FISCUS v BEARTOOTH ELECTRIC COOP
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No. 14301 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA CLAYTON R. FISCUS, Plaintiff and Appellant, BEARTOOTH ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Berger, Anderson, Sinclair and Murphy, Billings, Montana Richard Anderson argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Hutton and Cromley, Billings, Montana Brent Cromley argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: Decided: Filed: FEE - !:7q December 12, 1978 2 ' 1g71 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Plaintiff-appellant, C l a y t o n R. F i s c u s , b r i n g s t h i s m a t t e r t o t h i s Court, asking t h a t , because t h e holding i n F i s c u s v . B e a r t o o t h E l e c t r i c ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164 Mont. 319, 522 P.2d 87, h a s been o v e r r u l e d by P i p e r v . Lockwood Water Users Mont. - 573 P.2d 646, 35 St.Rep. , Ass'n (1978), 1 3 , t h a t h e now b e g i v e n h i s day i n c o u r t . 9, The immediate events giving rise t o t h i s appeal a r e a s follows. On J u n e 10, 1974, p u r s u a n t t o t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n rendered i n F i s c u s v . Beartooth Electric, s u p r a , t h e D i s - t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d summary judgment i n f a v o r of B e a r t o o t h and a g a i n s t F i s c u s . The c a s e l a y dormant on i t s t h u s d i s m i s s e d s t a t u s u n t i l February 3 , 1978, when F i s c u s moved t o v a c a t e t h e judgment and d i s m i s s a l . B r i e f s w e r e f i l e d f o r and a g a i n s t t h e motion i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h e Honorable C h a r l e s Luedke p r e siding. The c o u r t made no r u l i n g on t h e motion, and on March 30, 1978, F i s c u s ' motion became "deemed d e n i e d " under Rule 5 9 ( d ) and ( g ), M.R.Civ.P. Fiscus then f i l e d t h i s appeal. For t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n , s e e F i s c u s v . B e a r t o o t h Elec- t r i c , supra. The i s s u e a t t h i s p o i n t i s a narrow p r o c e d u r a l o n e , namely, whether t h e d o c t r i n e of e i t h e r "law of t h e c a s e " o r res j u d i c a t a b a r s a p p e l l a n t from p u r s u i n g a c l a i m a g a i n s t Beartooth E l e c t r i c . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t h e h a s n e v e r had h i s c l a i m adj u d i c a t e d and t h a t h e h a s never been i n c o u r t t o have such made, on t h e m e r i t s , t h e f a c t u a l and t h e l e g a l determinat i o n s of t h e c a s e . H e a r g u e s t h a t h e h a s been p r o c e d u r a l l y b a r r e d by o r d e r of t h i s C o u r t d a t e d 1974. A p p e l l a n t acknowledges t h a t " t h e law o f t h e c a s e " and res j u d i c a t a a r e t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o b a r t h o s e a t t e m p t s by a d i s s a t i s f i e d l i t i g a n t t o r e o p e n a m a t t e r which h a s been d e c i d e d . H e argues t h a t a l l general r u l e s , however, have t h e i r e x c e p t i o n s , and t h a t under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s case, t h e y s h o u l d b e a l l o w e d under t h e exception of t h e general r u l e . B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y (Rev. 4 t h Ed., 1968), defines res j u d i c a t a t h u s : "A m a t t e r adjudged; a t h i n g j u d i c i a l l y a c t e d upon o r d e c i d e d ; a t h i n g o r m a t t e r s e t t l e d by . Rule t h a t f i n a l judgment o r dejudgment cree on m e r i t s by c o u r t o f competent j u r i s d i c t i o n i s conclusive of r i g h t s of p a r t i e s o r t h e i r p r i v i e s i n a l l l a t e r s u i t s on p o i n t s and m a t t e r s d e t e r m i n e d i n former s u i t And t o b e a p p l i c a b l e , r e q u i r e s i d e n t i t y i n t h i n g sued f o r a s w e l l a s i d e n t i t y of c a u s e of a c t i o n , o f p e r s o n s and p a r t i e s t o a c t i o n , and of q u a l i t y i n p e r s o n s f o r o r a g a i n s t whom c l a i m i s made The sum and s u b s t a n c e of t h e whole r u l e i s t h a t a m a t t e r once j u d i c i a l l y decided i s f i n a l l y decided . . ... ... . . ." I n Western Montana P r o d u c t i o n C r e d i t A s s ' n v . Hydroponics, Inc. ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 157, 1 6 1 , 410 P.2d 937, 939, t h i s C o u r t , c i t i n g Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e , s a i d : " ' T h e t e r m res j u d i c a t a i s o f t e n used t o d e n o t e two t h i n g s i n r e s p e c t t o t h e e f f e c t o f a v a l i d , (1) t h a t s u c h judgment, when f i n a l judgment: r e n d e r e d on t h e merits, i s a n a b s o l u t e b a r t o a s u b s e q u e n t a c t i o n , between t h e same p a r t i e s o r t h o s e i n p r i v i t y w i t h them, upon t h e same c l a i m o r demand; and ( 2 ) t h a t s u c h a judgment c o n s t i t u t e s a n e s t o p p e l , between t h e same p a r t i e s o r t h o s e i n p r i v i t y w i t h them, a s t o matters t h a t w e r e n e c e s s a r i l y l i t i g a t e d and d e t e r m i n e d a l t h o u g h t h e c l a i m o r demand i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t a c t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t . Under t h e f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n t h e judgment o p e r a t e s a s a b a r * * *. Under t h e second p r o p o s i t i o n t h e judgment p r e v e n t s t h e p a r t i e s from r e l i t i g a t i n g 1-B o n l y t h o s e m a t t e r s t h a t were d e t e r m i n e d . ' Moore F.P. 621-622, S 0.405. "The f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n i s p r o p e r l y c a l l e d res j u d i c a t a w h i l e t h e second i s c a l l e d c o l l a t e r a l estoppel. " A s t o t h e c o n c e p t "law of t h e c a s e " , B l a c k ' s d e f i n i t i o n includes t h e following: "The d e c i s i o n , judgment, o p i n i o n o r r u l i n g s on f o r m e r a p p e a l o r w r i t of e r r o r become ' l a w o f t h e case. ' ... "The d o c t r i n e e x p r e s s e s p r a c t i c e of c o u r t s g e n e r a l l y t o r e f u s e t o reopen what h a s been decided [ I l t expresses t h e r u l e t h a t f i n a l judgment of h i g h e s t c o u r t i s f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a r t i e s ' r i g h t s ... ... "The d o c t r i n e i s g e n e r a l l y deemed a p p l i c a b l e whether f o r m e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s r i g h t o r wrong. B u t some cases h o l d t h a t d o c t r i n e i s i n a p p l i c a b l e where p r i o r d e c i s i o n i s unsound, o r i n c o r r e c t p r i n c i p l e s w e r e announced o r m i s t a k e of f a c t w a s made on f i r s t a p p e a l ... ... ... 11 "Law o f t h e c a s e " h a s been e x p l a i n e d by t h e Montana Court thus: " ' T h e r u l e i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and l o n g a d h e r e d t o i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t where, upon a n a p p e a l , t h e Supreme C o u r t , i n d e c i d i n g a case p r e s e n t e d s t a t e s i n i t s o p i n i o n a p r i n c i p l e o r r u l e of l a w n e c e s s a r y t o t h e d e c i s i o n , s u c h pronouncement becomes t h e l a w of t h e c a s e , and must b e a d h e r e d t o throughout i t s subsequent progress, both i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t and upon s u b s e q u e n t a p p e a l ; and t h i s , a l t h o u g h upon i t s s u b s e q u e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e Supreme C o u r t may b e c l e a r l y of o p i n i o n t h a t t h e f o r m e r d e c i s i o n i s e r r o n e o u s . * * * it i s a f i n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n from t h e consequences of which t h i s c o u r t may n o t d e p a r t , n o r t h e p a r t i e s r e l i e v e themselves ( c i t i n g cases).' Carlson v . Northern Pac.R.Co., 86 Mont. 7 8 , 281 P a c . 