r u c k tion. d r i v e n by Walter G r e i g Godkin, a n employee of d e f e n d a n t F l i n t Valley F o r e s t Products. Godkin i g n o r e d s i g n s i n t h e a r e a d i r e c t i n g t r a f f i c t o keep r i g h t and n o t t o p a s s , and a s a r e s u l t , while improperly i n t h e l e f t l a n e , h i s t r u c k struck p l a i n t i f f ' s vehicle. Plaintiff suffered severe i n j u r y t o h i s l e f t l e g , which w a s n e a r l y s e v e r e d a t t h e ankle. P l a i n t i f f sued F l i n t V a l l e y f o r t h e i r a g e n t ' s a l l e g e d l y n e g l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n of t h e l o g g i n g t r u c k w h i l e i n t h e c o u r s e of h i s employment, and sued t h e S t a t e of Montana f o r t h e a l l e g e d l y n e g l i g e n t c o n s t r u c t i o n , d e s i g n and marking of t h e Warm S p r i n g s i n t e r s e c t i o n and t h e t r a n s i t i o n a r e a . On motion t h e a l l e g a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g n e g l i g e n t d e s i g n and cons t r u c t i o n were dropped. contended a t t r i a l . Negligence as t o marking a l o n e was The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t a g a i n s t b o t h d e f e n d a n t s and awarded p l a i n t i f f $100,000. Both d e f e n - d a n t s moved f o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t and d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s a n d , i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , f o r new t r i a l . p l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from an o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l t o d e f e n d a n t S t a t e of Montana. The S t a t e c r o s s - a p p e a l s from t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o d i s m i s s t h e c a s e a g a i n s t i t , a motion on which w a s made a t t h e c l o s e of p l a i n t i f f ' s case-in-chief. With r e s p e c t t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s on d e s i g n and c o n s t r u c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f a r g u e d d u r i n g o r a l argument t h a t t h o s e c l a i m s were s t i l l b e i n g advanced and t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d by t h i s C o u r t . There was t e s t i m o n y by t h e e n g i n e e r s t h a t went t o q u e s t i o n s of cons t r u c t i o n and d e s i g n n e g l i g e n c e , as w e l l a s t o t h e problem of marking t h e a c c i d e n t a r e a . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e t r i a l d e f e n d a n t s c l a i m e d t h e y were u n a b l e , a f t e r d i l i g e n t l y s e e k i n g , t o f i n d Godkin, t h e d r i v e r of t h e F l i n t V a l l e y l o g g i n g t r u c k . W i t h i n d a y s of t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e t r i a l , c o u n s e l f o r F l i n t V a l l e y l o c a t e d Godkin, a c o n v i c t o u t on p a r o l e . He now comes up w i t h a most a r t i c u l a t e s t a t e m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e a c c i d e n t which had happened some y e a r s b e f o r e on a s t r e t c h of r o a d which h e had d r i v e n ( e x a c t l y , according t o h i s a f f i d a v i t ) eleven t i m e s . In his affidavit, Godkin e x p r e s s e s h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o r e t u r n t o Montana f o r t r i a l o r t o be deposed. To g e t a new t r i a l where a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e h a s come t o l i g h t , t h e moving p a r t y must d e m o n s t r a t e , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t i t was n o t l a c k of d i l i g e n c e which f a i l e d t o t u r n up t h e e v i d e n c e a t a n e a r l i e r time. ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 115 Mont. 1 3 6 , 144-45, See K e r r i g a n v . ~ e r r i g a n 139 P.2d 533, 535. W e find t h i s e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t meet t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t i n ~ e r r i g a n o t w a r r a n t a new t r i a l . P l a i n t i f f appeals t h e D i s t r i c t Court order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , advancing a claim of i n v a l i d i t y f o r f a i l u r e t o p a r t i c u l a r l y s p e c i f y t h e grounds t h e r e f o r a s r e q u i r e d by Rule 5 9 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P., and c o n t e n d i n g t h e c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n s o o r d e r i n g a new t r i a l . A s p l a i n t i f f re- q u e s t e d and r e c e i v e d from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a s t a t e m e n t o f C e r t i f i c a t i