STATE v BLINZLER

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No. 14631 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1979 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vsBRUCE R. BLINZLER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial ~istrict, Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. i Counsel of Record: For Appellant: James D. Moore, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana . Ted 0 Lympus, County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on briefs: August 2, 1979 Filed: SE[ " 1973 J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court. Mr. A p p e l l a n t w a s c o n v i c t e d on two c o u n t s o f p r a c t i c i n g c h i r o p r a c t i c w i t h o u t a l i c e n s e i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 3712-301, MCA, f o l l o w i n g a j u r y t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , t h e Honorable James M. Salansky presiding. H e was s e n t e n c e d t o pay a f i n e o f $ 2 0 0 on e a c h c o u n t , and h e a p p e a l s from t h a t judgment. Appellant i s a naturopathic physician practicing i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Kenneth L. P i l l e r i n K a l i s p e l l , Montana, h a v i n g come t h e r e from t h e S t a t e o f P e n n s y l v a n i a where he had p r a c t i c e d a s a n a t u r o p a t h i c and c h i r o p r a c t i c p h y s i c i a n f o r a p e r i o d o f some t e n y e a r s . I n 1977 D r . B l i n z l e r became i n t e r e s t e d i n moving t o Montana and s u b m i t t e d a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a Montana c h i r o p r a c t i c l i c e n s e . s t a t e he c o n t a c t e d D r . Ronald R. B e f o r e coming t o t h e Hoye, p r e s i d e n t o f t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Naturopathic P h y s i c i a n s and S t a n l e y Crowe, a B o i s e a t t o r n e y r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e n a t i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n , t o i n q u i r e i n t o t h e l e g a l requirements t o p r a c t i c e i n t h e S t a t e o f Montana. H e was i n f o r m e d t h a t Montana had no r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e l i c e n s i n g r e l a t i n g t o t h e p r a c t i c e of naturopathy. A f t e r c o n f e r r i n g w i t h D r . Hoye and M r . i n I d a h o , a p p e l l a n t and D r . Crowe P i l l e r moved t o K a l i s p e l l where t h e y opened up a n a t u r o p a t h i c c l i n i c . Dr. Hoye a d v i s e d him t h a t upon coming t o K a l i s p e l l he s h o u l d c o n t a c t D r . ~ e r l i n Anderson, a K a l i s p e l l n a t u r o p a t h i c p h y s i c i a n who had p r a c t i c e d i n t h e a r e a some 2 0 y e a r s . On December 20, 1977, i n f o r m a t i o n s w e r e f i l e d a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t , Bruce B l i n z l e r , and h i s a s s o c i a t e c h a r g i n g them w i t h p r a c t i c i n g m e d i c i n e w i t h o u t a l i c e n s e and p r a c t i c i n g c h i r o p r a c t i c w i t h o u t a l i c e n s e , b o t h ~ i s t r i c t o u r t misdeC meanors. Appellant herein was charged with two counts of chiropractic and one count of medicine. He entered pleas of not guilty to these charges. Subsequently, the information was amended on April 4, 1978, when three counts were added against appellant. Again, on July 21, 1978, the information was amended and appellant ended up being charged with a total of seven counts of either practicing medicine or practicing chiropractic without a license. To all of these charges, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial by jury followed. Prior to going to the jury, one count of practicing chiropractic without a license was dismissed. Appellant was acquitted of the four counts of practicing medicine and was found guilty on two counts of practicing chiropractic. From the verdict and judgment, appellant appeals. The issues presented for our consideration are: 1. Whether the statutes under which appellant was prosecuted violate the due process clause and equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution? 