913, 914. "'Whether t h e o p i n i o n i s r i g h t o r wrong, i t i s t h e law of t h e c a s e , was b i n d i n g upon t h e t r i a l c o u r t , and i s b i n d i n g upon u s . ' Anderson v . B o r d e r , 87 Mont. 4 , 285 Pac. 174, 176." Apple v . Edwards ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 123 Mont. 1 3 5 , 139-40, 2 1 1 P.2d 138, 140. I n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of t h e r i g i d s t a n d a r d s a r t i c u l a t e d a b o v e , a p p e l l a n t c i t e s t h e c o u r t t o P e r k i n s v . K r a m e r (1948) , 1 2 1 Mont. 595, 600, 198 P.2d 475, 477, f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g p e r t i n e n t language: "The d o c t r i n e o f res j u d i c a t a , i f a p p l i c a b l e , d o e s n o t p r e v e n t t h e c o u r t from c o r r e c t i n g manif e s t e r r o r i n i t s f o r m e r judgment. Thus i n C l u f f v . Day, 1 4 1 N.Y. 580, 36 N.E. 1 8 2 , 183, t h e court said: ' T h e r e i s no i r o n r u l e which p r e c l u d e s a c o u r t from c o r r e c t i n g a m a n i f e s t e r r o r i n i t s former judgment, o r which r e q u i r e s i t t o a d h e r e t o a n unsound d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e I t may, f o r c o g e n t r e a s o n s , r e v e r s e o r law. q u a l i f y a p r i o r d e c i s i o n , even i n t h e same c a s e . But t h e c a s e s i n which t h i s w i l l b e done a r e e x c e p t i o n a l , and t h e power s h o u l d b e s p a r i n g l y exercised.' "When t h e p r i o r d e c i s i o n i s by a d i v i d e d c o u r t , t h e c o u r t w i l l t h e more r e a d i l y a s here, [Citation omitted.]" d e p a r t from it, i f e r r o n e o u s . ... I n P e r k i n s , t h e d e f e n d a n t s contended t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f w a s p r e c l u d e d from m a i n t a i n i n g h i s a c t i o n , b e c a u s e of t h e h o l d i n g i n a p r e v i o u s c a s e , which was d e s c r i b e d a s b e i n g " a n a p p e a l from t h e judgment e n t e r e d i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t a f t e r r e v e r s a l " by t h e s t a t e Supreme C o u r t . 198 P.2d a t 476. 1 2 1 Mont. a t 597-98, The C o u r t acknowledged t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d t h e r e w a s t h e same a s t h a t p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e , b u t s a i d t h a t i t had n o t p r e c l u d e d p l a i n t i f f from r e l i e f i n t h e e a r l i e r case. 1 2 1 Mont. a t 598, 198 P.2d a t 476. Appellant a l s o d i r e c t s our a t t e n t i o n t o a recent case of t h i s C o u r t , S t a t e v . Zimmerman ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 573 P.2d 1 7 4 , 34 St.Rep. 1561. - Mont. I W b e l i e v e t h a t he d o e s s o e i n c o r r e c t l y b e c a u s e t h e above c a s e i s a c r i m i n a l m a t t e r and t h e p r i n c i p l e s a p p l y i n g t h e r e t o c a n n o t always b e conveyed s t r a i g h t a c r o s s t h e board and a p p l i e d t o a c i v i l p r o c e e d i n g . The problem t h e r e i n v o l v e d r e l a t e d t o d o u b l e j e o p a r d y , a l e g a l concept decidedly applicable t o criminal cases only. While w e c i t e d a number o f c i v i l c a s e s i n Zimmerman, i n o u r b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e "law of t h e c a s e " , r e l y i n g on Zimmerman i s i n t h i s c a s e i l l - a d v i s e d . The r e c i t a t i o n i n t h o s e c a s e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e e x c e p t i o n t o the general r u l e i s opposite t o t h i s case. The e x c e p t i o n i s t h a t t h e g e n e r a l r u l e w i l l n o t be a p p l i e d i n t h o s e c a s e s where r e v e r s a l w a s b a s e d on a n u n r e l a t e d matter. Here t h e i s s u e i s not unrelated. Thus t h e e x c e p t i o n s h o u l d n o t apply W e f i n d t h a t P e r k i n s i s c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s c a s e and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t err i n i t s r u l i n g . Next a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t o f a c c e s s t o t h e c o u r t s h a s been d e n i e d him. Art. 111, 1889 Mont. C o n s t . , 5 6, i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e