o n of I s s u e s on Appeal, it a p p e a r s t h e f i r s t c l a i m i s moot. The S t a t e c r o s s - a p p e a l s a l l e g i n g t h e D i s - t r i c t Court erred i n f a i l i n g t o dismiss t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t i t a t t h e end of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f . I n meeting p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a t e m e n t of t h e i s s u e s , t h e S t a t e c l a i m s t h a t t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l i s s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e . The S t a t e a r g u e s a new t r i a l w a s c o r r e c t l y o r d e r e d f o r four reasons: 1. P l a i n t i f f ' s attempt a t introducing i t s Exhibit #28, a p e t i t i o n s i g n e d by t h e r e s i d e n t s of t h e Garrison-Warm S p r i n g s a r e a p r o t e s t i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e highway i n t h e v i c i n i t y o f t h e a c c i d e n t , was harmful and p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e S t a t e such t h a t i t c o u l d n o t r e c e i v e a f a i r t r i a l . 2. The award of damages was e x c e s s i v e , g i v e n under t h e i n f l u e n c e of p a s s i o n o r p r e j u d i c e , s u c h t h a t a new t r i a l was properly ordered. 3. S e c t i o n 93-5603(5), R.C.M. 1947. The e v i d e n c e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r - d i c t , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of t h e t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by a highway p a t r o l m a n t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f w a s c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t s u c h t h a t p l a i n t i f f ' s r e c o v e r y s h o u l d have been barred. 4. T h e r e w a s e r r o r i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 28, 30, 34, and 4 4 , e s p e c i a l l y t h e f i r s t two which employed d e s c r i p t i v e language, e.g., dangerous i n t e r s e c t i o n s , embodying c o n c l u s i o n s which w e r e w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y a l o n e t o make. In its Certification of Issues on Appeal, which the State deems "irregular" but to which it says it does not object, the District Court stated: ". . . ... the only reason for granting a new trial in this action is as follows: "The Appellant's attempted [sic] to introduce [which] was not their [sic] Exhibit 28 listed in the pre-trial order as a proposed exhibit. As such its attempted introduction was an irregularity in the trial which prevented the defendants from having a fair trial, and is a grounds [sic] for a new trial under Section 93-5603(1), R.C.M. 1947." ... The purposes of requiring a statement of the reasons are to narrow the issues on appeal and to obviate the need for this Court to read the entire record to find the rationale underlying the ruling. Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ.P., ~dvisory Committee's note; Ballantyne v. The Anaconda Company (1978), Mont. , 574 P.2d 582, 35 St.Rep. 172. These pur- poses have been accomplished by the District Court's certification. In virtue of that certification of issues, we need not entertain the last three of defendant's reasons in support of the order for new trial. Granting a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its order so granting a new trial will be reversed only if manifest abuse of that discretion is shown. Such an order will be upheld if it can be sustained on any ground stated in the order or opinion accompanying the order. Rule 59(f), M.R.Civ.P. The question thus is whether the order may be sustained on that ground specified by the District Court as the reason for granting the new trial. Plaintiff argues that defendant suffered no prejudice, such that it was denied a fair trial, because of plaintiff's attempt to offer its Exhibit # 2 8 . The court refused to admit the exhibit upon defendant's objection and further refused to grant defendant's motion for a mistrial. jury at no time was allowed to view the exhibit. The Counsel's questions were brief and did not convey information calculated to prejudice the jury. Without the exhibit the jury, at the conclusion of trial, had received evidence sufficient to form the foundation for the belief that the intersectiontransition area was so confusingly marked as to have contributed to the accident and thus to ascribe fault to the State. The State points to the District Court's certification of issues as evidence enough of the prejudice which it suffered by the attempted introduction of Exhibit # 2 8 , declaring that that alone demonstrates that the trial judge believed the jury was unduly influenced and that the