2. In the event the statutes are constitutional, was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions? 3. Do the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Montana Constitutions bar the convictions? The first issue before this Court is the question of whether the charges are specific enough to satisfy due process. We first note that the constitutional validity of the definition of "medicine" as set forth in section 37-3I 102r(a), MCA, is not before the Court in this case. Much of appellant's brief concerns the practice of medicine and the statutes controlling the same; however, in this case, appel- l a n t was n o t c o n v i c t e d o f u n l a w f u l l y p r a c t i c i n g m e d i c i n e under t h e s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n . On t h o s e c h a r g e s t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t o f a c q u i t t a l , and t h e r e c a n b e no p r e j u d i c e shown i n t h i s case i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 37-3i 1 0 2 7 a ) , MCA. Appellant, therefore, l a c k s standing t o chal- lenge its constitutionality. A s t h i s Court noted i n S t a t e e x rel. Hauswirth v . Beadle, e t a l . ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 90 Mont. 24, 27, 300 P . 1 9 7 , t h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r moot p o i n t s . There, t h e Court noted : "The q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d i s moot. (See S t a t e e x r e l . Rankin v . M a r t i n , 65 Mont. 323, 211 P . 210; H o n s t a i n v. Board o f County Commissioners, 52 Mont. 391, 158 P . 476; Chesapeake Western Railway v . J a r d i n e , 56 App.D.C. 33, 8 F.2d 794.) T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t p a s s on moot q u e s t i o n s . ( S t a t e e x r e l . OIGrady v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 58 Mont. 695, 198 P . 1117; S t a t e e x r e l . Rankin v . M a r t i n , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . K n i l a n s , 69 Mont. 8 , 220 P . 91; S t a t e e x r e l . S t . George v . J u s t i c e C o u r t , 84 Mont. 1 7 3 , 274 P . 4 9 5 . ) " T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f s e c t i o n 37-31 0 2 ( a ) , MCA, was r e n d e r e d a moot q u e s t i o n by t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t o f a c q u i t t a l o n t h e c o u n t s c h a r g e d u n d e r t h a t section. A p p e l l a n t was c o n v i c t e d o n l y o f t h e u n l a w f u l p r a c - t i c i n g o f c h i r o p r a c t i c , and t h e r e f o r e o n l y t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h a t s t a t u t e i s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e t h e Court, viz. , s e c t i o n 37-12-101 ( 2 ) , MCA, d e f i n i n g t h e p r a c t i c e o f chiropractic. W e a r e f a c e d , t h e r e f o r e , w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether s e c t i o n 37-12-101(2), MCA, i s s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i f i c and d e t a i l e d t o s a t i s f y t h e requirements of due process. s e c t i o n (2) of t h i s s t a t u t e reads: " ' C h i r o p r a c t i c ' i s a system of s p e c i f i c a d j u s t ment o r m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n s and t i s s u e s o f t h e body, p a r t i c u l a r l y o f t h e s p i n a l column, f o r c o r r e c t i o n o f n e r v e i n t e r f e r e n c e and i n c l u d e s t h e u s e o f r e c o g n i z e d d i a g n o s t i c and t r e a t m e n t methods a s t a u g h t i n c h i r o p r a c t i c colleges b u t does n o t include surgery o r t h e p r e s c r i p t i o n o r u s e of drugs." Sub- To summarize t h e argument o f a p p e l l a n t , h e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e p r a c t i c e of c h i r o p r a c t i c contains an i n d e f i n i t e term--"specific pulation"--which a d j u s t m e n t o r mani- is susceptible t o differing interpretation by e x p e r t s i n t h e f i e l d o f c h i r o p r a c t i c . H e further argues t h a t t h e p u b l i c cannot be expected t o p r o v i d e t h e c o n t e n t f o r t h i s t e r m when e x p e r t s a r e u n a b l e t o a g r e e a s t o i t s meaning, and t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i s t h e r e f o r e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague. Noting t h e d e f i n i t i o n of c h i r o p r a c t i c , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t nowhere a r e t h e t e r m s " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t m e n t " o r " a r t i c u l a t i o n s and t i s s u e s " d e f i n e d . Therefore, he says, t h e s t a t u t e h a s a n i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s t a n d a r d t o t h e members o f t h e p u b l i c and p l a c e s a heavy burden upon a d e f e n d a n t . With r e g a r d t o t h e heavy b u r d e n p l a c e d on a d e f e n d a n t , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s no a s c e r t a i n a b l e s t a n d a r d o f c o n d u c t a g a i n s t which h e m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y have measured h i s conduct a s a naturopath, noting: ". . . There must be a s c e r t a i n a b l e s t a n d a r d s of g u i l t . Men o f common i n t e l l i g e n c e c a n n o t b e r e q u i r e d t o g u e s s a t t h e meaning o f t h e e n a c t ment. The v a g u e n e s s may b e from u n c e r t a i n t y i n regard t o persons within t h e scope of t h e a c t , L a n z e t t a v . N e w J e r s e y , 306 U.S. 451, o r i n reg a r d t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e tests t o a s c e r t a i n g u i l t . " W i n t e r s v . N e w York ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 333 U.S. 507, 515516, 68 S . C t . 