NOTT v BOOKE HEIDEMA
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No. 14665 I THE S P ! M CC W OF THE STATE O P J D ~ N U FE E O F 1979 P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants, GLEN BOOKE and VICKY BOOKE, husband and wife, and JACK D. HEIDEMA and JOHN A. HEIDENA, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal f m : D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Fillner and P i t e t , Billings, Wntana For Wspondents: Reno and Dolve, Billings, W n t a w Swandal, Douglass & Swandal, Livingston, mntana S u h i t t e d on briefs: Decided: June 7, 1979 AUG 2 0 1979 Filed: Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a motion for summary judgment entered in favor of respondents Jack and John Heidema and Glen and Vicky Booke in the District Court of the Thirteen Judicial District. The granting of the motion in effect dismissed a complaint brought by the appellants, Lyle and Odeal Nott, seeking to quiet title to a disputed portion of land by a claim of adverse possession. Appellants and respondents are adjacent landowners in Carbon County, Montana, their land adjoining at appellants' southern and respondents' northern boundaries. In 1942, appellants purchased their property, which is described according to their deed as: The North Half of the Southwest Quarter (N1/2SW1/4), the Southwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter (SW1/4SW1/4) , Lot 9 and the North 19 feet of Lots 10 and 11, all located in Section Four, Township Six South, Range 23 East, M.P.M. Respondents Bookes purchased their land in 1976 from respondents Heidemas. Genevieve Shupak. The land was originally owned by John and The legal description of the property is described as: Tract A of Certificate of Survey No. 885, situated in Lots 10 and 11, Section 4 and Lot 2, Section 9, Township 6 South, Range 23 East, M.P.M. The strip of land which is the center of dispute is located between appellants' and respondents' property. It is a triangular portion of land, approximately 1950 feet in length, 68 feet in width on the east end, 38 feet in width on the west end, and slightly over two acres in total area. It is also enclosed by a boundary line fence which was constructed by appellants in 1946. Appellants claim t i t l e t o t h e s t r i p of land under a d e e d e x e c u t e d i n 1946 t o L y l e B. N o t t and h i s t h e n s p o u s e , ~ o s i a Nett, from t h e r e s p o n d e n t s ' p r e d e c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t , J o h n and Genevieve Shupak. T h a t d e e d was t h e c u l m i n a t i o n o f a n a g r e e m e n t s e t t l i n g a boundary l i n e d i s p u t e between t h o s e parties. I n 1946 t h e N o t t s employed W i l l i a m Burke t o c o n d u c t a s u r v e y o f t h e boundary l i n e between t h e i r p r o p e r t y and t h e S h u p a k s ' , whereupon a f e n c e was c o n s t r u c t e d by t h e N o t t s a l o n g t h e l i n e a s l a i d o u t by Burke. After the construction o f t h e f e n c e , however, t h e Shupaks d i s a g r e e d a s t o t h e c o r r e c t p l a c e m e n t o f t h e f e n c e and boundary l i n e . This, i n t u r n , l e d t o t h e l a n d b e i n g r e s u r v e y e d by Burke, who d i s c o v e r e d a n e r r o r i n h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s and d e t e r m i n e d t h e p r o p e r boundary l i n e t o b e 1 9 f e e t n o r t h o f t h e f e n c e . To s e t t l e t h e d i s p u t e , t h e Shupaks e x e c u t e d a d e e d f o r good c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e N o t t s conveying t h e n o r t h 19 f e e t of L o t s 1 0 a n d 11. The p a r t i e s t h e r e a f t e r o c c u p i e d t h e i r l a n d s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e boundary f e n c e . During t h i s t i m e , t h e N o t t s c u l t i v a t e d t h e l a n d , c o n s t r u c t e d f e n c e s and c o r r a l s f o r l i v e s t o c k and b u i l t a c o n c r e t e i r r i g a t i o n f l u m e n e x t t o t h e f e n c e a n d upon t h e a r e a o f l a n d which i s t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s dispute. A p p e l l a n t s w e r e a l s o a s s e s s e d a n d have p a i d t a x e s upon t h e i r l a n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e d e s c r i p t i o n on t h e d e e d s i n c e 1946. Respondents Bookes p u r c h a s e d t h e i r l a n