t h a t h e s u f f e r e d h i s i n j u r i e s . However, h e d o e s n o t d e v e l o p t h i s c l a i m w i t h case l a w o r o t h e r a u t h o r i t y and w e f i n d no m e r i t t o it. Recognizing t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n i n t h i s a p p e a l i s p r o b a b l y d e f e c t i v e under t h e Montana law on t h e " r u l e of t h e c a s e " a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t under f e d e r a l d e c i s i o n s i n t e r p r e t i n g Rule 6 0 ( b ) , which i s i d e n t i c a l t o Montana's Rule 6 0 ( b ) , d i f f e r e n t s o l u t i o n s o f t h e case c o u l d b e a r r i v e d a t . Appel- l a n t , i n s u p p o r t of h i s argument, c i t e s a number of f e d e r a l c a s e s , which we w i l l d i s c u s s i n d i v i d u a l l y i n t h i s o p i n i o n . K l a p p r o t t v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 3 3 5 U . S . S.Ct. 384, 93 L.ed. 601, 69 266, i s a n a t u r a l i z a t i o n case and d o e s n o t i n o u r o p i n i o n m e e t t h e s i t u a t i o n h e r e where a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t o v e r r u l e d a l a t e r d e c i s i o n . There t h e c o u r t s i m p l y h e l d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f had been s o e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y v i c t i m i z e d by t h e government t h a t t h e f e d e r a l r u l e 6 0 ( b ) ( 6 ) would b e invoked t o c u r e t h a t o u t r a g e where t h e government had f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e r e q u i r e d i n a m a t t e r of l a w i n t h e denaturalization process. There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f came under and d e s e r v e d t o come under ~ u l e 60 ( b ) ( 6 ) . T h i s i s n o t a c a s e t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n h e r e which i s whether t o change t h e d e c i s i o n a l l a w s e v e r a l y e a r s a f t e r a f i n a l judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t him and w h e t h e r t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s a p r e r e q u i s i t e of "any o t h e r r e a s o n j u s t i f y i n g r e l e a s e from judgment". A p p e l l a n t n e x t c i t e s Ackermann v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 0 ) , 340 U.S. 1 9 3 , 7 1 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.ed. 207. This case l i k e K l a p p r o t t s t a n d s f o r t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t o n l y i n an e x t r a o r d i n a r y c a s e s h o u l d Rule 6 0 ( b ) be g r a n t e d . There i s con- s i d e r a b l e a u t h o r i t y h o l d i n g t h a t when a d e c i s i o n i s l a t e r o v e r r u l e d by a c o u r t , t h a t i t i s n o t " e x t r a o r d i n a r y " contemplated i n Klapprott. as W e do n o t f i n d t h a t i n t h e c a s e c i t e d , Ackermann, i s a u t h o r i t y f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n . The n e x t c a s e c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t i n s u p p o r t of h i s p o s i t i o n i s T s a k o n i t e s v. T r a n s p a c i f i c C a r r i e r s Corp. N.Y. 1 9 7 0 ) , 322 F.Supp. (S.D. 722, which comes t h e c l o s e s t t o a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n here. However i t i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n o u r o p i n i o n from t h e Montana "law of t h e c a s e " d o c t r i n e b e c a u s e t h e r e n e v e r would have been a T s a k o n i t e s c a s e e x c e p t f o r t h e f a c t t h a t sometimes v a r i o u s c i r c u i t s have c o n f l i c t i n g h o l d i n g s as t h e y r e l a t e t o s p e c i f i c i s s u e s of l a w . It is i n t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i s more w i l l i n g and u s u a l l y w i l l g r a n t c e r t i o r a r i f o r t h e p u r p o s e of r e s o l v i n g t h e c o n f l i c t by announcing a f i n a l r u l e t o be uniformly applied t o a l l t e n c i r c u i t s . T h i s , of c o u r s e , i s o n e of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e f e d e r a l system and o u r