665, 92 L.Ed. 840. I n W i n t e r s t h e Supreme C o u r t went on t o n o t e : "'Where t h e s t a t u t e u s e s words o f no d e t e r m i n a t i v e meaning, o r t h e l a n g u a g e i s s o g e n e r a l and i n d e f i n i t e as t o embrace n o t o n l y a c t s commonly recognized a s reprehensible, b u t a l s o o t h e r s which i t i s u n r e a s o n a b l e t o presume w e r e i n t e n d e d t o b e made c r i m i n a l , i t w i l l be d e c l a r e d v o i d f o r uncertainty.'" 333 U.S. a t 516, q u o t i n g S t a t e v . Diamond ( 1 9 2 1 ) , 27 N.M. 477, 485, 202 P . 988, 991. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t , b a s e d o n W i n t e r s , when a s t a t u t e i s s o vague a s t o make c r i m i n a l a n i n n o c e n t a c t t h e c o n v i c - ; t i o n cannot be s u s t a i n e d . H. .. 1 C l a c k Co. v . P u b l i c S e r v i c e &. i Commission ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 94 Mont. 488, 22 P.2d 1056. At trial, w i t n e s s e s Bekkedahl, Vernon, G o r d e r , and S t r u n k t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e n a t u r e and t h e e x t e n t o f a p p e l l a n t ' s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e i r respective conditions. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e S t a t e pro- duced t h e e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y o f D r . Loren W e i s and D r . W a l t e r Kaye, b o t h l i c e n s e d c h i r o p r a c t o r s i n t h e S t a t e o f Montana, who i d e n t i f i e d t h e movements p r a c t i c e d o n Vernon and Gorder a s s p e c i f i c adjustments. Dr. Weis i n a d d i t i o n d e s c r i b e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s p e c i f i c c h i r o p r a c t i c a d j u s t m e n t s and nerve interference. The e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d by a p p e l l a n t c o n f l i c t e d w i t h t h e S t a t e ' s evidence on t h e i s s u e of s p e c i f i c i t y . Dr. Hoye, a n a t u r o p a t h , t e s t i f i e d t h a t m a n i p u l a t i o n s done by a n a t u r o p a t h i n h i s p r a c t i c e d i f f e r from c h i r o p r a c t i c a d j u s t m e n t s i n t h a t naturopathic manipulations lack s p e c i f i c i t y . Appellant t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n s done on Vernon and Gorder w e r e general r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c . On t h e b a s i s o f t h e c o n f l i c t i n g evidence presented t o t h e jury, t h e j u r y found appellant g u i l t y of practicing chiropractic without a license. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n C o n n a l l y v . G e n e r a l C o n s t r u c t i o n Company ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 269 U.S. 1 2 6 , 7 0 L.Ed. 385, 391-92, 46 S . C t . 322, n o t e d : "The q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r g i v e n l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t ments have been t h u s w a n t i n g i n c e r t a i n t y h a s f r e q u e n t l y been b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t . I n some o f t h e c a s e s t h e s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d were u p h e l d ; i n others, declared invalid. The p r e c i s e p o i n t o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n some i n s t a n c e s i s n o t e a s y o f statement. B u t i t w i l l be enough f o r t h e p r e s e n t purposes t o say g e n e r a l l y t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e c o u r t upholding t h e s t a t u t e a s s u f f i c i e n t l y c e r t a i n , r e s t e d upon t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e y employed words o r p h r a s e s h a v i n g a t e c h n i c a l o r o t h e r s p e c i a l meaning, w e l l enough known t o ena b l e those within t h e i r reach t o correctly apply them, Hygrade P r o v i s i o n Co. v . Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502; Omaechevarria v . I d a h o , 246 U.S. 343, 348, o r a w e l l - s e t t l e d common law meaning, n o t withstanding an element of degree i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n a s t o which e s t i m a t e s m i g h t d i f f e r , Nash v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 299 U.S. 373, 376; I n t e r n a t i o n a l H a r v e s t e r Co. v . Kentucky, s u p r a , a t 223, o r , a s b r o a d l y s t a t e d by M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e White i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92, ' t h a t , f o r r e a s o n s found t o r e s u l t e i t h e r from t h e t e x t of t h e s t a t u t e s involved o r t h e s u b j e c t s w i t h which t h e y d e a l t , a s t a n d a r d o f some s o r t was afforded.' . . ." W e find t h a t t h i s case f a l l s within the f i r s t c l a s s i d e n t i f i e d i n Connally, supra. The t e r m " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t - ment o r m a n i p u l a t i o n " i s a s c i e n t i f i c t e r m h a v i n g a r e a d i l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e d e f i n i t i o n w i t h i n t h e c h i r o p r a c t i c community, and a p p e l l a n t h e r e i n , a s a c h i r o p r a c t o r l i c e n s e d i n two s t a t e s , c a n n o t a s s e r t a l a c k o f n o t i c e o f t h e meaning o f t h e terms. Viewing t h e s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n , i n l i g h t o f t h e cond u c t o f which a p p e l l a n t was c o n v i c t e d , most c e r t a i n l y a p p e l l a n t was g i v e n a d e q u a t e n o t i c e o f t h e k i n d of c o n d u c t t h a t the s t a t u t e proscribes. Although no p a r t i c u l a r m e n t a l s t a t e i s i d e n t i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 37-12-301, MCA, t h e Montana C r i m i n a l Code c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e o f c h i r o p r a c t i c b e done knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y t o c o n s t i t u t e a n offense. S e c t i o n 45-2-103(1), MCA. The t r i a l c o u r t i n - s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n t h e t e r m s i m i l a r t o t h e Idaho s t a t u t e r e l i e d upon i n Omaechevarria v . I d a h o ( 1 9 1 8 ) , 246 U.S. 343, .3 38 S.Ct. 322, 62 L.Ed. 763, t h a t t h e a c t and i n t e n t must b o t h b e p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t o s a t i s f y a c o n v i c tion. Here, t h e t e s t i m o n y o f two S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s , D r . W e i s and D r . Kaye, g a v e a d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e t e r m " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t m e n t " upon which t h e j u r y c o u l d make a p r o p e r d e c i s i o n o f what " s p e c i f i c a d j u s t m e n t " was, which was "when a p e r s o n i s p r e s e n t e d w i t h a l o c a l i z e d c o n d i t i o n i n v o l v i n g o n e o r two o r t h r e e v e r t e b r a e a n d i n t e n t i o n a l l y b r i n g s a b o u t a movement of these vertebrae to relieve that condition, he or she has performed a specific adjustment." The key to the query here is whether the statute in question provides a standard with meaningful differentiation between culpable and innocent conduct. 301, MCA, such a standard exists: Under section 37-12- there can be no statutory violation unless the adjustment in question is shown to be specific and intentional. It is manifest in this case that "specificity" provides a meaningful standard. In fact, a lack of specificity resulted in the dismissal of one count in this case. The United States Supreme Court in Roth v. united States (19571, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, where they quoted from United States v. Petrillo (1947), 332 U.S. 1, 7-8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877, had this to say: ". . . lack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. ' [Tlhe Constitution does not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the prescribed conduct when measured by the common understanding and practices. .' .'That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which the particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense . . . f 11 .. ... . Here appellant was a chiropractor by profession and training. Since he was unlicensed in Montana, and during the time the offense was committed had an application in to be licensed in Montana as a chiropractor, the law placed the responsibility on him to assure that his practice of naturopathy be performed with no chiropractic movements. The fact that the law required appellant to make a choice, and extracted a penalty when his judgment proved incorrect, does not invalidate the statute. As noted in the United States Supreme Court case of Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman (1925), 266 U.S. 497, 502, 45 S.Ct. 141, 69 L.Ed. 402: "If exceptional cases may sometimes