d from r e s p o n d e n t s Heidemas i n 1976. To comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e S u b d i v i s i o n and P l a t t i n g A c t , a c e r t i f i c a t e o f s u r v e y was made a f t e r t h e p u r c h a s e . T h i s s u r v e y , which was con- d u c t e d i n 1977, c r e a t e d a f u r t h e r d i s c r e p a n c y between t h e boundary f e n c e and B u r k e ' s second s u r v e y , g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e p r e s e n t l y d i s p u t e d p o r t i o n of l a n d . On J u l y 6, 1977, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t s Bookes t o q u i e t t i t l e t o t h e d i s p u t e d p o r t i o n o f l a n d , p r o c e e d i n g on t h e t h e o r y o f a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n . An amended c o m p l a i n t f i l e d on August 1 6 , 1978, added r e s p o n d e n t s Heidemas, t h e r e c o r d owners o f t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e r t y . A l l p a r t i e s t o t h e l a w s u i t t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d and r e q u e s t e d motions f o r summary judgment. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d r e s p o n d e n t s Bookes' motion on August 30, 1978, and r e s p o n d e n t s Heidemas' motion on J a n u a r y 9 , 1979. From t h e s e o r d e r s t h e Notts appeal. The f i r s t a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r w e s h a l l c o n s i d e r i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g r e s p o n d e n t s ' m o t i o n s f o r summary judgment. Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s t h a t summary judgment s h a l l be g r a n t e d i f : ". . . t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a f f i d a v i t s , i f a n y , show t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t [ t h e moving] p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o judgment a s a m a t t e r of l a w . . ." I n c o n s t r u i n g t h e above r u l e , w e have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment h a s t h e burden o f showing t h e complete a b s e n c e of any g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o a l l f a c t s which a r e deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of t h o s e s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r of l a w . W have a l s o h e l d t h a t t h i s i s a s t r i c t s t a n d a r d e and t h a t , i f t h e r e i s any d o u b t a s t o t h e p r o p r i e t y of t h e motion f o r summary judgment, C l a r k ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. i t s h o u l d be d e n i e d . F u l t o n v. 399, 403, 538 P.2d 1371, 1373; H a r l a n d v . Anderson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 447, 450, 548 P.2d 613, 615; Cheyenne Western Bank v. Young ( 1 9 7 8 ) , , 587 P.2d 401, 404, 35 St.Rep. 1806, 1809. Mont . Our function in this appeal, then, is to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment, Appellants argue that the District Court erred because they have acquired title to the disputed strip of land by satisfying all of the elements of adverse possession. Included in these elements is the statutory requirement that an adverse claimaint pay all municipal, county and state taxes upon land he occupies and wishes to claim for a continuous period of five years. Section 70-19-411, MCA, provides: "In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied for a period of 5 years continuously and the party or persons, their predecessors, and grantors have during such period paid all the taxes, state, county, or municipal, which have legally been levied and assessed upon such land." While respondents admit that appellants have paid taxes according to their deed description, they argue that such payment does not satisfy the requirements of section 70-19411, MCA. Their primary contention is that the payment of taxes upon the north 19 feet of Lots 10 and 11 is not equivalent to the payment of taxes upon a portion of land which is approximately 1950 feet in length, 68 feet in width on the east end, 38 feet in width on the west end, and slightly over two acres in total area. Therefore, because they argue that appellants have not satisfied - of the elements of all adverse possession, the motion for summary judgment was properly granted as a matter of law. This Court has had prior occasion to consider