s t a t e j u d i c i a l system i n t h a t t h e r e t h e r e a r e i n t e r m e d i a t e c o u r t s of a p p e a l w h i l e h e r e t h e Supreme C o u r t i s t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s i n t h e r u l i n g s i n t h e D i s t r i c t Courts. H e r e we have no i n t e r m e d i a t e c o u r t s of a p p e a l and when t h i s C o u r t r e n d e r s a d e c i s i o n on a l e g a l i s s u e , t h a t i s and s h o u l d b e t h e end o f t h e m a t t e r . I n T s a k o n i t e s t h e a p p e l l a n t had a t t e m p t e d t o go t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n 1967 f o l l o w i n g an a d v e r s e result i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t of t h e C o u r t of Appeals. However, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e n i e d h i s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i and t h u s d i d n o t h e a r , c o n s i d e r and r u l e upon t h e i s s u e which c a u s e d him t o l o s e below, t h e i s s u e t h e r e r e l a t i n g t o whether h i s m a r i t i m e employer had s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s w i t h America t o come under t h e Jones A c t . I t was n o t u n t i l H e l l e n i c L i n e s L t d . v . R h o d i t i s ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 398 U.S. 306, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 26 L Ed 2d 252, r e h . d e n i e d , 400 U.S. 856, t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t r u l e d upon t h e v e r y i s s u e i t had d e c l i n e d t o i s s u e i n i t s e a r l i e r o p i n i o n i n Tsakonites. The c r i t i c a l f a c t o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g T s a k o n i t e s from t h e H e l l e n i c L i n e s c a s e and t h i s a p p e a l i s t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d i d n o t o v e r r u l e a p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n of i t s own. I t had n o t r u l e d as w e have i n t h i s c a s e , b u t c h o s e t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r Tsakonites i n t h e Hellenic Lines c a s e t o c o n s i d e r t h e m a t t e r and r e s o l v e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s of t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t s on t h e i s s u e t h a t T s a k o n i t e s and H e l l e n i c L i n e s had b e f o r e them i n 1967. T h i s c a s e , however, a s i t r e l a t e s t o t h e Supreme C o u r t t h a t i s s u e d i t , i s w i t h o u t any d i r e c t i v e from o t h e r c o u r t s , a s i n t h e f e d e r a l system. For t h a t reason w e think i t i s distinguishable. A p p e l l a n t n e x t c i t e s t h e G r i f f i n v . S t a t e Board of E d u c a t i o n (E.D. Va. 1 9 6 9 ) , 296 F.Supp. 1178, c a s e , which i n v o l v e d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e V i r g i n i a t u i t i o n g r a n t l a w s , a d e n i a l of t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e . This deci- s i o n , w e f i n d , supports t h e respondent i n t h i s m a t t e r i n view of t h e f a c t w h i l e t h e r e w a s a change i n t h e d e c i s i o n a l l a w i t was made p r o s p e c t i v e l y and o p e r a t e d t o p r e s e r v e t h e r u l i n g i n 1955 and t h e l a w of t h e c a s e b e i n g a p p l i c a b l e up t h r o u g h 1969. Respondent c i t e s a number of f e d e r a l c a s e s i n s u p p o r t of i t s p o s i t i o n , two of which w e t h i n k a r e of i m p o r t f o r d i s c u s s i o n . T i t l e v . United S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 5 9 ) , 263 F.2d 28, c e r t . d e n i e d 359 U . S . 914, a c a s e where M r . 989, r e h . d e n i e d , 360 U . S . T i t l e whose a p p e a l had been d i s m i s s e d i n 1956 moved t o r e o p e n h i s c a s e i n 1958, and asked t h e c o u r t , a s i n t h i s c a s e , t o invoke Rule 60 a t t h e expense of t h e "law of t h e c a s e " . There t h e c o u r t s a i d : "Appellant recognizes t h a t t h e r e a r e reasons of p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r a s s u r i n g t h e f i n a l i t y of judgments, b u t s u g g e s t s t h a t under r u l e 60 ( b ) ( 5 ) , Fed.