arise where opinions might differ, that is no more than is likely to occur, and does occur, in respect to many criminal statutes either upheld against attack or never assailed as indefinite." Here, appellant chose to perform a manipulation which the jury found to be specific and therefore prohibited to all except licensed chiropractors. The next issue raised is whether the record reflects substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Appel- lant argues that there is no evidence establishing that the treatment of Vernon and Gorder involved specific adjustment or that the treatments were for the purpose of relieving nerve interference. A review of the record discloses that this contention is without merit. A brief review of the facts show that Vernon testified that she went to appellant's office complaining of a "rib out." She stated that appellant told her he could put it in place. According to her testimony, appellant then placed his knee on the place indicated by her and pulled her arms back, causing pain. Gorder testified to a treatment of his lower back. He testified that he told appellant he had lower back problems. He was placed lying on his stomach, and appellant told him one of his vertebrae was lower than the other in the lower back. Appellant then pushed down on his back and it sounded like "bones moving." While appellant argues that there is no expert testimony to establish that these were specific adjustments, Dr. weis t e s t i f i e d t h a t p l a c i n g a knee and p u l l i n g back on t h e s h o u l d e r s was " p r e t t y s p e c i f i c . " "When you have y o u r k n e e i n o n e p a r t i c u l a r s p o t , l i k e a g a i n s t a r i b , o r where t h e r i b j o i n s t h e v e r t e b r a , you have a p a r t i c u l a r s p o t . " This Court has o f t e n s t a t e d t h a t a jury v e r d i c t based on s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e w i l l be s u s t a i n e d on a p p e a l . See, S t a t e v . Pankow ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 134 Mont. 519, 522, 333 P.2d 1017. S u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d h e r e from which t h e j u r y c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r e a t m e n t o f Vernon a n d Gorder involved s p e c i f i c adjustments f o r r e l i e f of nerve i n t e r ference. T h e r e f o r e , t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and judgment w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d . A p p e l l a n t n e x t a l l e g e s t h a t he was s u b j e c t e d t o d o u b l e j e o p a r d y by t h e c h a r g e s o f t h e S t a t e . H e argues t h a t the f a i l u r e o f t h e S t a t e t o e l e c t between C o u n t s I and 11, which c h a r g e d p r a c t i c e o f c h i r o p r a c t i c on Bekkedahl, J u l i a Vernon, and L e e G o r d e r , and C o u n t s I V t h r o u g h V I , c h a r g i n g t h e p r a c t i c e o f m e d i c i n e o n t h e same p a t i e n t s f o r t h e same c o n d u c t , s u b j e c t e d him t o d o u b l e j e o p a r d y . H e argues t h a t u n d e r t h e r e c e n t case o f S t a t e e x r e l . McKenzie v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 54, 525 P.2d 1211, t h i s C o u r t a d o p t e d a s o - c a l l e d "same t r a n s a c t i o n " t e s t and abandoned t h e t r a d i t i o n a l "same f a c t s " r u l e . Since t h e counts c l e a r l y arose from t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n , i t i s a r g u e d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e by t h e S t a t e t o e l e c t between p r a c t i c i n g m e d i c i n e and p r a c t i c i n g c h i r o p r a t i c subjected a p p e l l a n t t o double jeopardy. We find no m e r i t t o t h i s argument. The F i f t h Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t no p e r s o n " s h a l l b e s u b j e c t f o r t h e same o f f e n s e t o be t w i c e p u t i n jeopardy of l i f e o r limb." his p r o h i b i t i o n i s a p p l i c a b l e t o s t a t e a c t i o n s u n d e r t h e "due p r o c e s s " c l a u s e o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment o f t h e U n i t e d *.- States Constitution. U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. ' N o r t h C a r o l i n a v . P k r c e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656. It protects of- f e n d e r s from m u l t i p l e punishment f o r t h e same o f f e n s e . P a r t e Lange ( 1 8 7 3 ) , 85 U.S. (18 W a l l ) 1 6 3 , 2 1 L.Ed. Ex 872, and Kohlfus-2v. Warden ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 9 Conn. 692, 1 8 3 A.2d 626. Montana's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r p r o v i d i n g t h a t "no person s h a l l be a g a i n p u t i n jeopardy f o r t h e same o f f e n s e .. .I' 1972 Ilont. C o n s t . , A r t . 