what kind of payment will suffice to meet the requirements of section 70-19-411, MCA. We have held that, where the evidence shows t h a t t a x e s have been p a i d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e l a n d d e s c r i p t i o n i n t h e deed which d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h e s t r i p of prope r t y i n d i s p u t e , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n agreement e x t e n d i n g t h e boundary t o i n c l u d e t h i s s t r i p , s u c h payment d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e payment o f t h e t a x e s on t h e d i s p u t e d s t r i p . Townsend v . Koukol ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 1, 8-9, 536; S t e p h e n s v. Hurly ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 546, 551, 34 St.Rep. 243, 249. 416 P.2d 532, Mont. , 563 P.2d However, where a boundary l i n e h a s been a g r e e d upon o r f i x e d b e c a u s e of t h e uncert a i n t y o f t h e p a r t i e s a s t o t h e t r u e boundary and t h e deed d e s c r i p t i o n d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h e d i s p u t e d l a n d , t h e payment o f t a x e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e deed d e s c r i p t i o n d o e s c o n s t i t u t e a payment upon such l a n d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f s a t i s f y i n g t h e statute. Townsend v . Koukol, 148 Mont. a t 8, 416 P.2d a t 536. The q u e s t i o n o f f a c t which i s most c r u c i a l t o a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e i s s u e f a c i n g t h i s C o u r t , t h e n , i s whether a n agreement e x i s t e d between a p p e l l a n t s and r e s p o n d e n t s , o r t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t , t h a t t h e d i s p u t e d s t r i p of l a n d l a y w i t h i n a n a g r e e d upon o r f i x e d boundary. A p p e l l a n t s have f i l e d two p l e a d i n g s which a l l e g e t h a t t h e "boundary l i n e d i s p u t e was s e t t l e d between . . . Nott and Shupak by a n agreement b e i n g r e a c h e d a s t o t h e c o r r e c t placement o f t h e boundary l i n e on t h e f e n c e l i n e a s cons t r u c t e d by [ N o t t ] . . ." Moreover, t h e y have f i l e d t h e d e p o s i t i o n o f L y l e N o t t i n which he answers t h e f o l l o w i n g questions: "Q. So sometime, t h e n , a f t e r you b o u g h t , I unders t a n d t h e r e became a d i s p u t e between you and t h e Shupaks r e g a r d i n g t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e two adThat's right. j o i n i n g p i e c e s of l a n d ? A. "Q. A s a r e s u l t o f t h a t s u r v e y , t h e n , you and t h e Shupak's [sic] then s e t t l e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n on t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f y o u r p r o p e r t y ? A . W e did. "Q. And h e d e e d e d t o you, t o s e t t l e t h a t d i s p u t e , h e d e e d e d t o you t h e n o r t h 1 9 f e e t of L o t s 1 0 and 1 i n S e c t i o n 4 ? A. 1 That's right." R e s p o n d e n t s , i n t u r n , have l e f t t h e above a l l e g a t i o n s u n c o n t r o v e r t e d i n t h e i r b r i e f s and have a l s o a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e disputed s t r i p i s "enclosed within a c o n s t r u c t e d by t h e [ N o t t s ] . . . fence o r i g i n a l l y ." I n view of t h i s testimony, w e f i n d t h a t t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s and a d m i s s i o n s p l a c e i n c o n t r o v e r s y a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t , namely w h e t h e r a n a g r e e m e n t e x i s t e d between t h e N o t t s and Shupaks t h a t e x t e n d e d t h e boundary l i n e between t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s t o i n c l u d e t h e d i s p u t e d p o r t i o n of land. T h i s q u e s t i o n may u l t i m a t e l y b e d e t e r m i n a t i v e of the r e s u l t i n the case. A c c o r d i n g l y , w e f i n d t h a t i t was e r r o r f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o g r a n t r e s p o n d e n t s ' m o t i o n s f o r summary judgment, and w e remand t h i s c a u s e t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e m a t t e r . W e concur: Chief J u s t i c e Justices I I
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