prejudice had not been cured, even with instructions. The peti- tion, drafted and signed by local residents, says the State, was likely of greater weight than the testimony of experts, and even the attempt to introduce it would persuade the jury to find against the State. We find the above argument insufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial in view of the fact here that it was not admitted as evidence. We have said the following in respect of granting a new trial: .. ". it is not every error or defect that occurs during the course of a trial that furnishes grounds for granting a new trial. The court must disregard any error or defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.) To authorize granting a new trial, the error complained of must be an error 'materially affecting the substantial rights of [the aggrieved party] ' (section 93-5603, R.C.M. 1947) and the error must be of such character that refusal to grant a new trial 'appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.' In other words, if the (Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.) substantial rights of the aggrieved party are not prejudiced, only 'harmless error' is involved not authorizing a new trial to be granted, Within these limitations, the trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial and will not be reversed except for abuse thereof. [Citations omitted.]" Martello v. Darlow (1968), 151 Mont. 232, 235, 441 P.2d 175, 176. As in Martello we find that, under the circumstances of this case, the error did not affect the complaining party's substantial rights. Therefore, the District Court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on this ground alone. Defendant's other issue bears brief consideration. That issue is whether the District Court erred in failing to dismiss the action against the State at the conclusion of plaintiff's case-in-chief. The State contends that plaintiff failed to prove either negligence or proximate cause such that the State could be chargeable for plaintiff's damages. Essential to plaintiff's case, says the State, was proof that the State was negligent in marking the highway at the site of the and accident - that such negligence was the legal (proximate) cause of the accident in which plaintiff received his injuries. The States further contends that assuming arguendo it was negligent in marking the area, that negligence alone cannot be transformed into the requisite proximate cause. At most, the State says, it furnished the conditions in which the injury occurred by the subsequent independent act of a third person, Flint Valley, and asks us to rely on Boepple v. Mohalt (1936), 101 Mont. 417, 436, 54 P.2d 857, 862. Existence of conditions is not proximate cause; there- fore, plaintiff's case fails for want of proof, according to the State. Although t h e s e arguments a r e sound as f a r a s t h e y g o , t h e y f a i l t o go f a r enough. Court r e c e n t l y s a i d , t h a t I t must be remembered, a s t h i s ". . . where one has n e g l i g e n t l y c a u s e d a c o n d i t i o n o f d a n g e r , he i s n o t r e l i e v e d of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r damage c a u s e d t o a n o t h e r m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e i n j u r y a l s o i n v o l v e d t h e l a t e r misconduct of someone e l s e . " Halsey v. Uithof 690. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 319, 327, 532 P.2d 686, An i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n of t h i s r u l e , however, was s t a t e d immediately t h e r e a f t e r . "But, t h i s i s t r u e only i f both n e g l i g e n t a c t s are i n f a c t concurring proximate causes of t h e i n j u r y ; and it i s n o t t r u e i f t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n c e i s a n i n d e p e n d e n t , i n t e r v e n i n g s o l e c a u s e of t h e i n c i d e n t . " H a l s e y , 166 Mont. a t 327, 532 P. 2d a t 690. I n deciding Halsey, t h e Court e n t e r t a i n e d t h e s e thoughts: " I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e n e g l i g e n c e i n c r e a t i n g a h a z a r d ( t h e t r u c k s t a l l e d on t h e highway) was a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e a c c i Did t h e d e n t , t h i s t e s t i s t o be a p p l i e d : w r o n g f u l a c t , i n a n a t u r a l c o n t i n u o u s sequence of e v e n t s , which m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y be e x p e c t e d t o f o l l o w , produce t h e i n j u r y ? I f s o , it i s a c o n c u r r i n g p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e i n j u r y even though t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n t a c t of a n o t h e r [Walker and McWhirk] c o o p e r a t e d t o c a u s e i t . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e l a t t e r ' s a c t of n e g l i g e n c e i n c a u s i n g t h e a c c i d e n t was of such a c h a r a c t e r a s n o t r e a s o n a b l y t o be e x p e c t e d t o happen i n t h e n a t u r a l sequence of e v e n t s , t h e n s u c h l a t e r a c t o f n e g l i g e n c e i s t h e indep e n d e n t , i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e and t h e r e f o r e t h e s o l e proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y . (Citat i o n s omitted. ) "Applying t h e f o r e g o i n g t e s t t o t h e i n s t a n t s i t u a t i o n , it was r e a s o n a b l e t o f o r e s e e t h a t t h e e a s t b o u n d d r i v e r s [Walker and McWhirk] would see t h e t r u c k parked on t h e highway. C o n s i d e r i n g Montana's c a s e law and t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t views on o u r l a w , t h i s C o u r t a g a i n f i n d s t h a t abstract foreseeability is not sufficient t o m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of p r o x i m a t e c a u s e . "Applying J i m i s o n h e r e , a p p e l l a n t was n o t obliged t o foresee o r a n t i c i p a t e t h a t e i t h e r Walker o r McWhirk would come o v e r t h e h i l l a t such speeds t h a t they could n o t s t o p w i t h i n t h e a s s u r e d c l e a r d i s t a n c e ahead of them. Neither was appellant obliged to foresee that Walker would continue over the hill without braking after seeing the reflector at the top and should have realized there might be trouble on the other side. All of this leads to the conviction that the district court should have granted appellant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of respondent's case-inchief." Halsey v. Uithof, 166 Mont. at 328, 532 P.2d at 690-91. A case should be taken from the jury only when the facts and reasonable inferences drawn from them, when viewed in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion for a directed verdict is made, cannot sustain a finding for the party against whom it is made. See e.g., Thomas v. Merriam (1959), 135 Mont. 121, 126, 337 P.2d 604 and cases cited therein. Here evidence supporting plain- tiff's case was presented, and whether that evidence was sufficient to sustain a prima facie case undoubtedly was considered by the trial judge in making his ruling against defendant. The court properly let the case go to the jury. As to the other assertions of error made by the State, the following is dispositive. 1. The State claims that the award of damages was excessive, given under the influence of passion and prejudice. As noted in Brown v. Columbia Amusement Co. (1931), 91 Mont. 174, 193, 6 P.2d 874, no two cases are alike. The rule is that given we have a justice system which confides to juries the duty to determine the issues and to fix the amount of compensation to be paid, unless the award is such to shock the conscience and understanding, it must be accepted as conclusive. The award in the instant case is not so shocking as to be deserving of vacation. 2. The States claims that the evidence was insuffi- cient to support the verdict and that plaintiff's claim should have been barred because of his contributory negligence. he only testimony as to possible contributory negligence was that given as mere speculation by the highway patrolman who investigated the accident, but who did not witness it. Again, it was the task of the jury to determine if the factual circumstances were such that plaintiff could be deemed contributorily negligent; it did not so find. It concluded that plaintiff's testimony to the effect that he did check his rear-view mirror for upcoming traffic, and that he did signal so as to warn any upcoming traffic of his intention to turn left, was believable. 3. The other objection centers on certain of the instructions given the jury. The State particularly objects to those numbered 28, 30, 34 and 44, putting emphasis on the first two. The charge is that the instruction contained language drawing conclusions which were within the province of the jury to make. While these instructions are not necessarily model, we do not find them to be so prejudicial to defendant as to be made the basis for a new trial. Again, error, to be made the basis for a new trial, must be so significant as to materially affect the substantial rights of the complaining party. See Martello v. Darlow, supra. The order of the District Court granting a new trial is set aside and the verdict and judgment reinstated. We Concur: Chief Justice 2 ' . j; ,i Justices - L/- d , I
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