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., a s p e c i a l r u l e should be adopted i n d e n a t u r a l i z a t i o n c a s e s r e l a x i n g t h e s t r i c t n e s s of t h e o r d i n a r y r u l e . I n support of t h i s , a p p e l l a n t r e f e r s t o t h e language of t h e d i s s e n t i n g J u s t i c e s i n Ackermann v . United S t a t e s , 1950, 340 U . S . 193, 202, 7 1 S . C t . 209, 95 L.Ed. 270. W e a r e , of c o u r s e , bound by t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i n Ackermann, j u s t a s we a r e i n Zucca. Rule 6 0 ( b ) was n o t i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e r e l i e f f o r e r r o r on t h e p a r t of t h e c o u r t o r t o a f f o r d a subs t i t u t e f o r appeal. [ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] Nor i s a change i n t h e j u d i c i a l view of a p p l i c a b l e law a f t e r a f i n a l judgment s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r vac a t i n g such judgment e n t e r e d b e f o r e announcement of t h e change. [ C i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d . ] " 263 F.2d a t 31. T h i s N i n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t of Appeals c a s e c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e s t h a t post-judgment change i n d e c i s i o n a l l a w a f f o r d s no avenue f o r r e o p e n i n g judgments. I t i s a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e "law of t h e c a s e " d o c t r i n e which i s t h e law i n Montana. The second c a s e w e c o n s i d e r t h a t r e s p o n d e n t c i t e d i s Lubben v . S e l e c t i v e S e r v i c e System Local Bd. No. 27, Cir. 1 9 7 2 ) , 453 F.2d 645. (1st T h i s c a s e i n v o l v e d a d r a f t e e who had s e c u r e d a permanent i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t i n d u c t i o n . After p r e c e d e n t i a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e i n j u n c t i o n was removed, t h e government moved f o r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e i n j u n c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t provided r e l i e f f o r t h e government, b u t t h e F i r s t C i r c u i t C o u r t of Appeals r e v e r s e d on t h e "law of t h e c a s e " grounds. I n s o h o l d i n g under Rule 60 it noted t h a t i t would n o t a l l o w t h e v a c a t i o n of a judgment g r a n t i n g t h e injunction stating: "TO h o l d o t h e r w i s e would d e s t r o y t h e c e r t a i n t y which a l l o w s c o n t r o v e r s i e s t o be deemed j u d i c i a l l y concluded ... " ' I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t w h i l e 60 ( b ) ( 5) aut h o r i z e d r e l i e f from a judgment on t h e grounds t h a t a p r i o r judgment upon which it i s based h a s been r e v e r s e d o r o t h e r w i s e v a c a t e d , it d o e s n o t a u t h o r i z e r e l i e f from a judgment on t h e ground t h a t t h e law a p p l i e d by t h e c o u r t i n making i t s a d j u d i c a t i o n h a s been s u b s e q u e n t l y o v e r r u l e d o r d e c l a r e d e r r o n e o u s i n a n o t h e r and u n r e l a t e d p r o c e e d i n g . ' 7 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 1160.26[3] a t 3 2 5 . " 453 F.2d a t 650. (Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) These c a s e s show t h a t t h e r e i s ample s u p p o r t i n t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s t h a t t h e y f e e l bound by t h e " l a w of t h e c a s e " and t h a t when a d e c i s i o n a l l a w change o c c u r s , s u b s e q u e n t t o f i n a l judgment i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , t h e "law of t h e c a s e " i s t h a t f i n a l judgment s h o u l d n o t b e a l t e r e d . The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d and t h e appeal i s dismissed. W concur: e 8 Honorable R. D. M c P h i l l i p s , D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy.
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