11, S25. I n a r e c e n t c a s e , S t a t e v . Davis (1978), , 577 P.2d 375, 377, 35 St.Rep. Mont. 381, t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e i s s u e r a i s e d h e r e and h e l d : "This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y quoted with approval t h e f o l l o w i n g h o l d i n g from t h e M a s s a c h u s e t t s c a s e o f Morey v . Commonwealth ( 1 8 7 1 ) , 108 Mass. 433, 434: ... A s i n g l e a c t may be a n o f f e n s e a g a i n s t two s t a t u t e s ; and i f e a c h s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s p r o o f o f a n a d d i t i o n a l f a c t which t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t , a n a c q u i t t a l o r c o n v i c t i o n under e i t h e r s t a t u t e d o e s n o t exempt t h e d e f e n d a n t from p r o s e c u t i o n and punishment u n d e r t h e o t h e r . ' I' 1 " S t a t e v . Marchindo ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 65 Mont. 431, 446, 211 P. 1093; S t a t e v. L a g e r q u i s t ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 21, 30, 445 P.2d 910; S t a t e v . McDonald ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 158 Mont. 307, 310, 491 P.2d 711. See a l s o B l o c k b u r g e r v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 1 8 0 , 76 L.Ed. 306; Gore v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 386, 78 S.Ct. 1 2 8 0 , 2 L e d 2d 1405." Here, t h e s t a t u t e s s e t f o r t h s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t criminal o f f e n s e s t h a t a r e designed f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of completely d i f f e r e n t offenses. Therefore, a p p e l l a n t suf- f e r e d no v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t s u n d e r e i t h e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n o r t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . The p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t d o u b l e j e o p a r d y i s a l s o s t a t u t o r y i n Montana. S e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, provides: "When t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e comm i s s i o n o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e , a p e r s o n c h a r g e d w i t h s u c h c o n d u c t may b e p r o s e c u t e d f o r e a c h s u c h o f f e n s e . H e may n o t , however, b e c o n v i c t e d o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e i f : " (1) o n e o f f e n s e i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e o t h e r ; " Under this statute appellant suffered no violation unless he was convicted of two offenses, one of which is included in the other. The mere charging of included of- fenses involves no violation of appellant's rights, nor are his rights infringed upon if the State fails to elect or charge in the alternative as long as a defendant is not convicted of both offenses. Here, appellant was convicted of two counts of practicing chiropractic without a license involving the treatment of two different patients on different occasions. These convictions are not subject to, nor do they violate, the double jeopardy provision. We note in closing that appellant argues that the State no longer follows "the same facts" rule but has now adopted the so-called "same transaction" test. ment erroneous. - Mont. , We find this argu- In the recent case of State v. Perry (1979), .. 590 P.2d 1199, 36 St.Rep. 291, this Court applied Montana's statutory same facts rule, section 46-11501(2)(a), MCA. Perry involved an issue similar to the one raised in State ex rel. McKenzie v. District Court, supra, which is fully consistent with the holding in Perry. We noted in McKenzie: "The joinder provisions of section 951504, R.C.M. 1947 [now section 46-11-404, MCA], are highly flexible. Part (a) therefore permits an information to charge two or more different offenses, connected together in their commission. . ." McKenzie, 165 Mont. at 62. Appellant argues that the offenses arising from the same transaction generally must be prosecuted together to avoid double jeopardy. However, where, as here, the State prosecutes "the same transaction" offenses together, double jeopardy is implicated under section 46-11-502, MCA, only if a defendant is convicted of two offenses, one of which is included in the other. Here, appellant suffered no such dual convictions, and his double jeopardy claim is therefore without merit. Finding no prejudicial error, the convictions are affirmed. We concur: 2L-Q % J. Chief Justice %&,&/ Justices a d 4

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